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Ex-Intel security expert: This new Spectre attack can even reveal firmware secrets
Yuriy Bulygin, the former head of Intel's advanced threat team, has published research showing that the Spectre CPU flaws can be used to break into the highly privileged CPU mode on Intel x86 systems known as System Management Mode (SMM). Bulygin, who has launched security firm Eclypsium, has modified Spectre variant 1 with kernel privileges to attack a host system's firmware and expose code in SMM, a secure portion of BIOS or UEFI firmware. SMM resides in SMRAM, a protected region of physical memory that should only be accessible by BIOS firmware and not the operating system kernel, hypervisors or security software. "Because SMM generally has privileged access to physical memory, including memory isolated from operating systems, our research demonstrates that Spectre-based attacks can reveal other secrets in memory (eg, hypervisor, operating system, or application)," Bulygin explains. To expose code in SMM, Bulygin modified a publicly available proof-of-concept Spectre 1 exploit running with kernel-level privileges to bypass Intel's System Management Range Register (SMRR), a set or range registers that protect SMM memory. "These enhanced Spectre attacks allow an unprivileged attacker to read the contents of memory, including memory that should be protected by the range registers, such as SMM memory," he notes. "This can expose SMM code and data that was intended to be confidential, revealing other SMM vulnerabilities as well as secrets stored in SMM. Additionally, since we demonstrate that the speculative memory access occurs from the context of SMM, this could be used to reveal other secrets in memory as well."
zdnet, 18.05.2018
itsicherheit_cpu_meltdown_spectre  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  itsicherheit_hardware  itsicherheit_seitenkanalanalyse  tech_hw_chip_cpu_smm_smi  tech_hw_chip_intel_smram_smrr  itsicherheit_verdeckterkanal_data_exfil  itsicherheit_firmware_bios  unternehmen_intel 
12 hours ago by kraven
Efail or OpenPGP is safer than S/MIME
Some may have noticed that the EFF has warnings [NB:] about the use of PGP out which I consider pretty overblown. The GnuPG team was not contacted by the researchers but I got access to version of the paper [NB:] related to KMail. It seems to be the complete paper with just the names of the other MUAs redacted. Here is a response I wrote on the weekend to a reporter who inquired on this problem: The topic of that paper is that HTML is used as a back channel to create an oracle for modified encrypted mails. It is long known that HTML mails and in particular external links like <img href=""/> are evil if the MUA actually honors them (which many meanwhile seem to do again; see all these newsletters). Due to broken MIME parsers a bunch of MUAs seem to concatenate decrypted HTML mime parts which makes it easy to plant such HTML snippets. There are two ways to mitigate this attack: - Don't use HTML mails. Or if you really need to read them use a proper MIME parser and disallow any access to external links, - Use authenticated encryption. The latter is actually easy for OpenPGP because we started to use authenticated encryption (AE) since 2000 or 2001. Our AE is called MDC (Modification detection code) and was back then introduced for a very similar attack [NB: Massive Fail der gesamten in- und ausländischen Presse & inkl. EFF].
gnupg-users mailinglist, 14.05.2018
krypto_openpgp  software_krypto_gnupg  ngo_eff  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  uni_de_fh_münster  software_mua_tb_enigmail  software_mua_html_mail  krypto_smime  itsicherheit_implementierung  itsicherheit_verdeckterkanal_data_exfil  itsicherheit_strategie  internet_protokoll_mime  krypto_openpgp_mdc  uni_nl_ku_leuven  uni_de_bochum 
6 days ago by kraven
Super-GAU für Intel: Weitere Spectre-Lücken im Anflug
Ganze acht neue Sicherheitslücken in Intel-CPUs haben mehrere Forscher-Teams dem Hersteller bereits gemeldet, die aktuell noch geheimgehalten werden. Alle acht sind im Kern auf dasselbe Design-Problem zurückzuführen, das der Abschnitt "Meltdown und Spectre für Dummies" näher erläutert – sie sind sozusagen Spectre Next Generation. Jede der acht Lücken hat eine eigene Nummer im Verzeichnis aller Sicherheitslücken bekommen (Common Vulnerability Enumerator, CVE) und jede erfordert eigene Patches – wahrscheinlich bekommen sie auch alle eigene Namen. Konkrete Informationen liegen uns bisher nur zu Intels Prozessoren und deren Patch-Plänen vor. Es gibt jedoch erste Hinweise, dass zumindest einzelne ARM-CPUs ebenfalls anfällig sind. Vier der Spectre-NG-Sicherheitslücken stuft Intel selbst mit einem "hohen Risiko" ein; die Gefahr der anderen vier ist lediglich als mittel bewertet. Eine der Spectre-NG-Lücken vereinfacht Angriffe über Systemgrenzen hinweg so stark, dass wir das Bedrohungspotential deutlich höher einschätzen als bei Spectre. Konkret könnte ein Angreifer seinen Exploit-Code in einer virtuellen Maschine (VM) starten und von dort aus das Wirts-System attackieren – also etwa den Server eines Cloud-Hosters. Oder er greift die auf dem gleichen Server laufenden VMs anderer Kunden an.
ct, 03.05.2018
itsicherheit_cpu_meltdown_spectre  itsicherheit_seitenkanalanalyse  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  itsicherheit_hardware  itsicherheit_implementierung  tech_hw_chip_cpu  tech_hw_chip_cpu_cache  unternehmen_amd  unternehmen_intel  unternehmen_allg_desinformation_propaganda  itsicherheit_by_obscurity  itsicherheit_virtualisierung 
17 days ago by kraven
As predicted, more branch prediction processor attacks are discovered
Researchers from the College of William and Mary, Carnegie Mellon, the University of California Riverside, and Binghamton University have described a security attack that uses the speculative execution features of modern processors to leak sensitive information and undermine the security boundaries that operating systems and software erect to protect important data. The new attack, named BranchScope by the researchers, shares some similarity with variant 2 of the Spectre attack, as both BranchScope and Spectre 2 take advantage of the behavior of the processor's branch predictor. BranchScope and Spectre 2 both take advantage of different parts of the branch predictor. Spectre 2 relied on a part called the Branch Target Buffer (BTB)—the data structure within the processor that records the branch target. BranchScope, instead, leaks information using the direction of the prediction—whether it's likely to be taken or not—which is stored in the pattern history table (PHT). The researchers looked only at Intel processors, using the attacks to leak information protected using Intel's SGX (Software Guard Extensions), a feature found on certain chips to carve out small sections of encrypted code and data such that even the operating system (or virtualization software) cannot access it. They also described ways the attack could be used against address space layout randomization and to infer data in encryption and image libraries. Spectre 2 has provoked both operating system and hardware changes, with more hardware fixes planned. The researchers suggest that a similar combination of solutions would be needed for BranchScope; some software can be modified to eliminate branches, and hardware could be altered to partition the speculative execution data structures on the processor so that one process could not attack another.
ars technica, 26.03.2018
itsicherheit_cpu_branchscope  tech_hw_chip_intel_sgx  tech_hw_chip_cpu  itsicherheit_seitenkanalanalyse  uni_allg_diverse  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw 
7 weeks ago by kraven
A Security Issue in Intel’s Active Management Technology (AMT)
In July 2017 Harry Sintonen, one of F-Secure’s Senior Security Consultants, discovered unsafe and misleading default behaviour within Intel’s Active Management Technology (AMT). “The attack is almost deceptively simple to enact, but it has incredible destructive potential. In practice, it can give a local attacker complete control over an individual’s work laptop, despite even the most extensive security measures,” Sintonen says. The issue allows a local intruder to backdoor almost any corporate laptop in a matter of seconds, even if the BIOS password, TPM Pin, Bitlocker and login credentials are in place. No, we’re not making this stuff up. The setup is simple: an attacker starts by rebooting the target’s machine, after which they enter the boot menu. In a normal situation, an intruder would be stopped here; as they won’t know the BIOS password, they can’t really do anything harmful to the computer. In this case, however, the attacker has a workaround: AMT. By selecting Intel’s Management Engine BIOS Extension (MEBx), they can log in using the default password “admin,” as this hasn’t most likely been changed by the user. By changing the default password, enabling remote access and setting AMT’s user opt-in to “None”, a quick-fingered cyber criminal has effectively compromised the machine. Now the attacker can gain access to the system remotely, as long as they’re able to insert themselves onto the same network segment with the victim (enabling wireless access requires a few extra steps).
f-secure, 12.01.2018
unternehmen_intel  tech_hw_chip_intel_me_amt_mebx  itsicherheit_strategie  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  itsicherheit_authentisierung_passwort  itsicherheit_firmware_bios  tech_computer_fernwartung  tech_hw_laptop_notebook  überwachung_beschlagnahme_hardware  geheimdienst_us_nsa_cao_tarex  überwachung_grenzübergang  geheimdienst_polizei_infiltration_tech 
january 2018 by kraven
Reading privileged memory with a side-channel
We have discovered that CPU data cache timing can be abused to efficiently leak information out of mis-speculated execution, leading to (at worst) arbitrary virtual memory read vulnerabilities across local security boundaries in various contexts. Variants of this issue are known to affect many modern processors, including certain processors by Intel, AMD and ARM. For a few Intel and AMD CPU models, we have exploits that work against real software. So far, there are three known variants of the issue: Variant 1: bounds check bypass (CVE-2017-5753), Variant 2: branch target injection (CVE-2017-5715), Variant 3: rogue data cache load (CVE-2017-5754). Before the issues described here were publicly disclosed, Daniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Yuval Yarom, Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Michael Schwarz, Mike Hamburg, Stefan Mangard, Thomas Prescher and Werner Haas also reported them; their [writeups/blogposts/paper drafts] are at: Spectre (variants 1 and 2), Meltdown (variant 3) [NB: Fuck you Intel, mein nxter Rechner wird non-intel].
google project zero, 03.01.2018
itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  itsicherheit_malware_spyware  itsicherheit_speicher_aslr  itsicherheit_hardware  itsicherheit_implementierung  itsicherheit_os  itsicherheit_seitenkanalanalyse  unternehmen_intel  sicherheitsforschung_itsicherheit  software_os_linux  software_os_windows  software_os_mac  software_os_kernel  unternehmen_amd  unternehmen_arm  tech_hw_chip_cpu  tech_hw_chip_cpu_cache  itsicherheit_cpu_meltdown_spectre 
january 2018 by kraven
No boundaries for user identities: Web trackers exploit browser login managers
We show how third-party scripts exploit browsers’ built-in login managers (also called password managers) to retrieve and exfiltrate user identifiers without user awareness. To the best of our knowledge, our research is the first to show that login managers are being abused by third-party scripts for the purposes of web tracking. The underlying vulnerability of login managers to credential theft has been known for years. Much of the past discussion has focused on password exfiltration by malicious scripts through cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. Fortunately, we haven’t found password theft on the 50,000 sites that we analyzed. Instead, we found tracking scripts embedded by the first party abusing the same technique to extract emails addresses for building tracking identifiers. We found two scripts using this technique to extract email addresses from login managers on the websites which embed them. These addresses are then hashed and sent to one or more third-party servers. Why does the attack work? All major browsers have built-in login managers that save and automatically fill in username and password data to make the login experience more seamless. The set of heuristics used to determine which login forms will be autofilled varies by browser, but the basic requirement is that a username and password field be available. The simplest defense is to allow users to disable login autofill. For instance, the Firefox preference signon.autofillForms can be set to false to disable autofilling of credentials.
freedom to tinker, 27.12.2017
itsicherheit_authentisierung_passwort  itsicherheit_software_browser  software_passwort_manager  software_javascript  überwachung_internet_tracking  überwachung_identifizierung_itk_nutzer  itsicherheit_by_obscurity  uni_us_princeton  itsicherheit_strategie  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw 
december 2017 by kraven
Breaking Out HSTS (and HPKP) on Firefox, IE/Edge and (possibly) Chrome
We have been for a long time researching about HSTS, HPKP, certificate pinning and TLS technologies in general. As a collateral effect of this work, we have found some interesting weaknesses in the way Firefox, Chrome and IE/Edge implement both mechanisms HSTS and HPKP. With this research we applied to Black Hat Europe 2017 and went to talk in London last December 7th, in the briefings section. Here are some details about what we talked then, as a "digest" of the presentation itself.
elevenpaths, 11.12.2017
krypto_tls_hsts  krypto_tls_cert_pinning  überwachung_internet_mitm  itsicherheit_dos  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  itsicherheit_by_obscurity  itsicherheit_software_browser  krypto_tls  krypto_verschlüsselung_transport  krypto_downgrading  software_javascript 
december 2017 by kraven
Europol soll Europas Ermittlern bei Entschlüsselung helfen
Europol soll zu einer zentralen Entschlüsselungsstelle in der Europäischen Union ausgebaut werden. Die Justiz- und Innenminister im Europäischen Rat gaben entsprechenden Plänen der Europäischen Kommission auf ihrer Sitzung am gestrigen Donnerstag grünes Licht. Europol soll demnach Fähigkeiten aufbauen, um Polizei- und Justizbehörden in den europäischen Mitgliedstaaten bei der Entschlüsselung zu unterstützen. Damit erhält nicht nur die deutsche Entschlüsselungsbehörde Zitis, deren Mitarbeiterzahl seit Monaten noch immer bei rund 20 stagniert, Unterstützung. Mitgliedstaaten, die über solche Einrichtungen noch nicht verfügen, werden damit nicht länger benachteiligt. Europol soll eine Toolbox für "alternative Untersuchungstechniken" entwickeln, um die Zugriff auf verschlüsselte Informationen zu ermöglichen. Die neuen Kenntnisse und Fähigkeiten sollen dann in Ausbildungseinheiten an die nationalen Polizei- und Justizbehörden weitergegeben werden. Überdies soll Europol mit Internet-Service-Providern "zusammenarbeiten", damit diese bei der Bereitstellung von "Lösungen" helfen und gleichzeitig "starke Verschlüsselung" behalten können.
heise, 08.12.2017
geheimdienst_eu_europol  geheimdienst_eu_europol_ec3  land_europa  geheimdienst_polizei_zusammenarbeit  krypto_entschlüsselung  internet_zugang_anbieter  internet_regulierung  eu_minister_rat_der_eu  eu_kommission  krypto_analyse  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  krypto_backdoor  krypto_verschlüsselung_datenträger  krypto_verschlüsselung_transport 
december 2017 by kraven
Intel Management Engine Flaws Leave Millions of PCs Exposed
Security researchers have raised the alarm for years about the Intel remote administration feature known as the Management Engine. The platform has a lot of useful features for IT managers, but it requires deep system access that offers a tempting target for attackers; compromising the Management Engine could lead to full control of a given computer. Now, after several research groups have uncovered ME bugs, Intel has confirmed that those worst-case fears may be possible. On Monday, the chipmaker released a security advisory that lists new vulnerabilities in ME, as well as bugs in the remote server management tool Server Platform Services, and Intel’s hardware authentication tool Trusted Execution Engine. Intel found the vulnerabilities after conducting a security audit spurred by recent research. It has also published a Detection Tool so Windows and Linux administrators can check their systems to see if they're exposed.
wired, 20.11.2017
überwachung_backdoor_hardware  überwachung_backdoor_software  itsicherheit_by_obscurity  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  tech_computer_fernwartung  unternehmen_intel  tech_hw_chip_intel_me_amt  tech_hw_chip_intel_txe  tech_hw_chip_intel_sps 
november 2017 by kraven
How the US decides which security flaws to keep secret
The White House released its Vulnerabilities Equities Policy on Wednesday, detailing the process it follows to make that decision along with ten agencies, including the CIA, NSA and Homeland Security. It explains why some vulnerabilities are kept secret, while warnings are immediately issued for others. These decisions are specifically regarding zero-day vulnerabilities, previously unknown security flaws that haven't yet been patched. Government agencies often find these vulnerabilities and sometimes turn them into their own hacking weapons. White House Cybersecurity Coordinator Rob Joyce said in a blog post Wednesday that it's critical to improve transparency of the process but he defended the government's decisions to keep certain vulnerabilities a secret.
cnet, 15.11.2017
us_regierung_vep  us_regierung_hspd23  us_regierung_nspd54  geheimdienst_allg_sabotage  geheimdienst_polizei_infiltration_tech  geheimdienst_us_cia  geheimdienst_us_fbi  geheimdienst_us_nsa  geheimdienst_us_odni  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  itsicherheit_malware_spyware  land_usa  militär_allg_kriegsführung_elektro_it  staat_politik_geheimhaltung 
november 2017 by kraven
Millions of high-security crypto keys crippled by newly discovered flaw
A crippling flaw in a widely used code library has fatally undermined the security of millions of encryption keys used in some of the highest-stakes settings, including national identity cards, software- and application-signing, and trusted platform modules protecting government and corporate computers. The weakness allows attackers to calculate the private portion of any vulnerable key using nothing more than the corresponding public portion. Hackers can then use the private key to impersonate key owners, decrypt sensitive data, sneak malicious code into digitally signed software, and bypass protections that prevent accessing or tampering with stolen PCs. The five-year-old flaw is also troubling because it's located in code that complies with two internationally recognized security certification standards that are binding on many governments, contractors, and companies around the world. The code library was developed by German chipmaker Infineon and has been generating weak keys since 2012 at the latest. The flaw is the one Estonia's government obliquely referred to last month when it warned that 750,000 digital IDs issued since 2014 were vulnerable to attack. Estonian officials said they were closing the ID card public key database to prevent abuse. Last week, Microsoft, Google, and Infineon all warned how the weakness can impair the protections built into TPM products that ironically enough are designed to give an additional measure of security to high-targeted individuals and organizations. The flaw is the subject of a research paper titled The Return of Coppersmith's Attack: Practical Factorization of Widely Used RSA Moduli, which will be presented on November 2 at the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. The vulnerability was discovered by Slovak and Czech researchers from Masaryk University in the Czech Republic, Enigma Bridge in Cambridge, UK, and Ca' Foscari University in Italy.
ars technica, 16.10.2017
eid_dokument  itsicherheit_code_signing  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  tech_hw_chip_krypto_tpm  krypto_bibliothek_rsa_infineon  unternehmen_infineon  krypto_entschlüsselung  krypto_algo_rsa  krypto_faktorisierung  krypto_key_recovery  de_bundesamt_bsi  itsicherheit_zertifizierung  itsicherheit_implementierung  krypto_openpgp  krypto_verschlüsselung_datenträger  krypto_verschlüsselung_kommunikation  krypto_verschlüsselung_transport  tech_hw_krypto_token  krypto_tls_cert  krypto_signierung  krypto_signierung_qes 
october 2017 by kraven
Falling through the KRACKs
The big news in crypto today is the KRACK attack on WPA2 protected WiFi networks. Discovered by Mathy Vanhoef and Frank Piessens at KU Leuven, KRACK (Key Reinstallation Attack) leverages a vulnerability in the 802.11i four-way handshake in order to facilitate decryption and forgery attacks on encrypted WiFi traffic.
matthew green, 16.10.2017
krypto_algo_wpa2  internet_wlan  tech_wifi_wlan  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  itsicherheit_trafficmanipulation_paketinjektion  krypto_entschlüsselung  krypto_verschlüsselung_transport  verband_ieee  überwachung_internet_mitm  itsicherheit_implementierung 
october 2017 by kraven
Der BND hat das Anonymisierungs-Netzwerk Tor angegriffen und warnt vor dessen Nutzung
Der BND hat(te) ein System zur Überwachung des Tor-Netzwerks entwickelt und Bundesbehörden gewarnt, dass dessen Anonymisierung „unwirksam“ ist. Das geht aus einer Reihe geheimer Dokumente hervor, die wir veröffentlichen. Der Geheimdienst gab einen Prototyp dieser Technik an die NSA, in Erwartung einer Gegenleistung. Während sich diese Ereignisse in Deutschland abspielen, ist der BND-Agent mit dem Tarnkürzel „H.F.“ auf Dienstreise in den USA. Dort heißt der Präsident noch George W. Bush – und dessen handverlesene CIA-Unterstützung bei Auslandsreisen manchmal Edward Snowden. H.F. ist zu Gast im Hauptquartier der NSA, auf der jährlichen SIGDEV-Konferenz, wo sich über tausend Agenten über neueste Entwicklungen der Überwachungstechnik austauschen. Während der BND in Deutschland unter Druck steht, darf er hier glänzen. Auf Einladung der NSA präsentiert H.F. einen Angriff auf das Tor-Netzwerk, den die BND-Hacker kurz vorher entwickelt haben. Ein paar Wochen vor der Konferenz haben die BND-Hacker vom Referat 26E „die Idee zu einem Verfahren entwickelt, wie relativ einfach das Tor-Netzwerk aufgeklärt werden könnte“, heißt es in internen BND-Unterlagen. Im März 2008 weiht der Geheimdienst die Partner aus den USA und Großbritannien in seinen Plan ein. Beim Besuch einer ausländischen Delegation in München präsentiert die Abteilung TA „das Anonymisierungsnetzwerk Tor und eine mögliche Auflösung der Anonymisierungsfunktion“, schreibt der BND in einem internen Besprechungsbericht. Um den Plan umzusetzen, wünscht sich der BND „eine internationale Zusammenarbeit mit mehreren ausländischen Nachrichtendiensten“.
netzpolitik, 14.09.2017
anonymisierung_anti  geheimdienst_de_bnd_ta  geheimdienst_polizei_zusammenarbeit  geheimdienst_uk_gchq  geheimdienst_us_nsa  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  krypto_verschlüsselung_transport  land_deutschland  land_uk  land_usa  software_anon_tor  überwachung_int_sigint_comint  überwachung_identifizierung_itk_nutzer  itsicherheit_trafficmanipulation_paketinjektion  überwachung_internet_trafficanalyse 
september 2017 by kraven
Seitenkanalangriff: RSA-Verschlüsselung der GnuPG-Kryptobibliothek geknackt
Unter dem Titel "Sliding Right into Disaster" haben mehrere namhafte Krypto-Experten ein Paper vorgelegt, das einen praktischen Angriff auf RSA-Schlüssel mit 1024 Bit Länge der GnuPG-Kryptobibliothek Libgcrypt beschreibt. Ältere Versionen der in GnuPG verbauten Kryptobibliothek Libgcrypt sind anfällig für eine Seitenkanalattacke, die es ermöglicht, geheime RSA-Schlüssel bis zu einer Länge von 1024 Bit im Verschlüsselungsbetrieb auszulesen (in 13 Prozent der Fälle kann sogar ein RSA-2048-Schlüssel ausgelesen werden). Dazu muss der Angreifer allerdings bereits beliebigen Code auf dem System ausführen können, auf dem der Schlüssel benutzt wird.
heise, 04.07.2017
itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  krypto_analyse_seitenkanal  krypto_key_recovery  krypto_openpgp  software_krypto_gnupg  krypto_algo_rsa  krypto_bibliothek_libgcrypt 
august 2017 by kraven
100 Sekunden, um einen Wahlcomputer zu hacken
30 Wahlcomputer und Systeme zur elektronischen Wählerregistrierung hatten die Veranstalter des sogenannten Voting Village auf der Hackerkonferenz Def Con in Las Vegas aufgebaut. Alle werden in den USA für Wahlen auf kommunaler oder auch Bundesebene genutzt oder wurden es bis vor Kurzem noch. Alle 30 wurden von den Def-Con-Teilnehmern gehackt. Vor der US-Wahl im vergangenen Jahr war eine mögliche Manipulation der Ergebnisse durch Hacker ein Szenario, das Regierung, Geheimdienste, FBI und Heimatschutzministerium (DHS) schwer beschäftigte. Im Weißen Haus wurde sogar ein Notfallplan erarbeitet, der im Extremfall den Einsatz der Nationalgarde vorgesehen hätte. Unmittelbar nach der Wahl hatte die grüne Kandidatin Jill Stein eine Neuauszählung in drei Swing-States angestrebt, weil der Sicherheitsforscher J. Alex Halderman behauptete, eine Manipulation wäre technisch und organisatorisch möglich gewesen und nur eine forensische Untersuchung der Wahlcomputer sowie die Neuauszählung könne Gewissheit bringen. Doch Stein war an rechtlichen und finanziellen Hürden gescheitert, das Thema wurde anschließend nur noch abstrakt behandelt.
zeit, 31.07.2017
tech_hw_wahlcomputer  itsicherheit_by_obscurity  land_usa  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  itsicherheit_authentisierung_passwort  itsicherheit_firmware_bios 
august 2017 by kraven
Security flaw shows 3G, 4G LTE networks are just as prone to stingray phone tracking
The findings, revealed Wednesday at the Black Hat conference in Las Vegas, detail a cryptographic flaw in the protocol used in 3G and 4G LTE networks which enables mobile devices to connect with the cell operator. Ravishankar Borgaonkar and Lucca Hirschi, who co-authored the research, found a weakness in the authentication and key agreement, which lets a phone communicate securely with the subscriber's cell network. The agreement protocol relies on a counter that's stored on the phone operator's systems to authenticate the device and to prevent replay attacks, but the researchers found that the counter isn't well protected and partially leaks. That can allow an attacker to monitor consumption patterns, such as when calls are made and when text messages are sent, and track the physical location of a cell phone. But the flaw doesn't allow the interception of calls or text messages. This flaw could pave the way for a next-generation of stingray devices, otherwise known as cell site (or IMSI) simulators.
zdnet, 26.07.2017
tech_mobilfunk_lte_mgmn  itsicherheit_by_obscurity  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  itsicherheit_authentisierung_protokoll  krypto_key_agreement_exchange  überwachung_int_sigint_comint  überwachung_mobilfunk_imsi_catcher  überwachung_person_profil  überwachung_lokalisierung_bewegung 
august 2017 by kraven
Vault 7 - ELSA
WikiLeaks publishes documents from the ELSA project of the CIA. ELSA is a geo-location malware for WiFi-enabled devices like laptops running the Micorosoft Windows operating system. Once persistently installed on a target machine using separate CIA exploits, the malware scans visible WiFi access points and records the ESS identifier, MAC address and signal strength at regular intervals. If it is connected to the internet, the malware automatically tries to use public geo-location databases from Google or Microsoft to resolve the position of the device and stores the longitude and latitude data along with the timestamp. The collected access point/geo-location information is stored in encrypted form on the device for later exfiltration. The malware itself does not beacon this data to a CIA back-end; instead the operator must actively retrieve the log file from the device - again using separate CIA exploits and backdoors.
wikileaks, 28.06.2017
geheimdienst_us_cia_ddi_cci_edg  geheimdienst_polizei_infiltration_tech  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  itsicherheit_malware_spyware  land_usa  software_os_windows  tech_wifi_wlan  überwachung_lokalisierung_bewegung  überwachung_int_sigint_comint  ngo_wikileaks_cia_vault 
june 2017 by kraven
CSE to get foreign cyber operations mandate
Among the changes that the Liberal government is proposing to make via its Bill C-59, announced on June 20th, are several important measures affecting CSE, including an entirely new statutory basis for the agency, the Communications Security Establishment Act, that will replace the current CSE-related provisions of the National Defence Act. Together, the proposals affecting CSE comprise a wide-ranging and highly consequential set of measures, but probably the most significant item is the plan to give the agency the power to conduct both defensive and "active" (i.e., offensive) cyber operations against foreign targets. The first big change in that role happened in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, although it had more to do with the advent of the Internet beginning in the 1990s. Passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act gave CSE the authority to conduct the cyberspace version of the black-bag job—Computer Network Exploitation (CNE)—in support of its SIGINT mandate. The proposed CSE Act would enable CSE to conduct deliberate Computer Network Attack (CNA) operations, both to defend Canadian IT systems against foreign CNE and CNA operations and to attack foreign IT systems in furtherance of Canadian foreign policy, defence, or security goals. The bill refers to these two types of CNA operation as "defensive cyber operations" and "active cyber operations" respectively. Under the new CSE Act, CSE would be explicitly permitted to provide operational and technical assistance to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces (as it already does for federal law enforcement and security agencies), and cyber assistance provided under this mandate would not be subject to the limitations applied to CSE's own cyber operations.
lux ex umbra, 24.06.2017
land_kanada  gesetz_ca_c_59  gesetz_ca_cse_act  geheimdienst_ca_csec_cna_cne  geheimdienst_polizei_infiltration_tech  itsicherheit_malware_spyware  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  geheimdienst_militär_zusammenarbeit  geheimdienst_allg_sabotage  geheimdienst_allg_spionage  militär_allg_sabotage  militär_allg_kriegsführung_elektro_it  überwachung_int_sigint_comint  militär_ca_armed_forces  ca_ministerium_verteidigung  recht_legalisierung 
june 2017 by kraven
Staatstrojaner: Dein trojanischer Freund und Helfer
Der Bundestag hat eine neue rechtliche Grundlage für den Einsatz von Staatstrojanern beschlossen. Für das Hacken von Computern durch Deutschlands Strafverfolgungsbehörden, für das Verwanzen von Smartphones, für das heimliche Mitlesen von WhatsApp-Nachrichten. Offiziell heißt es Gesetz zur effektiveren und praxistauglicheren Ausgestaltung des Strafverfahrens. Bemerkenswert ist, dass die Staatstrojaner aber gar nicht im Entwurf selbst stehen. Sondern in diesem Änderungsantrag, den die Bundesregierung selbst nachträglich als "Formulierungshilfe" eingebracht hat. Eine größere, geschweige denn öffentliche Debatte kam deshalb praktisch nicht zustande. Selbst die Bundesdatenschutzbeauftragte erfuhr erst über die Berichterstattung von davon – und war nicht amüsiert. Die Koalition hat den Änderungsantrag aber fast Wort für Wort übernommen und im Rechtsausschuss passieren lassen, sodass er heute zur Abstimmung steht.
zeit, 22.06.2017
de_bundesregierung  de_bundestag  geheimdienst_polizei_infiltration_tech  gesetz_de_stpo_tech_observation  gesetz_entwurf_änderung  itsicherheit_exploit_flaw  itsicherheit_malware_spyware  land_deutschland  recht_grundrecht_kernbereich_privat  recht_grundrecht_it_systeme  staat_politik_intransparenz  überwachung_chat_telefonie_voip  überwachung_int_sigint_comint  überwachung_internet_email  überwachung_itk_inhaltsdaten  überwachung_quellen_tkü  überwachung_onlinedurchsuchung  krypto_crypto_war  partei_de_spd  partei_de_cducsu  überwachung_präventiv  überwachung_itk_verkehrs_metadaten  software_chat_messenger_voip 
june 2017 by kraven

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