recentpopularlog in

jerryking : u.s.-china_relations   46

Tech innovation needs a level playing field
January 19, 2020 | Financial Times | by Rana Foroohar.

.........Creating an even playing field will require both monopoly scrutiny and a close examination of whether the pendulum in the patent system has swung too far towards benefiting tech companies that depend more on data and networks than patents, or have an interest in making it tougher to obtain patents.

Because their own products (for example, smartphones) require so many different bits of technology, the companies have an interest in keeping these inputs as cheap as possible. They can deploy legions of lawyers to protect any crucial IP of their own while “efficiently infringing” on the patents that belong to others (that’s the term for violations done knowingly by big companies as a cost of doing business).
......The US, in particular, has work to do there. “Our leadership on the global stage depends on our ability to promote and protect the innovations of American creators, engineers, and scientists,” said Democratic Senator Chris Coons, who has sponsored bipartisan legislation to strengthen America’s own IP protection. “I’m concerned that while our competitors — like China — strengthen their intellectual property regimes, we have been weakening our own innovation ecosystem.”
.......But the US has another problem — that of trying to compete with a state-run economy like China’s when it has no national innovation strategy. While large American companies are busy fighting each other in expensive legal battles to see who gets to set standards for smart speakers (or 5G, or AI, or a host of other areas), China is using its Belt and Road Initiative to roll out its own equipment, technology standards and interests across nations from Asia to Southern Europe. That’s not duplication. It’s just smart.
Big_Tech  China  cross-licensing  entrepreneurship  Google  industrial_policies  innovation  innovation_policies  intellectual_property  national_interests  One_Belt_One_Road  patents  patent_infringement  Rana_Foroohar  smart_speakers  Sonos  technical_standards  U.S.-China_relations 
4 weeks ago by jerryking
Consciously decoupling the US economy
December 1 , 2019 | Financial Times | Rana Foroohar.

The US is economically decoupling from the rest of the world.....Europe is being pulled into China’s technology orbit via the 5G standards and technologies that make up part of the Belt and Road Initiative......one of the most important things the US could do right now to ensure both national security and its own position in the 21st-century digital economy would be to work with allies on transatlantic standards for emerging technologies like 5G, artificial intelligence and so on....... decoupling is no longer a fringe idea......the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is now admitting that we are in a more fragmented world — one that won’t reset to the 1990s — and advocating what amounts to a US industrial policy--- a major shift in thinking. Deglobalisation, the idea of the US and China decoupling economically, is now mainstream.....heightened awareness of the relationship between national security and technology........it is becoming a given that the US needs a more coherent national economic strategy in a world in which state capitalism is in the ascendant. The question is how to get there. And that’s where the internal contradictions in America’s laissez-faire, free-market system start to become a problem......what role should government play?........What should the private sector expect from government and what should they be willing to do in exchange (e.g. Will FAANG repatriate profits to the U.S.? Will Silicon Valley and Wall Street volunteer to retrain the millions of underemployed millennials? How can we move from 40 years of supply-side thinking that has benefited multinational companies, towards something that better supports local economies and workers? ...if America is going to compete with a state-run economy like China in the digital era — one that seems to support a winner-takes-all dynamic — we are going to need bigger, public-sector directed shifts.
5G  adversaries  CFR  China  China_rising  decoupling  deglobalization  digital_economy  industrial_policies  military-industrial_complex  multinationals  new_tech_Cold_War  One_Belt_One_Road  public_sector  Rana_Foroohar  security_&_intelligence  state_capitalism  supply_chains  tariffs  technical_standards  technology  U.S.-China_relations  winner-take-all 
11 weeks ago by jerryking
Opinion | The World-Shaking News That You’re Missing
Nov. 26, 2019 | The New York Times | By Thomas L. Friedman

** “Has China Won? by  Kishore Mahbubani

A new wall — a digital Berlin Wall — had begun to be erected between China and America. And the only thing left to be determined, a Chinese business executive remarked to me, “is how high this wall will be,” and which countries will choose to be on which side.

This new wall, separating a U.S.-led technology and trade zone from a Chinese-led one, will have implications as vast as the wall bisecting Berlin did. Because the peace, prosperity and accelerations in technology and globalization that have so benefited the world over the past 40 years were due, in part, to the interweaving of the U.S. and Chinese economies.

The messy, ad hoc decoupling of these two economies, driven by miscalculations by leaders on both sides, will surely disrupt those trends and the costs could be huge. We might want to talk about that.

Former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson gave a speech here a year ago trying to kick-start that discussion. “For 40 years,” Paulson noted, “the U.S.-China relationship has been characterized by the integration of four things: goods, capital, technology and people. And over these 40 years, economic integration between the two countries was supposed to mitigate security competition. But an intellectually honest appraisal must now admit both that this hasn’t happened and that the reverse is taking place.” That reversal is happening for two reasons. First, because the U.S. is — rightly — no longer willing to accept China’s unfair trade practices. Second, because, now that China is a technology powerhouse — and technological products all have both economic and military applications........“after 40 years of integration, a surprising number of political and thought leaders on both sides advocate policies that could forcibly de-integrate the two countries across all four of these baskets.” the digital Berlin Wall took a big step up on May 17, when Trump blacklisted China’s Huawei.......Lots of Chinese tech companies are now thinking: We will never, ever, ever leave ourselves again in a situation where we are totally dependent on America for key components. Time to double down on making our own......similarly, U.S. manufacturers are thinking twice about building their next factory in China or solely depending on a supply chain from there.....this is the sound of two giant economies starting to decouple.....the State Department has been restricting visas for Chinese graduate students studying in sensitive fields — like aviation, robotics and advanced manufacturing ....
What to do?
Friedman is worried that by imposing more and more export and visa controls we will be cutting ourselves off from the access we need to the global investment pools, customers and collaborative scientists and engineers to maintain our technological lead.

I still believe that the most open systems win — they get all the signals of change first, they attract the most high-I.Q. risk-takers/innovators and they enrich and are enriched by the most global flows of talent, ideas and capital. That used to be us.....

China is our economic competitor, economic partner, source of talent and capital, geopolitical rival, collaborator and serial rule-breaker. It is not our enemy or our friend.

The only effective way to manage a relationship this complex is:
1) with an all-of-government approach. You can’t have the Justice Department doing one thing, the Pentagon another, the Treasury another, the trade negotiators another, the State Department another and the president tweeting another. And
2), we need as many Pacific and European allies as possible so it’s “The Whole World Versus China”
blacklists  books  China  China_rising  co-ordinated_approaches  decoupling  Donald_Trump  dual-use  economic_disengagement  economic_integration  espionage  future  Hank_Paulson  Huawei  miscalculations  new_tech_Cold_War  open_borders  security_&_intelligence  seismic_shifts  self-sufficiency  signals  students  supply_chains  technology  Tom_Friedman  undermining_of_trust  U.S.-China_relations  visa_students  walled_gardens  Xi_Jinping 
12 weeks ago by jerryking
Unsettling precedents for today’s world
November 26, 2019 | | Financial Times | Martin Wolf.

** Destined for War, Harvard’s Graham Allison
**  The Rise and the Fall of the Great Powers, by Paul Kennedy

Martin Wolf focuses on the three eras of conflict of the past 120 years. 
(1) the cold war (1948-1989) between a liberal democratic west, led by the US, and the communist Soviet Union, a transformed version of the pre-first world war Russian empire. This was a great power conflict between the chief victors of the second world war.....The cold war ended in peaceful triumph. 

(2) the interwar years. This was an interregnum in which the attempt to restore the pre-first world war order failed, the US withdrew from Europe and a huge financial and economic crisis, emanating originally from the US, ravaged the world economy. It was a time of civil strife, populism, nationalism, communism, fascism and national socialism. The 1930s are an abiding lesson in the possibility of democratic collapse once elites fail. They are also a lesson of what happens when great countries fall into the hands of power-hungry lunatics.....the interwar period ended in a catastrophic war.

(3) the decisive period 1870-1914 saw a rebalancing of economic power. In 1880, the UK generated 23 per cent of global manufacturing output. By 1913, this had fallen to 14 per cent. Over the same period, Germany’s share rose from 9 per cent to 15 per cent. This shift in the European balance led to a catastrophic Thucydidean war between the UK, an anxious status quo power, especially once the Germans started building a modern fleet, and Germany, a resentful rising one. Meanwhile, US industrial output went from 15 to 32 per cent of the world’s, while China fell into irrelevance. Thereupon, US action (in the 20th century’s big conflicts) and inaction (in the interwar years) determined the outcomes.....The pre-1914 period ended in a catastrophic war.

Today’s era is a mixture of all three of these. It is marked by a conflict of political systems and ideology between two superpowers, as in the cold war, by a post-financial crisis decline of confidence in democratic politics and market economics as well as by the rise of populism, nationalism and authoritarianism, as in the 1930s, and, most significantly, by a dramatic shift in relative economic power, with the rise of China, as with the US before 1914. For the first time since then, the US faces a power with an economic potential exceeding its own.....what lessons are to be learned from the eras above?
(A) One lesson is that one is that quality of leadership matters!!!!
Xi Jinping’s capacities and intentions are clear enough: he is devoted to party dominance over a resurgent China. But the political system of the western world and especially the US and UK, the two powers that dragged the world through the 1930s, is failing. US President Donald Trump’s erratic leadership recalls that of Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm. Without better leadership, the west and so the wider world are in deep trouble.

(B) Another lesson is the overriding importance of avoiding war.
(C) the most important conclusion is that avoiding yet another catastrophe is insufficient.......Our fates are too deeply intertwined for that. A positive-sum vision of relations between the west, China and the rest has to become dominant if we are to manage the economic, security and environmental challenges we face.
'30s  books  China  China_rising  Cold_War  Donald_Trump  geopolitics  Graham_Allison  history  Martin_Wolf  rising_powers  superpowers  thought-provoking  U.S.  U.S.-China_relations  WWII  Xi_Jinping 
12 weeks ago by jerryking
Stephen Schwarzman: ‘I like to do things that are beautiful’
September 20, 2019 | Financial Times | by Lionel Barber.

Schwarzman’s fortune (net worth about $18bn) has bought him power and influence. He’s graduated from being a mega dealmaker to philanthropist, back channel in US-China relations and “Trump whisperer”. I want to explore these multiple roles, but also pin down why the man who has built one of the most successful financial businesses on the planet has never quite received the credit he believes he deserves......Blackstone started as a boutique advisory firm, with the goal of making enough money to start its own private equity fund. Private equity has attracted controversy because of alleged asset-stripping: buying companies, loading them with debt (“leverage”) and selling them off at a handsome profit, with favourable tax treatment.

Schwarzman casts himself as a long-term investor, not a scavenger in sheep’s clothing. He recounts with gusto the megadeals and the risk-taking involved in picking the right time to buy and sell assets, ranging from US Steel’s railroad network to the Waldorf hotel.

His skill is market timing. Blackstone has expanded into real estate and hedge funds and other “alternative assets”, with $545bn under management today. Blackstone funds are also the largest owner of real estate in the world. The firm’s rise epitomises the “buy side” revolution that favours asset managers at the expense of traditional banks trading liquid securities.

Schwarzman has written a book, which is part memoir, part Blackstone management primer called What It Takes: Lessons in the Pursuit of Excellence. (A better title would be Whatever It Takes, I suggest.) ......Blackstone is a meritocracy, he says, where two iron rules apply: no internal politics and do not lose money. “I go from the premise that anybody of talent does not want necessarily to be a private in an army. The lowest they want is to be a lieutenant colonel and preferably they’d all like to be generals.”......We turn to Schwarzman’s generous philanthropy. In recent years, he has donated $100m to the New York Public Library, $150m to Yale, £150m to Oxford university, $350m to MIT. He’s also set up the Schwarzman scholars, a one-year masters programme on global affairs for top international students to study at Tsinghua University in Beijing.
alternative_investments  Blackstone  books  dealmakers  investors  market_timing  philanthropy  private_equity  Stephen_Schwarzman  U.S.-China_relations 
september 2019 by jerryking
How China’s formidable cyber capabilities sparked a tech cold war
July 22, 2019 | | Financial Times | Geoff Dyer.

Chinese Spies: From Chairman Mao to Xi Jinping, by Roger Faligot, translated by Natasha Lehrer, Hurst, RRP£30, 568 pages.... the mercantilist mindset of the US administration and partly in the insecurities of a section of Washington’s foreign policy establishment, prompting the search for new demons to slay. But it is also an inevitable reaction to the aggressive intelligence and surveillance capabilities that China has installed.
Roger Faligot’s history of spying in the Chinese Communist party highlights the turbocharged growth in the nation’s intelligence services......Spying has been baked into the fabric of the Chinese Communist party since its earliest days......Faligot’s subject is the Chinese Communist party and its efforts to develop what he describes as the largest intelligence service in the world. He places particular emphasis on the state security ministry, known as the Guoanbu, the biggest of the non-military spying agencies......The central figure was Zhou Enlai, China’s premier from 1949 to 1976. Zhou’s early career is known more for the diplomatic skills he demonstrated during the second world war but he also developed a taste for clandestine activities as a young man in his twenties in Paris.
......Returning to China in 1928 after a spell at the GRU spy school in the Lenin Hills outside Moscow, Zhou established a series of intelligence networks which, Faligot writes, have a “direct link” with “today’s service”......Two themes, in particular, come through. First, right from the outset, China’s spy agencies latched on to the internet — both as a powerful weapon and as a tool for greater social control....As well as overseas intrusion, the intelligence agencies have been “given a mission to organise a vast system of control of the Chinese population”. Many of the new techniques were first developed in Xinjiang and Tibet, including the compulsory registration of internet users, which has been used to root out cyber-dissidents. ....The second theme is the way that these capabilities have now been harnessed by one all-powerful leader............Xi has conducted a sweeping anti-corruption drive whose biggest scalp was Zhou Yongkang, who in 2015 became the first ever former member of the politburo standing committee to be convicted of serious crimes and sentenced to life in prison. Arresting Zhou allowed Xi to take out a political rival. But it also allowed him to orchestrate a putsch of the security services, which Zhou had been in charge of in the previous administration. During his period as China’s effective spy chief, Zhou had set up what Faligot calls a “parallel diplomacy service” and had also been snooping on all the other senior Chinese leaders. The purge of “the old Zhou Yongkang system,” Faligot concludes, allowed Xi “to retake control of the CCP, the PLA and the secret services.”
books  book_reviews  China  Chinese_Communist_Party  Cold_War  cyberattacks  cyber_warfare  GRU  Guoanbu  new_tech_Cold_War  security_&_intelligence  Tibet  turbocharge  U.S.-China_relations  Xi_Jinping 
july 2019 by jerryking
The U.S. Is Ceding the Pacific to China
March 3, 2019 | WSJ | By Mark Helprin.

While Washington’s focus is elsewhere, Beijing plays the long game—that means preparing for war.

The only effective leverage on China, and by extension North Korea—which otherwise will retain nuclear weapons whether overtly or covertly but certainly—is to alter the correlation of military forces in the Western Pacific, and indeed in the world, so that it no longer moves rapidly and inevitably in China’s favor, which is what China cares about, the essence of its policy, its central proposition. Though with some effort the U.S. is perfectly capable of embarking upon this strategy, it has not. It seems we lack the awareness, political will, intelligence, probity, discipline, leadership, and habit of mind to do so.
America_in_Decline?  Asia_Pacific  balance_of_power  China  China_rising  geopolitics  hard_power  long-term  long-range  maritime  Mark_Helprin  North_Korea  nuclear  PACOM  political_geography  rivalries  South_China_Sea  strategic_geography  submarines  trade_wars  U.S.  U.S._Navy  USMC  U.S.-China_relations  Xi_Jinping  zero-sum_games 
march 2019 by jerryking
Opinion | Why the World Needs America and China to Get Along - The New York Times
By Robert E. Rubin
Mr. Rubin was secretary of the Treasury from 1995 to 1999 and is co-chairman emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Jan. 2, 2019

Leaders in both countries should recognize our imperative self-interest in working together on hugely consequential transnational issues, especially two threats to life on earth as we know it: nuclear weapons and climate change.

No single country can tackle these threats alone, and existing international institutions have proved inadequate. The best chance for successfully dealing with these overarching issues — as well as other transnational issues like pandemics, terrorism and cybersecurity — is for the world’s two largest national economies to catalyze global action.
CFR  China  climate_change  Donald_Trump  nuclear  Robert_Rubin  U.S.  U.S.-China_relations 
january 2019 by jerryking
China Gets Its Message to Americans but Doesn’t Want to Reciprocate - WSJ
By Orville Schell and Larry Diamond
Dec. 21, 2018

.......Getting China to agree to a new level of fairness and reciprocity may be exceedingly difficult and even create some risks, but it is the only path to a healthier, more durable relationship between the two countries.
China  China_rising  Communicating_&_Connecting  public_diplomacy  public_relations  reciprocity  U.S.-China_relations 
december 2018 by jerryking
Year in a Word: Thucydides’s trap
December 18, 2018 | Financial Times | Gideon Rachman |

Thucydides’s trap

Coined by Harvard professor Graham Allison to capture the idea that the rivalry between an established power and a rising one often ends in war....The ancient Greek historian Thucydides had observed that the Peloponnesian war (431BC-404BC) was caused by “the growth of Athenian power and the fear that this caused in Sparta”....
Graham_Allison  op-ed  rivalries  Thucydides_trap  China  China_rising  conflicts  endgame  Huawei  security_&_intelligence  superpowers  rising_powers  grand_strategy  strategic_thinking  U.S.foreign_policy  U.S.-China_relations  post-Cold_War  Donald_Trump  confrontations 
december 2018 by jerryking
Globe editorial: Why the Meng case feels like a replay of 2001 - The Globe and Mail
On Sept. 10, 2001, if you’d asked a random collection of international policy experts to name the biggest challenge to the global order, most of them would have given a one-word answer: China.....And then 9/11 happened. Nearly two decades later, it’s as if the world has awakened from that detour to find itself at its original destination, and much sooner than expected.

A China once rising has now risen – by some measures, it’s already the world’s largest economy......It’s why the arrest this month of Meng Wanzhou in Vancouver, and China’s response, feel like a kind of replay of the Hainan incident – but under very different circumstances. Compared with 2001, today’s China is far more powerful. It is also more than ever at the centre of the global economic and political system. Yet, it doesn’t always follow the rules and norms of that system. And that has created a paradox – the paradox expected by pre-9/11 analysts. China is part of the system. It is also an antagonist.

Though it’s put itself and its products at the centre of the international economy, China also operates with one foot outside of the international order. For example, it’s part of the WTO and its free-trade rules, from which it benefits. But it takes advantage of the rules more than it follows them.

It’s part of a global co-operative of organizations such as Interpol....but earlier this year, the man it placed at the head of the organization was effectively disappeared by his own government.....It’s also a government that responded to the arrest of Ms. Meng by kidnapping two Canadians on invented charges...The case is a reminder of the two big China challenges that Ottawa, and its allies, must grapple with.

The fact that China is part of the international economy and the largely open movement of goods and people is a good thing.....However, China has abused the invitation to join the international trading system. The Trump administration is right that China is an unfair trader. The trade relationship has to be realigned. The goal should not be to shut China out. It must be to ensure that China is made fully part of the system and is bound by rules imposed by the rest of the developed world, which together is much wealthier and more powerful than China.
Canada  Canada-China_relations  China  China_rising  developing_countries  editorials  foreign_policy  Huawei  international_system  Meng_Wanzhou  multipolarity  paradoxes  piracy  reprisals  rogue_actors  U.S.-China_relations  WTO 
december 2018 by jerryking
America, China and the art of confrontation
December 17, 2018 | Financial Times | Gideon Rachman.

Tell me how this ends? was the despairing question attributed to American generals as they contemplated the quagmires in Vietnam and Iraq. The same question needs to be asked by US policymakers now, as they consider the escalating tensions between America and China.

The world’s two most powerful countries are locked into confrontations on a range of issues, including trade, technology, espionage and control of the South China Sea. Broadly speaking, there are two ways of interpreting these clashes. The first is that Donald Trump’s administration is determined to reset the US-China relationship. The second is that the US has now embarked on an effort to block China’s rise.

The first approach focuses on objectionable Chinese behaviour; the second objects to the very idea of China as a rival superpower.

These two ways of thinking point to very different potential endings. The first approach — the reset — ultimately ends with a deal. The second approach — blocking the rise of China — points to a prolonged and deepening antagonism......but, over the long term, both Washington and Beijing must think more profoundly about “how this ends”.

The Chinese need to recognise that there has been a profound and bipartisan shift in American thinking. So trying to hoodwink Mr Trump or wait him out will ultimately not work. Instead, China has to consider much more significant changes in its policies on everything from forced technology transfer, to the South China Sea. It could be its last chance to head off a long-term confrontation with the Americans.

The US also has some thinking to do. The hawks in Washington are relishing the more overt use of US power in their confrontation with China. But they too need to think about “how this ends”.

It is not realistic to think that the US can ultimately stop China’s rise.
China  China_rising  conflicts  endgame  Huawei  rivalries  security_&_intelligence  superpowers  Thucydides_Trap  rising_powers  grand_strategy  strategic_thinking  U.S.foreign_policy  post-Cold_War  Donald_Trump  confrontations  U.S.-China_relations 
december 2018 by jerryking
Opinion | The Real China Challenge: Managing Its Decline - The New York Times
By Bret Stephens
Opinion Columnist

Nov. 29, 2018

.Bret Stephens read a deeply reported and thought-provoking series in The Times about another country of the future: China. The phrase “rise of China” has now become so commonplace that we treat it more as a fact of nature than as a prediction of a very familiar sort — one made erroneously about the Soviet Union in the 1950s and ’60s; about Japan in the ’70s and ’80s; and about the European Union in the ’90s and ’00s.....Beijing has ignored orthodox economic nostrums about the need for ever-greater market liberalization and fewer state controls while still managing to thrive. ....cruelty.... forced laborers....Tyrannies do not work in the long run....capital flight.... 46 % of wealthy Chinese wish to emigrate, most of them to the U.S.....individual rights, democratic choices, rule of law, competitive markets, high levels of transparency, low levels of government corruption, independent news sources, and freedoms of thought, conscience and speech are assets beyond price.....If you define power as the power to attract and not simply compel [jk: that is, soft power], then Beijing — with its dystopian vision to fully surveil and rate all citizens by 2020 — isn’t a rising power at all. It’s a collapsing one.......What about the skyscrapers of Guangzhou? What about the world-beating test scores of students in Shanghai?.....China’s rise is not some kind of mirage. But what matters is the future, not the past, and whether a nation built on constraining the freedoms granted to ordinary people can outpace, outsmart, and outlast another nation built on defending and broadening those freedoms....American policymakers and pundits often talk about the challenge of managing China’s rise. They had better start thinking instead of the challenge of managing its decline, beginning at the G-20 summit in Buenos Aires this weekend. Japan and Europe went gently into eclipse, and the Soviet Union surrendered without a fight (at least until its current revanchist phase).

Will China’s current leadership accept the possibility of their own decline so philosophically, after having convinced themselves of their rapid rise to primacy? Nobody should bet on it. A wounded tiger is rarely a placid one.
Bret_Stephens  capital_flight  China  China_rising  clichés  counterintuitive  decline  institutional_integrity  op-ed  rule_of_law  soft_power  thought-provoking  U.S.-China_relations 
november 2018 by jerryking
Globalised business is a US security issue | Financial Times
Rana Foroohar YESTERDAY

there is a much broader group of people in both the public and the private sector who would like to reverse the economic integration of China and the US for strategic reasons..... a two-day event sponsored late last month by the National Defense University, which brings together military and civilian leaders to discuss the big challenges of the day. Dozens of experts, government officials, and business leaders gathered to talk about the decline in the post-second world war order, the rise of China, and how the US could strengthen its manufacturing and defence industries. The goal would be to create resilient supply chains that could withstand not just a trade war, but an actual war......“If you accept as your starting point that we are in a great power struggle [with China and Russia], then you have to think about securing the innovation base, making viable the industrial base, and scaling it all,”....Included on the event’s reading list was Freedom’s Forge, which outlines the role that US business — notably carmakers — played in gearing up the US for war in the early 1940s. At that time, because of the depth and breadth of the auto industry’s manufacturing and logistical might, the sector was viewed as being just as important to national security as steel and aluminium.

That is not to say the US security community is pro-tariffs or trade war .... But there is a growing group of thoughtful people who believe that American national security interests will require a forcible untangling of the investment and supply chain links between the US and China. They point to high-tech areas like artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous vehicles, virtual reality, financial technology and biotech as important not only to the military but also for private sector growth.....While America’s military is still figuring out how make sure its supply chains are not controlled by strategic adversaries, the Chinese have played a much more sophisticated long game. The difference can be summed up in two words: industrial policy. China has one. The US doesn’t. The US has always steered away from a formal policy because critics see it as the government “picking winners”. But the Chinese don’t so much pick winners as use a co-ordinated approach to harnessing the technologies they need. They do it not only through investments and acquisitions but also through forced joint ventures, industrial espionage, and cybertheft [jk: predatory practices].....many multinationals were shortening their supply chains even before the current trade conflicts.

It is a trend that will probably speed up. Multinational companies, much more than domestically focused ones, will suffer collateral damage from tariffs. They will also be a major target of Chinese backlash. Anecdotally, this is already leading some groups to shift production from China to other countries, like Vietnam. If the military-industrial complex in the US has its way, those supply chains might move even closer to home.
adversaries  anecdotal  automotive_industry  books  China  China_rising  collateral_damage  co-ordinated_approaches  cybertheft  economic_integration  industrial_espionage  industrial_policies  military-industrial_complex  multinationals  predatory_practices  Rana_Foroohar  WWII  security_&_intelligence  supply_chains  trade_wars  U.S.  U.S.-China_relations 
july 2018 by jerryking
US and China must find ways to control their elites | Financial Times
July 1, 2018 | FT| Rana Foroohar. Pinboard saved article/artifact #25,000

Success rests on heading off popular unrest, rather than winning trade fights.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Tension between the US and China is driving much of what is happening in the markets today. The analysis has focused on tariffs, currency manipulation, strategic technologies and which country has the most to win or lose in a trade war.

But there is a more important question to be asked when thinking about the future success and stability of each nation: which country will be better able to control its moneyed elites?

In his 1982 work The Rise and Decline of Nations, the economist Mancur Olson argues that civilisations tend to decline when the moneyed interests take over politics. That has clearly happened in both countries, where the levels of wealth inequality are not dissimilar; the top 1 per cent in China own about 30 per cent of the economy; in the US, the figure is 42 per cent.

........Chinese leaders also believe that America’s inability to curb its own elites will be the country’s downfall [Achilles’ heel]....America’s elite business class has, for decades now, sought to distract from rising oligopoly with hypocrisy. US companies complain vociferously about unfair Chinese trade practices and intellectual property theft.
U.S.  China  elitism  Rana_Foroohar  societal_collapse  the_One_Percent  self-interest  books  economists  Mancur_Olson  entrenched_interests  Achilles’_heel  Xi_Jinping  corruption  Chinese_Communist_Party  conflicts  confrontations  U.S.-China_relations 
july 2018 by jerryking
China Started the Trade War, Not Trump
March 23, 2018 | WSJ | By Greg Ip.

Even free traders and internationalists agree China’s predatory trade practices—which include forcing U.S. business to transfer valuable technology to Chinese firms and restricting access to Chinese markets—are undermining both its partners and the trading system....starting in the 1980s, economists recognized that comparative advantage couldn’t explain success in many industries such as commercial jetliners, microprocessors and software. These industries are difficult for competitors to enter because of steep costs for research and development, previously established technical standards, increasing returns to scale (costs drop the more you sell), and network effects (the more customers use the product, the more valuable it becomes).......In such industries, a handful of firms may reap the lion’s share of the wages and profits (what economists call rents), at the expense of others. China’s efforts are aimed at achieving such dominance in many of these industries by 2025.
China  China_rising  comparative_advantage  Donald_Trump  Greg_Ip  increasing_returns_to_scale  myths  network_effects  predatory_practices  protectionism  tariffs  technical_standards  trade_wars  U.S.-China_relations  winner-take-all  WTO 
march 2018 by jerryking
America v China: How trade wars become real wars
March 11, 2017 | FT | by Gideon Rachman 2 HOURS AGO

Successive American presidents also believed that capitalism would act as a Trojan Horse — undermining one-party rule within China. As former US president George W Bush once said: “Trade freely with China, and time is on our side.” The American establishment believed that a more liberal China would be less likely to challenge the US on the international stage. One of the central tenets of liberal internationalism is that democracies do not wage war with each other.

But political developments in Xi’s China have refuted the expectations of the liberal internationalist worldview that shaped successive American presidencies. China has not become more democratic. Nor is it any longer willing to live quietly within a US-designed and dominated world order.
protectionism  U.S.  Donald_Trump  Xi_Jinping  U.S.-China_relations  trade_wars  free-trade  geopolitics  warfare  international_trade  China_rising 
march 2018 by jerryking
David Ignatius — Charlie Rose
11/07/2017 | Charlie Rose Show|

David Ignatius, columnist for The Washington Post, talks about Saudi Arabia, President Trump's China visit, and his new spy novel, Quantum Spy.
G-2  China  Saudi_Arabia  David_Ignatius  U.S.-China_relations  U.S.foreign_policy  Charlie_Rose  interviews  security_&_intelligence  authors  books  quantum_computing  novels  fiction  CIA 
november 2017 by jerryking
Chronicle of a war foretold | The Economist
Jun 27th 2015

Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War.By P.W. Singer and August Cole.Houghton Mifflin Harcourt; 404 pages; $28.
war  future  China  China_rising  PACOM  U.S._Navy  books  fiction  book_reviews  U.S.-China_relations 
november 2016 by jerryking
Turbulence Ahead for U.S., China Ties - WSJ.com
By
Andrew Browne
connect
Email
Print

Save ↓ More
13 Comments
Facebook
Twitter
Google+
LinkedIn

smaller
Larger

Dec. 17, 2013
China  China_rising  Asia_Pacific  U.S.-China_relations  turbulence  rivalries  confrontations  conflicts 
december 2013 by jerryking
An Elizabethan Cyberwar - NYTimes.com
May 31, 2013 | NYT | By JORDAN CHANDLER HIRSCH and SAM ADELSBERG.

Instead of trying to beat back the New World instability of the Internet with an old playbook, American officials should embrace it. With the conflict placed in its proper perspective, policy makers could ratchet down the rhetoric and experiment with a new range of responses that go beyond condemnation but stop short of all-out cyberwar — giving them the room to maneuver without approaching cyberconflict as a path to Defcon 1.

In these legally uncharted waters, only Elizabethan guile, not cold war brinkmanship, will steer Washington through the storm.
cunning  cyber_warfare  China  China_rising  U.S.  security_&_intelligence  guile  lessons_learned  contextual  Elizabethan  cyber_security  instability  resilience  perspectives  tools  frenemies  espionage  risk-mitigation  policy_tools  cyberweapons  U.S.-China_relations  policymakers  policymaking  playbooks 
june 2013 by jerryking
China to Seek More Equal Footing With U.S. in Talks
May 28, 2013 | NYTimes.com | By JANE PERLEZ

The relationship between the United States and China stood at a “critical juncture,” ... and it was time to explore “a new type of great power relationship.”...It is a given, Chinese and American analysts say, that Mr. Xi and his advisers are referring to the historical problem of what happens when an established power and a rising power confront each other. The analysts said the Chinese are well aware of the example of the Peloponnesian War that was caused, according to the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, by the fear that a powerful Athens instilled in Sparta.

Mr. Shi, an occasional adviser to the Chinese government, offered some ideas of what Mr. Xi has in mind.

“He wants the American president to recognize that China is dramatically rising in military and economic ways, and he wants the president to know that he is active in world diplomacy,” Mr. Shi said. “If the American president recognizes all of these things, then Xi can be nicer, nicer in his definition, in a very tense situation.”
China  U.S.foreign_policy  China_rising  Obama  security_&_intelligence  Thucydides  history  Greek  rising_powers  Thucydides_trap  U.S.-China_relations  intelligence_analysts 
may 2013 by jerryking
Zbigniew Brzezinski: As China Rises, A New U.S. Strategy - WSJ.com
DECEMBER 14, 2011 | WSJ |By ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI.

We should embrace Russia, Japan and South Korea as we seek to manage the rise of China.
strategy  strategic_thinking  diplomacy  geopolitics  China_rising  China  U.S.foreign_policy  U.S.-China_relations  NSC  APNSA 
december 2011 by jerryking
How China Can Defeat America - NYTimes.com
November 20, 2011 | NYT| By YAN XUETONG, who is the author of “Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power,” is a professor of political science and dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University....The pre-Qin period of Chinese history-- before China was unified as an empire more than 2,000 years ago — was a world in which small countries were competing ruthlessly for territorial advantage. It was perhaps the greatest period for Chinese thought, and several schools--ancient Chinese political theorists like Guanzi, Confucius, Xunzi and Mencius--competed for ideological supremacy and political influence. They converged on one crucial insight: The key to international influence was political power, and the central attribute of political power was morally informed leadership. Rulers who acted in accordance with moral norms whenever possible tended to win the race for leadership over the long term.
Confucian  Henry_Kissinger  soft_power  alliances  foreign_policy  moral_authority  values  China  China_rising  philosophy  political_theory  power  political_power  leadership  APNSA  political_influence  U.S.-China_relations 
november 2011 by jerryking
Stephens: China and the Next American Century - WSJ.com
* DECEMBER 21, 2010

China and the Next American Century
Beijing's Politburo has nothing on Mark Zuckerberg.

*
By BRET STEPHENS
Bret_Stephens  China  China_rising  America_in_Decline?  U.S.-China_relations 
december 2010 by jerryking
China's 'State Capitalism' Sparks a Global Backlash - WSJ.com
NOVEMBER 16, 2010/WSJ/ By JASON DEAN, ANDREW BROWNE And SHAI
OSTER. Bedeviling U.S.-China relations is a deep issue: China's national
economic strategy is detailed and multifaceted, and it is challenging
the U.S. and other powers on a number of fronts. Central to China's
approach are policies that champion SOEs, seek aggressively to obtain
advanced technology, and manage its exchange rate to benefit exporters.
It leverages state control of the financial sys. to channel low-cost
capital to domestic industries—and to resource-rich foreign nations
whose oil and minerals China needs to maintain rapid growth. ...Charlene
Barshefsky, Clinton's U.S.T.R.. says the rise of powerful state-led
economies like China & Russia is undermining the established
post-World War II trading system...the Chinese state is again ascendant.
...The govt. owns almost all major banks in China, its three major oil
companies, its three telecom carriers and its major media firms.
backlash  China  China_rising  industrial_policies  international_system  mercantilism  multifaceted  protectionism  post-WWII  SOEs  state-as-facilitator  state_capitalism  U.S.-China_relations 
november 2010 by jerryking
FT.com / Comment / Opinion - Obama is right to be hard-nosed on China
August 30, 2010 | Financial Times | By Minxin Pei. ``Mr
Obama has reverted to long-standing American principles in dealing with a
rising great power. For while the US can confidently manage China’s
mounting economic prowess, and count on economic progress to liberalise
the Chinese political system, the world’s sole superpower can ill-afford
to allow its new rival to become Asia’s hegemon. ``
China  China_rising  geopolitics  realpolitik  rising_powers  rivalries  superpowers  Thucydides_Trap  U.S.-China_relations  U.S.foreign_policy 
august 2010 by jerryking
Beyond the Rim
December 13, 2004 | Wall Street Journal | by MARK HELPRIN. The
21st century will be not just the century of terrorism: terrorism will
fade. It will be a naval century, with the Pacific its center, and
challenges in the remotest places of the world offered not by dervishes
and crazy-men but by a great power that is at last and at least
America's equal. Unfortunately, it is in the U.S. nature neither to
foresee nor prepare for what lies beyond the rim. With its new economic
resources China has embarked upon a military traverse from reliance
upon mass to devotion to quality, with stress upon war in space, the
oceans, and the ether--three areas of unquestioned American superiority.
China  China_rising  confrontations  cyber_security  cyber_warfare  geopolitics  maritime  Mark_Helprin  mercantilism  PACOM  rising_powers  security_&_intelligence  South_China_Sea  space_warfare  unprepared  U.S.-China_relations 
march 2010 by jerryking
Managing China's Rise
June 2005 | ATLANTIC MAGAZINE | By Benjamin Schwarz.
Contending effectively with China's ambitions requires a better
understanding of our own. (1) Acknowledge that the pace of China's
military modernization and the nature of its geopolitical alignments are
very much tied to the post—Cold War imbalance of power in Washington's
favor. (2) The U.S. should conduct whatever foreign policies it deems
appropriate—but it must recognize that actions it perceives as selfless,
others will most likely see in an entirely different light.
..Intervention by a dominant power accelerates the rise of other great
powers and ensures their wariness, if not their hostility, toward it.(3)
Rethink how Washington defines a "China threat."(4) examine the
strategic implications raised when regional and great powers emerge.
Far from discouraging the rise of China and other independent powers,
such as the European Union and Japan, Washington should recognize the
significant benefits that can result.
China  geopolitics  China_rising  U.S._Navy  U.S.-China_relations  PACOM  introspection  grand_strategy  strategic_thinking  U.S.foreign_policy  post-Cold_War  misinterpretations  Thucydides_Trap  selflessness  rising_powers  rivalries  confrontations  imbalances 
march 2010 by jerryking

Copy this bookmark:





to read