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Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys | Center for Information Technology Policy
Contrary to popular assumption, DRAMs used in most modern computers retain their contents for seconds to minutes after power is lost, even at operating temperatures and even if removed from a motherboard. Although DRAMs become less reliable when they are not refreshed, they are not immediately erased, and their contents persist sufficiently for malicious (or forensic) acquisition of usable full-system memory images. We show that this phenomenon limits the ability of an operating system to protect cryptographic key material from an attacker with physical access. We use cold reboots to mount attacks on popular disk encryption systems — BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt — using no special devices or materials. We experimentally characterize the extent and predictability of memory remanence and report that remanence times can be increased dramatically with simple techniques. We offer new algorithms for finding cryptographic keys in memory images and for correcting errors caused by bit decay. Though we discuss several strategies for partially mitigating these risks, we know of no simple remedy that would eliminate them.
security  paper  dram  memory  attack  encryption  infosec 
6 days ago by jabley
Stack Overflow Considered Harmful? The Impact of Copy&Paste on Android Application Security
Online programming discussion platforms such as
Stack Overflow serve as a rich source of information for software
developers. Available information include vibrant discussions
and oftentimes ready-to-use code snippets. Previous research
identified Stack Overflow as one of the most important information sources developers rely on. Anecdotes report that
software developers copy and paste code snippets from those
information sources for convenience reasons. Such behavior
results in a constant flow of community-provided code snippets
into production software. To date, the impact of this behaviour
on code security is unknown.
We answer this highly important question by quantifying
the proliferation of security-related code snippets from Stack
Overflow in Android applications available on Google Play.
Access to the rich source of information available on Stack
Overflow including ready-to-use code snippets provides huge
benefits for software developers. However, when it comes to
code security there are some caveats to bear in mind: Due
to the complex nature of code security, it is very difficult to
provide ready-to-use and secure solutions for every problem.
Hence, integrating a security-related code snippet from Stack
Overflow into production software requires caution and expertise.
Unsurprisingly, we observed insecure code snippets being copied
into Android applications millions of users install from Google
Play every day.
To quantitatively evaluate the extent of this observation, we
scanned Stack Overflow for code snippets and evaluated their
security score using a stochastic gradient descent classifier. In
order to identify code reuse in Android applications, we applied
state-of-the-art static analysis. Our results are alarming: 15.4%
of the 1.3 million Android applications we analyzed, contained
security-related code snippets from Stack Overflow. Out of these
97.9% contain at least one insecure code snippet.
filetype:pdf  paper  security  research  infosec  code  reuse 
october 2019 by jabley
[no title]
how information operations have been carried out in the past to exploit divisions
filetype:pdf  cybersecurity  security  infosec 
july 2019 by jabley
Programming Satan’s Computer
Cryptographic protocols are used in distributed systems to
identify users and authenticate transactions. They may involve the exchange of about 2–5 messages, and one might think that a program of
this size would be fairly easy to get right. However, this is absolutely not
the case: bugs are routinely found in well known protocols, and years
after they were first published. The problem is the presence of a hostile
opponent, who can alter messages at will. In effect, our task is to program a computer which gives answers which are subtly and maliciously
wrong at the most inconvenient possible moment. This is a fascinating
problem; and we hope that the lessons learned from programming Satan’s computer may be helpful in tackling the more common problem of
programming Murphy’s.
paper  security  infosec  comp-sci  crypto  protocol  design 
june 2019 by jabley
ExSpectre: Hiding Malware in Speculative Execution
Recently, the Spectre and Meltdown attacks revealed serious vulnerabilities in modern CPU designs, allowing
an attacker to exfiltrate data from sensitive programs. These
vulnerabilities take advantage of speculative execution to coerce
a processor to perform computation that would otherwise not
occur, leaking the resulting information via side channels to an
attacker.
In this paper, we extend these ideas in a different direction,
and leverage speculative execution in order to hide malware from
both static and dynamic analysis. Using this technique, critical
portions of a malicious program’s computation can be shielded
from view, such that even a debugger following an instructionlevel trace of the program cannot tell how its results were
computed.
We introduce ExSpectre, which compiles arbitrary malicious
code into a seemingly-benign payload binary. When a separate
trigger program runs on the same machine, it mistrains the CPU’s
branch predictor, causing the payload program to speculatively
execute its malicious payload, which communicates speculative
results back to the rest of the payload program to change its
real-world behavior.
We study the extent and types of execution that can be
performed speculatively, and demonstrate several computations
that can be performed covertly. In particular, within speculative execution we are able to decrypt memory using AES-NI
instructions at over 11 kbps. Building on this, we decrypt and
interpret a custom virtual machine language to perform arbitrary
computation and system calls in the real world. We demonstrate
this with a proof-of-concept dial back shell, which takes only
a few milliseconds to execute after the trigger is issued. We
also show how our corresponding trigger program can be a preexisting benign application already running on the system, and
demonstrate this concept with OpenSSL driven remotely by the
attacker as a trigger program.
ExSpectre demonstrates a new kind of malware that evades
existing reverse engineering and binary analysis techniques. Because its true functionality is contained in seemingly unreachable
dead code, and its control flow driven externally by potentially
any other program running at the same time, ExSpectre poses a
novel threat to state-of-the-art malware analysis techniques.
malware  cpu  papers  security  filetype:pdf  infosec  spectre  vulnerability 
march 2019 by jabley
ACLs don't
The ACL model is unable to make correct access decisions for interactions involving more than
two principals, since required information is not retained across message sends. Though this
deficiency has long been documented in the published literature, it is not widely understood. This
logic error in the ACL model is exploited by both the clickjacking and Cross-Site Request
Forgery attacks that affect many Web applications.
filetype:pdf  paper  web  infosec  vulnerability  security 
january 2019 by jabley
Macaroons: Cookies with Contextual Caveats for Decentralized Authorization in the Cloud
Controlled sharing is fundamental to distributed
systems; yet, on the Web, and in the Cloud, sharing is still
based on rudimentary mechanisms. More flexible, decentralized
cryptographic authorization credentials have not been adopted,
largely because their mechanisms have not been incrementally
deployable, simple enough, or efficient enough to implement
across the relevant systems and devices.
This paper introduces macaroons: flexible authorization credentials for Cloud services that support decentralized delegation
between principals. Macaroons are based on a construction that
uses nested, chained MACs (e.g., HMACs [43]) in a manner that
is highly efficient, easy to deploy, and widely applicable.
Although macaroons are bearer credentials, like Web cookies,
macaroons embed caveats that attenuate and contextually confine
when, where, by who, and for what purpose a target service
should authorize requests. This paper describes macaroons and
motivates their design, compares them to other credential systems,
such as cookies and SPKI/SDSI [14], evaluates and measures a
prototype implementation, and discusses practical security and
application considerations. In particular, it is considered how
macaroons can enable more fine-grained authorization in the
Cloud, e.g., by strengthening mechanisms like OAuth2 [17], and
a formalization of macaroons is given in authorization logic.
web  security  paper  filetype:pdf  authentication  authorisation 
january 2019 by jabley
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