recentpopularlog in

aries1988 : middle-east   46

A Record of Syrian Monuments Before ISIS
John Gendall writes about the photography of the veteran architectural photographer Peter Aaron, whose images of Syria, from 2009, serve as a quiet reminder of the country’s recent past.
venice  2018  architecture  syria  loss  civ  middle-east  isis  photo  exhibition 
may 2018 by aries1988
走出中东 - 图书
走出中东豆瓣评分:8.5 简介:资深国际记者 十年后重返中东
以世界的眼睛回望故园
【编辑推荐】
本书2016年在台湾上市,荣获《亚洲周刊》2016年度好书。梁文道、刘瑜、《东方历史评论》等合力推荐。内地版本增加50幅图片,全彩印刷,真实还原这个
book  buy  chinese  middle-east 
may 2018 by aries1988
The Interpreter
Such transitions, in authoritarian countries, tend to make rulers feel more insecure, which can make them paranoid and overreactive. They also tend to have a lot to prove, to their citizens and to powerful elites like the military leadership. All of this makes them prone to conflict and escalation abroad.
middle-east  future 
november 2017 by aries1988
Oman espère créer 40 000 emplois dans le secteur du tourisme d’ici 2020 - RFI
Le sultanat d'Oman est une destination touristique de plus en plus appréciée. Pour mieux accueillir les visiteurs é...
tourism  middle-east 
june 2017 by aries1988
Proche-Orient — Wikipédia
Cette appellation est aujourd'hui concurrencée par l'usage du terme Moyen-Orient1, traduction française de l'anglo-américain « Middle East » ; les deux expressions désignant souvent le même espace, elles sont interchangeables2. Il en résulte une situation très confuse : tandis que les médias utilisent presque exclusivement Moyen-Orient, les ouvrages savants en français continuent de privilégier l'usage de Proche-Orient pour désigner la même région, tandis que d'autres utilisent l'expression Proche et Moyen-Orient dont on ne voit pas très bien le sens ; enfin, certains tâchent de trouver une définition différente pour les deux expressions, le Moyen-Orient étant alors considéré comme plus large que le Proche-Orient qu'il inclut, ou bien désignant les régions situées plus à l'est.
français  vocabulary  history  middle-east 
april 2017 by aries1988
迟早更新 #46 直播「西游记」 — 迟早更新
沙特刚决定要建全国第一家电影院,埃及是阿拉伯世界的好莱坞,主播露肩膀会遭到用户投诉……「中东」对很多人来说是一个新奇而陌生,似乎只会出现在《新闻联播》里的地方。这期我们找来了在海湾地区从事互联网直播的刘博夏,来谈谈他的「西游记」。本期主要内容:- Fisson Technology 的 7nujoom http://www.7nujoom.com/index.shtml- 7nujoom 的土耳其版本 Haahi http://www.haahi.com/top- Facebook 的阿拉伯文页面 https://ar-ar.facebook.com/- UXBERT 上的文章《Designing an Arabic User Experience》http://uxbert.com/designing-an-arabic-user-experience-what-why-and-how/- 「迪拜人」访谈文章:《中东的网红世界 | 首个阿语直播平台源自中国制造》http://www.dubairen.com/35922.html- 黎巴嫩旅游官方网站 http://www.destinationlebanon.gov.lb/- 伊朗旅游官方网站 ªªhttp://tourismiran.ir/en/本期主播:任宁、枪枪本期嘉宾:刘博夏「迟早更新」是一档以科技创新、生活方式和未来商业为主要话题的播客节目,也是风险基金ºº ONES Ventures 内部关于热情、趣味和好奇心的音频记录。我们希望通过这档播客,能让熟悉的事物变得新鲜,让新鲜的事物变得熟悉。 官网:http://www.weareones.com/2微博:http://weibo.com/chizaogengxin如果有任何问题或反馈,欢迎发电子邮件至 embrace@weareones.com
podcast  middle-east  chinese  startup 
march 2017 by aries1988
The True Believers: Sam Harris
# Instapaper (2017/02/24)
## Added on Saturday, February 24-25

What I’m arguing for in the piece is not to discard either type of explanation but to remember the latter one and take the words of these ISIS people seriously. Even though at various points in the past we’ve ignored political or material causes, this doesn’t mean that ideology plays no role, or that we should ignore the plain meaning of words.

that’s really one of the things that social sciences have triumphed in doing: explaining that within certain boundaries, rationalities lie behind what at first looks like mere craziness or barbarity. Just calling behavior craziness is a trap that a lot of ISIS-watchers have fallen into. If you see members of the Islamic State as thrill-kill nihilists, then you’re not giving them enough credit.

There’s also a deep urge to deny agency to the Islamic State, and I think it’s fundamentally connected to a reluctance to see non-Western people as fully developed and capable of having intelligent beliefs and enough self-knowledge to express them. These people articulate well-thought-out reasons for what they do. And yet ignoring what they say somehow gets camouflaged in the minds of liberals as speaking up for them. It’s delusional.

although the Islamic State wants a civilizational war, of Muslims versus Crusaders, I think they’re consciously avoiding terrorist attacks on Western targets that would provoke too strong a response too soon. If they bombed the Super Bowl, they’d probably be looking at a ground invasion within weeks. They want the invasion, but on their own schedule.

I think we might be in a situation analogous to seeing someone writhing around on the ground in front of us, showing every symptom of having appendicitis. But instead of being surgeons, armed with sterile scalpels, we are just laymen who once read a first aid manual and have no tools other than a rusty soup can. There’s no good option, even though we recognize the problem. The overwhelming probability is that the patient will die a terrible death, and we will have to watch.

it’s abundantly clear that we are not good at massive occupations of countries we poorly understand. Not only that, we just don’t have the appetite for it.

The point of all propaganda is to create narratives about the world. Their view—and the view of jihadis everywhere, really—is that Muslims are under attack by a Crusader West.

confirm their narrative for other Muslims who are already inclined to believe that the West is at war with Islam. That’s not a view I would like to encourage.

The idea is that if we don’t walk on eggshells until the end of history as we fight jihadis, taking great pains to deny any link between the chaos they cause and the doctrine of Islam, then we’re doomed to provoke more-mainstream Muslims into choosing the wrong side in this conflict.

One of the things that is so refreshing about your article is that you didn’t do that. But you now seem to be saying that we must be very careful not to do anything that could give fodder to a “clash of civilizations” narrative.

The Islamic State leader identifies as Salafi, which means that he takes as his sources of authority the Qur’an, the hadīth of the Prophet Muhammad, and the actions of the generations immediately succeeding Muhammad.

The percentage of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims who identify as Salafi—who subscribe to this literalist version of Islam—is quite small, probably single-digit. The percentage of Salafis who would identify as jihadis is vanishingly small. And then, of course, within that population a lot are going to be noncombatants because they’re too old, or too young, or whatever. So we’re still talking about large, but perhaps now manageable, numbers.

The point of bringing up this quietist group is to say that the problem isn’t Islam, or even Islamic literalism. Most literalist Muslims are essentially harmless, or even better than harmless—nice people you would like to have as neighbors. So the specificity of interpretation that leads to the Islamic State is really quite narrow.

What you seem to be expressing is a fear that there could be a mass changing of sides based on some secret sympathy, or some susceptibility to moral confusion, even in the face of the clearest case for a just war that may have ever existed. Whatever the underlying causes of this form of jihadism, at the end of the day we have pure, fanatical, implacable evil vs. basic human sanity.

in the face of the clearest case for a just war that may have ever existed. Whatever the underlying causes of this form of jihadism, at the end of the day we have pure, fanatical, implacable evil vs. basic human sanity.

The Salafi neighbor may not be the neighbor you’d choose, if you could pick from a menu of atheists and liberals and, more generally, people who didn’t care what you thought about god.

there are many religious people whose beliefs about a far-off apocalyptic battle, and mass conversion at the sword, do not affect their lives much at all. People are good at compartmentalizing, and if they weren’t, the world would hardly be livable.

it is a lack of meaning or fulfillment in their lives, related to deep malaise and feelings of rejection or dissatisfaction with the worlds where they live.

If you think the high point of your life in England is going to be eating KFC, the promise of joining the greatest battle the world has ever known might be pretty attractive.

many of us experience such existential concerns early in life.

Where are your scholars?

huge numbers of scholars have been co-opted by politics—either the politics of the Middle East or the politics of the United States.

These differences between the palace scholars and ISIS seem minor, but I would encourage you to see them as significant.

I try studiously not to take a position on which one of these views is correct. I just don’t have any credibility as a non-Muslim to say whether one scholar or another espouses the best form of Islam. However, if I were able to choose what people believed, I’d hope it was the caliphate-later view.

Of course, there are Christians who think about the end times, which are also not envisioned as very pleasant. If you ask them, “Is it happening now?” some of them will say yes. But very few of them will act as if they actually believe it’s happening now. If they’re envisioning a terrible bloodbath at some unimaginably distant time, I can live with that.
illusion  debate  to:marginnote  islam  warrior  middle-east  religion  war  crisis  terrorism  explained  interview  muslim 
february 2017 by aries1988
梁文道:終於學懂了聖戰(聖戰之三)
我們不妨大膽地說,恰恰是奧圖曼帝國在它這場最後「聖戰」之後的瓦解,造成了現今世界其中幾種最激烈的政治和意識形態的衝突。往昔,奧圖曼人習慣把它管轄的地方叫做「和平之土」,在其統治之外的世界則是「戰爭之土」。這個劃分看起來非常可笑,因為它控制的地方幾乎全是依靠戰爭征服回來的。不過,這個想法背後卻有一個相當久遠的歷史基礎,可以上溯至古羅馬人所說的「羅馬和平」(Pax Romana),甚至波斯屠魯士大帝所締造的寬容太平,那就是在一個多民族、多文化的帝國之下,所有臣民都不應該為了信仰以及族裔的差別而拔刀相向。果然,奧圖曼崩潰的結局,就是中東和巴爾幹地區此後幾乎從不休止的血腥戰爭。不斷變形又不斷自我分裂的民族認同運動,和幽靈一般不停回歸的宗教認同政治,正是這一切爭端的最大觸媒。

古老帝國遇到了它不曾見過的新對手──民族主義。帝國、宗教,以及民族這三者之間的繁雜角鬥,正是尤金.羅根這部新書最叫人嘆為觀止的地方。
ww1  history  middle-east  turkey 
october 2016 by aries1988
Fractured Lands: How the Arab World Came Apart - The New York Times
To maintain dominion over these fractious territories, the European powers adopted the same divide-and-conquer approach that served them so well in the colonization of sub-Saharan Africa. This consisted of empowering a local ethnic or religious minority to serve as their local administrators, confident that this minority would never rebel against their foreign overseers lest they be engulfed by the disenfranchised majority.

The great difference, of course, is that in the American West, the settlers stayed and the tribal system was essentially destroyed. In the Arab world, the Europeans eventually left, but the sectarian and tribal schisms they fueled remained.

it would seem undeniable that those two factors operating in concert — the lack of an intrinsic sense of national identity joined to a form of government that supplanted the traditional organizing principle of society — left Iraq, Syria and Libya especially vulnerable when the storms of change descended.

The Alawites, along with many in Syria’s Christian minority, feared that any compromise with the protesters was to invite a Sunni revolution and, with it, their demise.

But Nasser possessed an advantage that his fellow autocrats in the region did not. With a sense of national identity that stretched back millenniums, Egypt never seemed in danger of being torn apart; the centrifugal pull of tribes or clans or sectarian identity simply didn’t exist there to the degree it did in Syria or Iraq. At the same time, Egypt’s long tradition of relative liberalism had given rise to a fractious political landscape that ran the spectrum from secular communists to fundamentalist Islamists.

For all their revolutionary rhetoric, the dictators of Libya, Iraq and Syria remained ever mindful that their nations were essentially artificial constructs. What this meant was that many of their subjects’ primary loyalty lay not to the state but to their tribe or, more broadly, to their ethnic group or religious sect.
On a more philosophical level, this journey has served to remind me again of how terribly delicate is the fabric of civilization, of the vigilance required to protect it and of the slow and painstaking work of mending it once it has been torn. This is hardly an original thought; it is a lesson we were supposed to have learned after Nazi Germany, after Bosnia and Rwanda. Perhaps it is a lesson we need to constantly relearn.

parallels in history suggest that such a course would be both wrenching and murderous — witness the postwar “de-Germanization” policy in Eastern Europe and the 1947 partition of the Indian subcontinent — but despite the misery and potential body count entailed in getting there, maybe this is the last, best option available to prevent the failed states of the Middle East from devolving into even more brutal slaughter.

If General Sisi took away any lesson from Mubarak’s downfall, though, it was to never be viewed as the West’s lap dog.

“You could say that, in many ways, the Yazidis are the pure Kurds,” he explained. “Their religion is what all Kurds believed at one time, not all this Shia-Sunni business. Everyone else changed, but they stayed true to the faith.”

Traditionally, armies and guerrilla groups try to deny or minimize their war crimes, but not so with ISIS;

Shiite-dominated army was well aware of the locals’ contempt and deeply distrusted them in turn, to such an extent that at the first sign of trouble — in this case, a few Sunni jihadists riding into town vowing vengeance — the soldiers, fearing a mass uprising against them, simply bolted.

The ISIS offensive of June 2014 marked one of the most stunning military feats in modern history: In less than one week, a lightly armed guerrilla force of, ultimately, perhaps 5,000 fighters scattered a modern and well-equipped army at least 20 times its size, capturing billions of dollars worth of advanced weaponry and military hardware, and now controlled population centers that totaled some five million people.
history  middle-east  politics  world  explained  reportage  war  comparison 
august 2016 by aries1988
Could Different Borders Have Saved the Middle East?
That Western imperialism had a malignant influence on the course of Middle Eastern history is without a doubt. But is Sykes-Picot the right target for this ire?
map  history  middle-east 
may 2016 by aries1988
Behind Stark Political Divisions, a More Complex Map of Sunnis and Shiites
The geography of the two main branches of Islam is a key factor in the region’s conflicts.
Visualization  map  religion  middle-east 
january 2016 by aries1988
Persian (or Arabian) Gulf Is Caught in the Middle of Regional Rivalries
This may be among the most minor of the disputes, but it speaks to the level of hostility and competition between the two, and is taken quite seriously by many with an interest in the region — including the United States Navy, which, for fear of alienating its regional allies, uses the term Arabian Gulf.

Persian Gulf has been used throughout history, in maps, documents and diplomacy, from the ancient Persians, whose empire dominated the region, to the Greeks and the British.

“It is commonly understood to be a friendly gesture of solidarity and support for our host nation of Bahrain and our other Gulf Cooperation Council partners in the region to use the term they prefer,” Commander Stephens wrote in an email.
geography  geopolitics  middle-east  name  conflict 
january 2016 by aries1988
The Arab winter | The Economist
Five years after a wave of uprisings, the Arab world is worse off than ever. But its people understand their predicament better


The West’s naivety, which was shared—and paid for—by those hopeful demonstrators, lay in underestimating two things. One was the fragility of many Arab states, too weak in their institutions to withstand such ructions in the way that, say, South Africa did when apartheid fell. The other was the vicious determination with which established regimes would seek to retain or recapture control. Who could believe that a soft-spoken leader such as Mr Assad would prefer to destroy his country rather than leave his palace? Those were the truths that brought hope to the ground.


Arabs may take heart from the fact that in Europe, the supposedly revolutionary years of 1848 and 1968 produced little forward motion; indeed their immediate effect was to prompt a conservative backlash. A.J.P. Taylor, a historian, described 1848, a year of continent-wide insurrection against autocracy, as a moment when “history reached a turning point but failed to turn.”
middle-east  2015  history  conflict  movement  revolution  dream  crisis  opinion 
january 2016 by aries1988
Friends and foes: rifts in the Middle East
Islamic State has no friends. But it has upended geopolitics in the Middle East and drawn America’s armed forces back to the region. Our “relationship mosaic” below summarises the friendships and enmities among countries, political groups and militant organisations in the Middle East. It provides a quick, simplified glimpse (the “neutral” category, for instance, embraces a large number of possibilities). Syria’s official al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, is almost as isolated as IS: neither was invited to a conference of Syrian opposition groups convened this month by Saudi Arabia. The Syrian government is disliked by many countries, but supported by Iran and Russia. Russia’s relationship with Turkey deteriorated sharply after the Turks’ shooting-down of a Russian warplane in November. The Iraqi Kurds count numerous friends and no sworn enemies. America must play a delicate diplomatic game in holding together unlikely allies.
2015  middle-east  infographics  diplomacy  geopolitics 
december 2015 by aries1988
Europe's Jihadists: What the Paris Attacks Tell Us about IS Strategy - SPIEGEL ONLINE
Olivier Roy, a French expert on Islamism, writes in Le Monde: “Almost all French radicals belong to one of two categories: They either come from the second generation of immigrants or they are converts.” What do the two groups have in common? “They break with their parents, or, to be more precise, with that which their parents represent when it comes to culture and religion.”

The younger ones can be found a hundred meters away, hanging out in front of a food stand and a café. There are perhaps a dozen of them, in their twenties and wearing sweat suits or sarwal, the baggy pants with the low-hanging crotch that Salafists prefer. It is just before noon on a workday, but none of those present have anywhere to be.

There are many like Mohammed in France, young men who live in housing projects on the outskirts of the city. Young men who feel oppressed as Muslims and who hate the country they live in. In Germany, there are no real ghettos of the kind found in France and there is also a lack of the historical rage that some French immigrants hold for the former colonial power.

there are more than 10,000 people in France with “Fiche S” files, which means they are seen as a potential danger to the state. There may not be as many in Germany, but officials here are also wondering what to do about them.
reportage  europe  middle-east  youth  numbers  deutschland  france  comparison  terrorism  germany  instapaper_favs 
november 2015 by aries1988
From Muhammad to ISIS: Iraq's Full Story - Wait But Why
Kamil was from Mosul, like everyone at the camp. Mosul is Iraq’s second largest city, only 30 miles west of the camp—and as of June 9th, an ISIS stronghold. After taking over, one of the first orders of business for ISIS was rounding up government workers for execution. Kamil, a police officer, was lucky to get out with his family before they got to him. When I asked him if he thought he’d return to Mosul at some point, he shook his head and said, Fuck Mosul.

The nation of Iraq, on the other hand, was created by two dicks with a pencil and ruler, and its history is mostly unpleasant.

When borders are drawn this way, two bad things happen: 1) Single ethnic or religious groups are sliced apart into separate countries, and 2) Different and often unfriendly groups are shoved into a nation together and told to share resources, get along, and bond together over national pride for a just-made-up nation—which inevitably leads to one group taking power and oppressing the others, resulting in bloody rebellions, coups, and sectarian violence. This isn’t that complicated.

According to Iraqi intelligence, ISIS has assets worth $2 billion, making it by far the richest terrorist group in the world. Most of this money was seized after the capture of Mosul, including hundreds of millions of US dollars from Mosul’s central bank. On top of that, they’ve taken oil fields and are reportedly making $3 million per day selling oil on the black market, with even more money coming in through donations, extortions, and ransom.

They knew they were removing a lid, but they seemed to think it was off a tupperware container of cookies, not a pressure cooker. And their plan to replace the wrought iron lid with a fresh sheet of democracy cellophane would have worked fine if it were a tupperware container of cookies. Just not if it were a pressure cooker.
story  irak  2014  2015  middle-east  history  islam  religion  politics  explained  terrorism 
november 2015 by aries1988
L’Arabie saoudite, un Daesh qui a réussi
On veut sauver la fameuse alliance stratégique avec l’Arabie saoudite tout en oubliant que ce royaume repose sur une autre alliance, avec un clergé religieux qui produit, rend légitime, répand, prêche et défend le wahhabisme, islamisme ultra-puritain dont se nourrit Daesh.

Le wahhabisme, radicalisme messianique né au 18ème siècle, a l’idée de restaurer un califat fantasmé autour d’un désert, un livre sacré et deux lieux saints, la Mecque et Médine. C’est un puritanisme né dans le massacre et le sang, qui se traduit aujourd’hui par un lien surréaliste à la femme, une interdiction pour les non-musulmans d’entrer dans le territoire sacré, une loi religieuse rigoriste, et puis aussi un rapport maladif à l’image et à la représentation et donc l’art, ainsi que le corps, la nudité et la liberté. L’Arabie saoudite est un Daesh qui a réussi.
opinion  middle-east  religion  politics  conflict  history  terrorism 
november 2015 by aries1988
Why welcoming more refugees makes economic sense for Europe | New Scientist
Any pull is insignificant compared to push – such as the ever-increasing hardship in Middle-Eastern refugee camps, Goldin says.

Germany had 200,000 more deaths than births in 2012, more than compensated by 391,000 immigrants. In contrast, UK prime minister David Cameron bowed to public pressure and this week said the country would take just 20,000 Syrian refugees by 2020.

Those travelling on their own can look up how-to guides written by others who’ve made it. One refugee showed a reporter at Public Radio International a video explaining, step-by-step, how to get across the Serbian-Hungarian border. Others post real-time updates about what areas are safe to travel through – where water is safe to drink, for example.
2015  refugee  middle-east  europe  analysis  economy  opinion  population  germany  numbers 
september 2015 by aries1988
林达:查理·威尔逊的战争
先且不提化学武器,叙利亚在此之前已经是一个当年阿富汗。它的人口两千七百万,迄今为止死亡人数是八万至十万之间,流亡国外的难民在两百万左右,另有超过一百万人在国内失去家园,流离失所。在化武事件之前,法国英国美国和欧盟,始终没有如对待利比亚一样处理叙利亚内战。并非他们的议员都不如威尔逊更有正义感和同情心,而是它的反对派武装可能比阿富汗的更复杂、更危险。
middle-east  movie  usa  war 
september 2015 by aries1988
The World’s Hot Spot
All the people in this region are playing with fire. While they’re fighting over who is caliph, who is the rightful heir to the Prophet Muhammad from the seventh century — Sunnis or Shiites — and to whom God really gave the holy land, Mother Nature is not sitting idle. She doesn’t do politics — only physics, biology and chemistry. And if they add up the wrong way, she will take them all down.
middle-east  environment 
august 2015 by aries1988
The Chinese Lingerie Venders of Egypt
In her opinion, the Chinese are direct and honest, and she appreciates their remove from local gossip networks. They keep their secrets, she said.

I was certain that even the most self-confident American woman would be mortified by the idea of shopping for lingerie with her fiancé, her mother, and her teen-age brother, not to mention doing this in the presence of two Chinese shop owners, their assistant, and a foreign journalist. But I had witnessed similar scenes at other shops in Upper Egypt, where an arusa is almost always accompanied by family members or friends, and the ritual seems largely disconnected from sex in people’s minds.

Inequality between men and women, he said immediately. Here the women just stay home and sleep. If they want to develop, the first thing they need to do is solve this problem. That’s what China did after the revolution. It’s a waste of talent here. Look at my family—you see how my wife works. We couldn’t have the factory without her. And my daughter runs the shop. If they were Egyptian, they wouldn’t be doing that.

Their strategy is to make economic linkages, so if you break these economic linkages it’s going to hurt you as much as it hurts them.

through the Suez Canal. In addition, Egyptian universities are home to approximately two thousand Chinese students, most of them Muslim. The Chinese government is concerned that these students will acquire radical religious ideas, which is another reason that they feel they have a stake in Egypt’s stability and prosperity.

More than two decades ago, at the start of the economic boom in China, bosses hired young women because they could be paid less and controlled more easily than men. But it soon became clear that, in a society that traditionally had undervalued women, they were more motivated, and over the years their role and reputation began to change.
story  chinese  entrepreneurial  middle-east  life  people  gaijin 
august 2015 by aries1988
Buckle up | The Economist
Status-enhancing yet dangerous manoeuvres, such as driving a motorbike on one wheel, can entail a fine of up to 3m Lebanese pounds ($2,000) and even time behind bars. Learner drivers must take proper lessons rather than being taught by relatives, themselves home-schooled in the art of dodging pedestrians and potholes. “They want us to act like Europeans,” says Imad, a motorist. “OK, but in return we’d like some European-style services.”
driving  middle-east  government 
august 2015 by aries1988
‘Defending the Faith’ in the Middle East
And yet, as new and disturbing as these developments may appear, the linkage of sectarian and secular interests is a return to the classic geopolitics of religion in the Middle East.

The politics of religion undermined the Westphalian order, based on the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, these policies subverted states, fueled divisions within them — and often ended in violence.
religion  state  middle-east  history 
may 2015 by aries1988
‘My Enemy, My Brother’
In this short documentary, two survivors of a brutal war in the Middle East meet again years later under astonishing circumstances.
canada  human  war  middle-east  destiny 
may 2015 by aries1988
Old, New and Unusual Alliances in the Middle East
A look at where Iran exerts influence across the region and at the emerging Saudi coalition.
explained  state  diplomacy  middle-east  today 
march 2015 by aries1988
Le schiste, roi du pétrole
En lançant la révolution du gaz et du pétrole de schiste, les Américains ont fait d’une pierre deux coups : relancer leur économie et enrichir leur panoplie stratégique d’une arme supplémentaire.

Autrement dit, le calcul américain consistait à parier sur la baisse des prix du brut pour faire plier le Kremlin, déjà étranglé par les sanctions. Et ce pari n'était pas hasardeux, puisque les Etats-Unis eux-mêmes, ayant augmenté leur production de pétrole de 80 % en six ans, sont en grande partie à l'origine de la chute des prix. En lançant la révolution du gaz et du pétrole de schiste, qui a réussi au-delà de leurs espérances, les Américains ont fait d'une pierre deux coups : elle leur a permis de relancer leur économie et a enrichi leur panoplie stratégique d'une arme supplémentaire. S'agissant de M. Poutine, le pari n'est pas gagné puisque bien qu'à la tête d'un pays affaibli, il n'a pas, pour l'instant, cédé à la pression. Mais la vulnérabilité de l'économie russe est incontestable.

Dans les années 1980, les pays du Golfe avaient réagi à la concurrence du pétrole de la mer du Nord en baissant leur production. Echec sur toute la ligne, prix et parts de marché. Les cheikhs ont juré qu'on ne les y reprendrait plus. Ils abordent 2015 arc-boutés sur leurs parts de marché face au schiste, " quel que soit le prix ", a promis le ministre Al-Naimi.

Les cheikhs, assis sur leurs très confortables réserves, attendraient donc tout simplement que les prix baissent jusqu'au point où les producteurs américains y laisseront leur chemise, car l'extraction du pétrole de schiste revient plus cher que celle du brut conventionnel.
today  geopolitics  usa  middle-east  russia  oil&gas 
january 2015 by aries1988
« Cessons ces guerres suicidaires et donnons enfin une chance à la paix ! »
La France se renie quand elle croit que la guerre contre le terrorisme est la solution. Cette guerre est sans victoire possible comme l’ont montré l’Afghanistan et l’Irak. C’est la loi des guérillas. C’est une guerre perpétuelle face à un ennemi sans cesse renaissant qui grandit en légitimité, visibilité et crédibilité. Cette guerre est sans espoir. Même si nous écrasons l’« Etat islamique » (EI), ce sera au prix de l’émergence d’un nouveau péril, chiite ou sunnite, islamiste ou nationaliste. Dix ans d’interventions incohérentes au Moyen-Orient ont enfanté et nourri l’EI.

L’EI est une menace d’un nouveau genre, inquiétante, hybride de parti totalitaire fanatisé, d’organisation criminelle lucrative et d’« entrepreneur de guerre » plaçant sa marque sur le marché mondial. Il tient son pouvoir sur son territoire de l’alliance avec des débris du régime de Saddam Hussein et avec des chefs de tribu et de quartiers sunnites, rejetant le pouvoir sectaire chiite.

En le privant aussi de ses soutiens sunnites modérés à travers un dialogue inclusif leur offrant des garanties politiques dans le nouvel Irak. En asséchant enfin son vivier de recrutement. Pour l’EI stagner, c’est déjà s’éteindre
middle-east  opinion  today 
september 2014 by aries1988
Gilles Kepel : « L'Iran pourrait redevenir le gendarme du Moyen-Orient »
L'été meurtrier au Moyen-Orient. Pourquoi ?
Gilles Kepel : Nous assistons à la remise en cause du Moyen-Orient, tel qu'il est sorti des accords Sykes-Picot à l'issue de la première guerre mondiale. Les frontières tracées par les Anglais et les Français après le démembrement de l'Empire ottoman ont été un facteur de stabilité. Ces frontières, contestées par les nationalistes arabes, n'en ont pas moins favorisé des systèmes d'équilibre, le maintien de dictatures et l'absence de démocratisation. Mais elles avaient aussi empêché le chaos qui règne aujourd'hui.

Iran:
Ce qui se passe en Irak, à Gaza ou en Syrie s'inscrit dans le processus de réintégration ou non de l'Iran dans la stratégie moyen-orientale.
Téhéran pourra redevenir le gendarme de la région qu'il était avant 1979. Ce pays de 80 millions d'habitants dispose de la bureaucratie étatique nécessaire et surtout de la classe moyenne qui a résisté aux tribulations du régime.

US:
Pour les Etats-Unis, dans une stratégie à long terme où la part du Moyen-Orient dans la production d'énergie mondiale va décliner, la question se pose de savoir si leur forte présence militaire vaut toujours la peine.
La solution du tout-technologique qui assurait la supériorité de l'Occident a fait apparaître des fissures dont se servent ses adversaires.

Israël:
Les opposants à cette reconnaissance faisaient observer que le Hamas, comme le Hezbollah, conserverait son armée et que le mouvement islamique au pouvoir à Gaza gagnerait sur tous les tableaux. Le Hamas comme le Hezbollah sont considérés comme les deux bras armés de l'Iran dans la région. Il fallait donc au préalable détruire l'arsenal du Hamas et affaiblir du même coup l'axe iranien. Le résultat n'a pas été à la hauteur de ses attentes.

EI:
Pour les Arabes du Golfe, l'hégémonie de Téhéran est un scénario de cauchemar. Turcs, Qatariens, Saoudiens ont vu dans l'Etat islamique le levier qui allait leur permettre d'en finir avec Bachar Al-Assad, allié de l'Iran. Le monstre qu'ils ont enfanté leur fait peur désormais.

Plus inquiétant, ce phénomène est devenu une sorte de grand récit dominant dans le monde sunnite. L'immense majorité des sunnites contre l'Etat islamique est bien en peine de lui opposer un autre grand récit aussi mobilisateur.

EU:
Il me paraît impossible de penser les problèmes sociaux qui agitent la société française indépendamment de ces bouleversements.

L'histoire de l'empire colonial fait partie de la nôtre comme de celle du Maghreb. Les élites maghrébines qui ont pris le pouvoir après les indépendances, tout comme les élites issues du gaullisme, ont vécu sur l'illusion que chacun pouvait vivre de son côté. C'est faux ! Nous continuons d'être interpénétrés. Il faut arriver à penser cette interpénétration, faute de quoi elle reviendra sous la forme du « retour du refoulé » salafiste et magique.

On voit bien comment cette nouvelle idéologie d'extrême droite mêle à la fois l'antisémitisme traditionnel et une judéophobie issue de la vision salafiste du monde. Ce mélange, cette confusion populiste, qui est aussi l'expression d'une souffrance sociale, constitue aujourd'hui un problème majeur.

Maghreb:
Or, pour la première fois dans un pays du Maghreb, un gouvernement n'a pas construit sa légitimité sur la lutte contre le colonialisme français mais sur la lutte contre un dictateur issu de l'indépendance. Cela permet à la Tunisie d'avoir une relation beaucoup plus décontractée avec la France, car celle-ci prend mieux en compte la réalité des flux économiques, migratoires. Elle est donc plus porteuse d'avenir.
video  middle-east  explained  today 
september 2014 by aries1988
Chiites-sunnites, guerres ouvertes
Tout comme le conflit entre protestants et catholiques a déchiré l’Europe du XVIIe siècle, la guerre entre chiites et sunnites est en train de redessiner la carte du Proche-Orient en ce début de XXIe siècle et de définir l’avenir de l’islam politique à l’échelle mondiale.

Car en fait, tout a (re) commencé avec la Révolution islamique de 1979, qui a renversé le régime pro-américain du chah. En prenant le leadership de la contestation, puis en éliminant ses concurrents de gauche, l’ayatollah Khomeiny a imposé au clergé chiite et à l’Iran une vision politisée et révolutionnaire de l’islam.

Cheval de Troie de la présence iranienne dans le monde arabe, la Syrie a aidé l’Iran à fonder le Hezbollah, qui recrute dans la communauté chiite libanaise et s’est peu à peu imposé comme l’un des plus redoutables ennemis d’Israël.
religion  middle-east 
august 2014 by aries1988
« L'Etat islamique, l'alliance entre Al-Qaida et Call of Duty »
Il faut arrêter de croire que les Etats-Unis voient tout et entendent tout face à un mouvement qui a pris l'habitude de se protéger et qui sait que les téléphones sont écoutés. De plus, les drones américains sont considérés comme des engins ennemis dans le ciel syrien, tout comme les forces spéciales qui interviendraient en territoire hostile, tant du côté du gouvernement de Damas que des djihadistes.
middle-east  analysis  today  crisis  terrorism 
august 2014 by aries1988
The Conundrum of a Unified Iraq and a Unified Syria - NYTimes.com
Today, the Ottomans are gone, the British and French are gone and now many of the kings and dictators are gone. We removed Iraq’s dictator; NATO and tribal rebels removed Libya’s; the people of Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen got rid of theirs; and some people in Syria have tried to topple theirs. Each country is now faced with the challenge of trying to govern itself horizontally by having the different sects, parties and tribes agree on social contracts for how to live together as equal citizens who rotate power.

Pluralism came to Europe only after many centuries of one side or another in religious wars thinking it could have it all, and after much ethnic cleansing created more homogeneous nations. Europe also went through the Enlightenment and the Reformation. Arab Muslims need to go on the same journey.
explained  middle-east  today 
june 2014 by aries1988
The Useless Tree: Egypt is not China
Egypt now is institutionally disintegrating before our very eyes. The earlier regime change opened the political system to much more participation and mobilization than the institutional capacities of the state could handle
explained  opinion  middle-east  china  comparison 
august 2013 by aries1988
Egypt Is Arena for Influence of Arab Rivals - NYTimes.com
Qatar, in alliance with Turkey, has given strong financial and diplomatic support to the Muslim Brotherhood, but also to other Islamists operating on the battlefields of Syria and, before that, Libya. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, by comparison, have sought to restore the old, authoritarian order, fearful that Islamist movements
middle-east  analysis  opinion  today  future 
july 2013 by aries1988
小贩之死
蝴蝶在热带轻轻扇动一下翅膀,就可能给遥远的国家带来一场飓风。一位名叫布阿齐兹的突尼斯小贩的轰然倒下,如同蝴蝶那扇动的翅膀,引发了世界新的一波民主化浪潮,这波浪潮直到现在仍然方兴未艾,其影响已经开始波及更广的范围。小贩之死,成为一曲临终哀乐,奏响的不仅仅是中东国家强人政权的末路之音。
middle-east  democracy  people 
april 2011 by aries1988

Copy this bookmark:





to read