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jerryking : financial_markets   17

DE Shaw: inside Manhattan’s ‘Silicon Valley’ hedge fund
March 25, 2019 | Financial Times Robin Wigglesworth in New York.

for a wider investment industry desperately trying to reinvent itself for the 21st century, DE Shaw has evolved dramatically from the algorithmic, computer-driven “quantitative” trading it helped pioneer in the 1980s.

It is now a leader in combining quantitative investing with traditional “fundamental” strategies driven by humans, such as stockpicking. This symbiosis has been dubbed “quantamental” by asset managers now attempting to do the same. Many in the industry believe this is the future, and are rushing to hire computer scientists to help realise the benefits of big data and artificial intelligence in their strategies........DE Shaw runs some quant strategies so complex or quick that they are in practice almost beyond human understanding — something that many quantitative analysts are reluctant to concede.

The goal is to find patterns on the fuzzy edge of observability in financial markets, so faint that they haven’t already been exploited by other quants. They then hoard as many of these signals as possible and systematically mine them until they run dry — and repeat the process. These can range from tiny, fleeting arbitrage opportunities between closely-linked stocks that only machines can detect, to using new alternative data sets such as satellite imagery and mobile phone data to get a better understanding of a company’s results...... DE Shaw is also ramping up its investment in the bleeding edge of computer science, setting up a machine learning research group led by Pedro Domingos, a professor of computer science and engineering and author of The Master Algorithm, and investing in a quantum computing start-up.

It is early days, but Cedo Crnkovic, a managing director at DE Shaw, says a fully-functioning quantum computer could potentially prove revolutionary. “Computing power drives everything, and sets a limit to what we can do, so exponentially more computing power would be transformative,” he says.
algorithms  alternative_data  artificial_intelligence  books  D.E._Shaw  financial_markets  hedge_funds  investment_management  Manhattan  New_York_City  quantitative  quantum_computing  systematic_approaches 
march 2019 by jerryking
Knowing what we don’t know is an important investing skill,
DECEMBER 19, 2017 | The Globe and Mail | Scott Barlow, Globe and Mail market strategist.

"Making short-term predictions about how a price chart reflecting the actions of millions of people will fluctuate is more than just hard. The word Mandelbrot uses is "unpredictable" rather than difficult. Again: not predictable… Mandelbrot is not saying that investors should throw their hands in the air and quit, but rather that they should use the tools of probability in a more refined and nuanced way… Risk comes from now knowing what you are doing and avoiding those areas [that are inherently unpredictable] is a very good thing."

Mr. Mandelbrot's concepts do not make for easy reading and I don't pretend to understand even a majority of their implications. It is important, I think, for investors to have a general understanding of his findings nonetheless.

For one thing, Mr. Mandelbrot's work throws a huge wrench into Modern Portfolio Theory, the highly popular efficient frontier investing strategies that use distribution curves and standard deviation as a measure of risk. As Berkshire Hathaway's Charlie Munger said, "if you think [distribution curves] apply to markets, then you must believe in the tooth fairy. It reminds me of when I asked a doctor at a medical school why he was still teaching an outdated procedure, and he replied, 'It's easier to teach.' "
investing  risks  financial_markets  investors  Charlie_Munger  unpredictability  pretense_of_knowledge  unknowns 
december 2017 by jerryking
Algos know more about us than we do about ourselves
NOVEMBER 24, 2017 | Financial Time | John Dizard.

When intelligence collectors and analysts take an interest in you, they usually start not by monitoring the content of your calls or messages, but by looking at the patterns of your communications. Who are you calling, how often and in what sequence? What topics do you comment on in social media?

This is called traffic analysis, and it can give a pretty good notion of what you and the people you know are thinking and what you are preparing to do. Traffic analysis started as a military intelligence methodology, and became systematic around the first world war. Without even knowing the content of encrypted messages, traffic analysts could map out an enemy “order of battle” or disposition of forces, and make inferences about commanders’ intentions.

Traffic analysis techniques can also cut through the petabytes of redundant babble and chatter in the financial and political worlds. Even with state secrecy and the forests of non-disclosure agreements around “proprietary” investment or trading algorithms, crowds can be remarkably revealing in their open-source posts on social media.

Predata, a three-year-old New York and Washington-based predictive data analytics provider, has a Princeton-intensive crew of engineers and international affairs graduates working on early “signals” of market and political events. Predata trawls the open metadata for users of Twitter, Wikipedia, YouTube, Reddit and other social media, and analyses it to find indicators of future price moves or official actions.

I have been following their signals for a while and find them to be useful indicators. Predata started by creating political risk indicators, such as Iran-Saudi antagonism, Italian or Chilean labour unrest, or the relative enthusiasm for French political parties. Since the beginning of this year, they have been developing signals for financial and commodities markets.

The 1-9-90 rule
1 per cent of internet users initiate discussions or content, 9 per cent transmit content or participate occasionally and 90 per cent are consumers or ‘lurkers’

Using the example of the company’s BoJ signal. For this, Predata collects the metadata from 300 sources, such as Twitter users, contested Wikipedia edits or YouTube items created by Japanese monetary policy geeks. Of those, at any time perhaps 100 are important, and 8 to 10 turn out to be predictive....This is where you need some domain knowledge [domain expertise = industry expertise]. It turns out that Twitter is pretty important for monetary policy, along with the Japanese-language Wiki page for the Bank of Japan, or, say, a YouTube video of [BoJ governor] Haruhiko Kuroda’s cross-examination before a Diet parliamentary committee.

“Then you build a network of candidate discussions [JK: training beds] and look for the pattern those took before historical moves. The machine-learning algorithm goes back and picks the leads and lags between traffic and monetary policy events.” [Jk: Large data sets with known correct answers serve as a training bed and then new data serves as a test bed]

Typically, Predata’s algos seem to be able to signal changes in policy or big price moves [jk: inflection points] somewhere between 2 days and 2 weeks in advance. Unlike some academic Twitter scholars, Predata does not do systematic sentiment analysis of tweets or Wikipedia edits. “We only look for how many people there are in the conversation and comments, and how many people disagreed with each other. We call the latter the coefficient of contestation,” Mr Shinn says.

The lead time for Twitter, Wiki or other social media signals varies from one market to another. Foreign exchange markets typically move within days, bond yields within a few days to a week, and commodities prices within a week to two weeks. “If nothing happens within 30 days,” says Mr Lee, “then we say we are wrong.”
algorithms  alternative_data  Bank_of_Japan  commodities  economics  economic_data  financial_markets  industry_expertise  inflection_points  intelligence_analysts  lead_time  machine_learning  massive_data_sets  metadata  non-traditional  Predata  predictive_analytics  political_risk  signals  social_media  spycraft  traffic_analysis  training_beds  Twitter  unconventional 
november 2017 by jerryking
Pentagon Turns to High-Speed Traders to Fortify Markets Against Cyberattack
Oct. 15, 2017 7| WSJ | By Alexander Osipovich.

"What it would be like if a malicious actor wanted to cause havoc on U.S. financial markets?".....Dozens of high-speed traders and others from Wall Street are helping the Pentagon study how hackers could unleash chaos in the U.S. financial system. The Department of Defense’s research arm, DARPA, over the past year and a half has consulted executives at high-frequency trading firms and quantitative hedge funds, and people from exchanges and other financial companies, participants in the discussions said. Officials described the effort, the Financial Markets Vulnerabilities Project, as an early-stage pilot project aimed at identifying market vulnerabilities.

Among the potential scenarios: Hackers could cripple a widely used payroll system; they could inject false information into stock-data feeds, sending trading algorithms out of whack; or they could flood the stock market with fake sell orders and trigger a market crash......Among potential targets that could appeal to hackers given their broad reach are credit-card companies, payment processors and payroll companies such as ADP, which handles the paychecks for one in six U.S. workers, participants said.....The goal of Darpa’s project is to develop a simulation of U.S. markets, which could be used to test scenarios, Such software would need to model complex, interrelated markets—not just stocks but also markets such as futures—as well as the behavior of automated trading systems operating within them....Many quantitative trading firms already do something similar.......
In 2009, military experts took part in a two-day war game exploring a “global financial war” involving China and Russia, according to “Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis,” a 2011 book by James Rickards. ....“Our charge at Darpa is to think far out,” he said. “It’s not ‘What is the attack today?’ but ‘What are the vectors of attack 20 years from now?’”
Pentagon  financial_markets  financial_system  vulnerabilities  DARPA  traders  hedge_funds  Wall_Street  hackers  books  rogue_actors  scenario-planning  cyber_security  cyber_warfare  cyberattacks  high-frequency_trading  pilot_programs  contagions 
october 2017 by jerryking
Mental bias leaves us unprepared for disaster
August 14, 2017 | Financial Times | Tim Harford.

Even if we could clearly see a crisis coming, would it have made a difference?

The 2004 storm, Hurricane Ivan, weakened and turned aside before striking New Orleans. The city was thus given almost a full year's warning of the gaps in its defences. The near miss led to much discussion but little action.

When Hurricane Katrina hit the city, evacuation proved as impractical and the Superdome as inadequate as had been expected. The levees broke in more than 50 places, and about 1,500 people died. New Orleans was gutted. It was an awful failure but surely not a failure of forecasting.

Robert Meyer and Howard Kunreuther in The Ostrich Paradox argue that it is common for institutions and ordinary citizens to make poor decisions in the face of foreseeable natural disasters, sometimes with tragic results.

There are many reasons for this, including corruption, perverse incentives or political expediency. But the authors focus on psychological explanations. They identify cognitive rules of thumb that normally work well but serve us poorly in preparing for extreme events.

One such mental shortcut is what the authors term the “amnesia bias”, a tendency to focus on recent experience (i.e. "disaster myopia" the human tendency to dismiss long-ago events as irrelevant, to believe This Time is Different and ignore what is not under one’s nose). We remember more distant catastrophes but we do not feel them viscerally. For example, many people bought flood insurance after watching the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina unfold, but within three years demand for flood insurance had fallen back to pre-Katrina levels.

We cut the same cognitive corners in finance. There are many historical examples of manias and panics but, while most of us know something about the great crash of 1929, or the tulip mania of 1637, those events have no emotional heft. Even the dotcom bubble of 1999-2001, which should at least have reminded everyone that financial markets do not always give sensible price signals, failed to make much impact on how regulators and market participants behaved. Six years was long enough for the lesson to lose its sting.

Another rule of thumb is “optimism bias”. We are often too optimistic, at least about our personal situation, even in the midst of a more generalized pessimism. In 1980, the psychologist Neil Weinstein published a study showing that people did not dwell on risks such as cancer or divorce. Yes, these things happen, Professor Weinstein’s subjects told him: they just won’t happen to me.

The same tendency was on display as Hurricane Sandy closed in on New Jersey in 2012. Robert Meyer found that residents of Atlantic City reckoned that the chance of being hit was more than 80 per cent. That was too gloomy: the National Hurricane Center put it at 32 per cent. Yet few people had plans to evacuate, and even those who had storm shutters often had no intention of installing them.

Surely even an optimist should have taken the precautions of installing the storm shutters? Why buy storm shutters if you do not erect them when a storm is coming? Messrs Meyer and Kunreuther point to “single action bias”: confronted with a worrying situation, taking one or two positive steps often feels enough. If you have already bought extra groceries and refuelled the family car, surely putting up cumbersome storm shutters is unnecessary?

Reading the psychological literature on heuristics and bias sometimes makes one feel too pessimistic. We do not always blunder. Individuals can make smart decisions, whether confronted with a hurricane or a retirement savings account. Financial markets do not often lose their minds. If they did, active investment managers might find it a little easier to outperform the tracker funds. Governments, too, can learn lessons and erect barriers against future trouble.

Still, because things often do work well, we forget. The old hands retire; bad memories lose their jolt; we grow cynical about false alarms. Yesterday’s prudence is today’s health-and-safety-gone-mad. Small wonder that, 10 years on, senior Federal Reserve official Stanley Fischer is having to warn against “extremely dangerous and extremely short-sighted” efforts to dismantle financial regulations. All of us, from time to time, prefer to stick our heads in the sand.
amnesia_bias  biases  books  complacency  disasters  disaster_myopia  dotcom  emotional_connections  evacuations  financial_markets  historical_amnesia  lessons_learned  manias  natural_calamities  optimism_bias  outperformance  overoptimism  panics  paradoxes  perverse_incentives  precaution  recency_bias  short-sightedness  single_action_bias  Tim_Harford  unforeseen  unprepared 
august 2017 by jerryking
Emerging markets offer clue for investors in 2017
December 31/January 1 2017 | Financial Times | by Gillian Tett.

Now (people = politicians = capriciousness/alternatively, unpredictable waves of populism) are shaping events, not established party platforms or policy programmes....the pricing of political uncertainty has moved from being an emerging market phenomenon to an emerged market issue....Is there any way for investors to adapt to this new world? ....(1) Start by abandoning the idea that asset values can be predicted by using neat economic models alone. ...investors urgently need to think about the difference between "risk" (i.e. events that can be predicted with a certain probability) and "uncertainty" (i.e. unknown future shocks). Until now, investors in developed markets have tended to focus primarily on risks and assume that these can be priced (and hedged against). But 2017 is likely to produce uncertainty. That cannot be easily priced or hedge--and investors should recognize this. (2) Investor should also embrace "optionality": the only way to prepare for a world of uncertainty is to stay as flexible and diversified as possible. Now is not the time for investors to put all their eggs in one basket, or bet on just one asset class. Nor is it time for businesses to be locked into rigid business plans: political and geopolitical upheaval could strike almost anywhere. (3) If 2017 does deliver more risk and uncertainty, expect financial markets to be "skittish" about "news" of all types, and not just economic....Bad news for those who despise market volatility (expectation: we're in for volatility like we've never seen before)....Uncertainty can deliver huge opportunity alongside risks..."good" surprises....Surviving 2017 in the developed economies requires that investors use tools beyond those found in the realm of economics: psychology, sociology and political science. Also, talk to successful emerging market investors to find out how they practice their craft.
concentration_risk  Gillian_Tett  emerging_markets  political_risk  unpredictability  Brexit  investors  Donald_Trump  uncertainty  risks  optionality  geopolitics  financial_markets  politicians  volatility  tools  economics  psychology  sociology  political_science  FT  institutions  rule_of_law  Gary_Cohn  populism  indicators  human_factor  assets  asset_values  asset_classes  diversification  dislocations  bad_news 
january 2017 by jerryking
For Britain’s ‘Brexit’ Bunch, the Party Just Ended - The New York Times
By PETER S. GOODMANOCT. 7, 2016For those blithely inclined toward the view that Britain would somehow find a way to sever its relationship with the European Union free of drama or financial consequences — like canceling a car rental reservation, with a tad more paperwork — Friday was a sobering day of reckoning.

As the British pound plunged some 6 percent against the American dollar in the span of two minutes in early trading in Asia, the markets offered a reminder that divorce tends to be messy, expensive and laced with uncertainties. It rarely ends happily.
Theresa_May  United_Kingdom  Brexit  EU  financial_markets  breakups  messiness  uncertainty 
october 2016 by jerryking
Honesty That Benefits All
November 11, 2013 | NYT | By DOUG STEINER.

Headlines highlight the bad deeds of players in financial markets: insider trading scandals, traders colluding on interest rate manipulation, executives backdate options, etc....One tool of tackling problematic behavior is to rely on behavioral economics (i.e. traditional economics' assumption — that everyone acts rationally when making decisions — is wrong).

Behavioral economists combine the social psychology of human interactions with the thought processes involved in making economic decisions. They predict and explain how people use faulty logic in building a framework for making decisions. Then they figure out how to make people behave properly by inserting new triggers for better behavior..... people can justify lying if it’s “just a little bit.”(e.g. customers underreporting annual miles driven when filling out their car insurance audit forms, or their income when filling out tax returns). ...adding "morality reminders" (e.g. asking customers to sign forms attesting to the accuracy of their reports at the top of a page, instead of the bottom)....can change behavior, ... minor, even imperceptible changes to workflow can significantly affect honesty....human decisions can be influenced with small suggestions — say, a reminder that “over 99 percent of people truthfully answer these questions.” Or a group might be reminded of a collective cause-and-effect. (“You and your colleagues will not be eligible for bonuses if any of you engage in illegal behavior.”)

Employing similar behavioral psychology in financial transactions can discourage bad actions. Some examples:

■ Getting legal advice: .... Showing lawyers the profound influence they have on trading action might dissuade them from endorsing or seeming to endorse questionable decisions.
■ Making the costs clear to clients: Modern technology allows firms to automatically trade against clients who are unaware of the practice or oblivious to it. Clients generally lose money on these trades. Such actions are legal, even if they’re unseemly. This type of behavior has to be defined as immoral within the industry, or it won’t be long before it is made illegal
■ Setting the right tone:

...the financial crisis of 2008 showed that risk perception and reality differed widely. Efforts to use social psychology to change behavior are resulting in two changes at the same time.

The first is a change in the general perception of business risk, and how much risk a firm should assume to make returns to shareholders. The second is more important and more controllable. It involves personal perceptions of how much risk they should take when, say, trading securities, to impress their bosses and presumably get a larger bonus.
behavioral_change  behavioural_economics  Doug_Steiner  financial_markets  financial_services  honesty  nudge  personal_risk  psychology  risk-assessment  risk-perception 
january 2014 by jerryking
Managing Risk In the 21st Century
February 7, 2000 | Fortune | By Thomas A. Stewart.

Take risk management, a responsibility of the treasury function. Most risk managers haven't begun to cope with the real threats 21st-century companies face. Like the drunk in the old joke who looks for his lost keys under the streetlamp because the light is better there, risk management is dealing with visible classes of risk while greater, unmanaged dangers accumulate in the dark.

Risk--let's get this straight upfront--is good. The point of risk management isn't to eliminate it; that would eliminate reward. The point is to manage it--that is, to choose where to place bets, where to hedge bets, and where to avoid betting altogether. Though most risk-management tools--insurance, hedging, diversification, etc.--have to do with reducing loss, the goal is to maximize the gains from the risks you take (alpha? McDerment?)

So where should we look for these new risks?

--Your reputation or brand. When a bad batch of carbon dioxide in Coca-Cola sickened some Belgian children last summer, Coke's European operating income fell about $205 million, and Coca-Cola Enterprises, the bottler, incurred $103 million in costs. What about the cost to brand equity? One highly imperfect proxy: Coke's market capitalization fell $34 billion between June 30 and Sept. 30, 1999.

--Your business model. Asset-free, knowledge-intensive competition is to entrenched business models what the Panzer was to the Maginot Line. MP3s changed the music business more fundamentally than anything since radio. E*Trade, 18 years old, forced Merrill Lynch, 180, to change its way of doing business. Yet the new guys' very nimbleness creates its own risks, which traditional risk management can't help. You can protect the hard assets of a brick-and-mortar mall. Click-and-order stores are much more exposed: Cash flow is just about all they've got.

--Your human capital. The obvious human-capital risk is flight--especially in a tight labor market--but it's only part of a larger, subtler problem. When the CEO intones, "People are our most important asset," he's wrong, even if he's sincere. People are your most important investors. Your stock of human capital matters less than your flow of it. Any turbulence--and is there anything but turbulence these days?--can disrupt the flow, damaging your ability to attract human capital or people's desire to collaborate. Says Thomas Davenport, a partner at Towers Perrin: "Uncertainty is a real enemy of human capital. People rebalance their ROI by cutting back the investment."

--Your intellectual property. Many risks to intellectual property--theft, for example--can be dealt with in obvious, if sometimes onerous, ways. Here's the cutting-edge question: How do you manage risk in the process by which new intellectual property is created? How do you cope with the fact that the safer a given R&D project is, the less likely it is to be a big-money breakthrough? How do you balance the virtues of specialization against those of diversification?

--Your network. No company is an island, entire of itself; odds are your business is embedded in a network you do not control. It's not just that AOL might crash and cost you a few days' sales; your whole business may depend on tangible and intangible assets that belong to outsourcing partners, franchisees, sugar daddies, or standard-setters.
There are a couple of patterns here. First, an ever-greater part of business risk comes from sources your company can't own--people, partners, environments. Second, volatility isn't just a currency or stock market risk anymore. Labor markets, technologies, even business models oscillate at higher frequencies--their behavior more and more resembling that of financial markets.

In those patterns are hints of how to manage intellectual risks--which we'll examine next time.
risk-management  21st._century  risks  Thomas_Stewart  reputation  branding  business_models  financial_markets  talent_management  intellectual_property  networks  human_capital  turbulence  uncertainty  volatility  instability  nimbleness  labour_markets  accelerated_lifecycles  intellectual_assets  e-commerce  external_interaction  talent_flows  cash_flows  network_risk  proxies  specialization  diversification  unknowns  brand_equity  asset-light  insurance  hedging  alpha  Michael_McDerment 
june 2012 by jerryking
Ride to the rescue of workers
Aug. 15 2007 | The Globe and Mail | JIM STANFORD. Economist with the Canadian Auto Workers Union

So imagine how surprised I was at the bank's rapid, powerful interventions into financial markets recently, issuing more than $4-billion in new low-cost loans in just three trading days to soothe frazzled nerves and keep the easy-credit machine out of the ditch. And it signalled in no uncertain terms there was plenty more where that came from.

Far from sitting back watching the economy "adjust to change," this drama featured the central bank as cavalry - charging over the hill just as the hedge-fund artists were making their last stand. Seems the prospect of bankrupt speculators tossed onto the street, forced to find real work, isn't the kind of change the bank has in mind. Now, don't get me wrong: What the bank did was prudent and important....This selective, one-sided approach to stabilization speaks volumes about the nature of the bank as an institution, and the biases of the inflation-targeting regime it espouses so passionately. The Bank of Canada is not a neutral, prescient team of technocrats, guiding us to some imaginary point of maximum efficiency. Like any other political body, its opinions and actions reflect value judgments about the relative importance of differing, sometimes conflicting, goals and interests. Job creation versus inflation control. Consumer inflation versus stock-market inflation. Financial troubles versus industrial troubles.

So, Governor Dodge, please carry on with your dramatic rescue mission. Just spread a little of that rescue around to the rest of us next time.
bailouts  Bank_of_Canada  biases  bubbles  business-government_relations  CAW  central_banks  economists  financial_crises  financial_markets  institutions  Jim_Stanford  layoffs  manufacturers  pairs  politics  tradeoffs  values  value_judgements 
june 2012 by jerryking
One Way to Look at Private Equity - NYTimes.com
January 16, 2012 |NYT | By ANDREW ROSS SORKIN

Alan Webber
Santa Fe, New Mexico

Flag

With all due respect, I think Messrs. Levy and Sorkin are missing the point: The question is not, does private equity play a valuable role in the economy? The question is, does Mitt Romney's experience in private equity represent a valid argument for why he should be President? Most people would say that private equity plays an important role--in the private sector. Of course, there are firms and individuals who have played the game fast and loose. Just as there are many who see the contribution that private equity can make to innovation and entrepreneurship. Not relevant, however, to the debate at hand. The debate at hand is over whether Mitt Romney's experience at Bain Capital has any bearing on his being President? Would you want the U.S. economy run like a private equity fund? (And if it were, wouldn't the President be picking winners and losers? Not very conservative, that idea!) Mr. Levy doesn't have to defend private equity. He needs to tell us whether being the head of a private equity fund in any way qualifies an individual to be President--a job which has to serve more stakeholders than just the financial markets. This column answers the wrong question and doesn't even ask the right one.
private_equity  Andrew_Sorkin  letters_to_the_editor  Bain_Capital  questions  financial_markets  Mitt_Romney  Campaign_2012 
january 2012 by jerryking
Op-Ed Columnist - Drilling for Certainty - NYTimes.com
May 27, 2010 | NYT | By DAVID BROOKS. "...the real issue has
to do with risk assessment. It has to do with the bloody crossroads where complex technical systems meet human psychology...we’ve come to depend on an ever-expanding array of intricate hi-tech systems. These h/w & s/w sys. are the guts of financial markets, energy exploration, space exploration, air travel, defense programs and modern production plants. These sys. which allow us to live as well as we do, are too complex for any single person to understand. (1) people can't
imagine how small failings can compound into catastrophic disasters. (2) people acclimate to risk (3) overconfidence in backup sys. and safety devices. (4) people match complicated technical sys. with complicated governing structures. (5) people tend to spread good news and hide bad news.(6) people in the same field suffer groupthink...Overlooks incentives that distort choices.
David_Brooks  oil_spills  complexity  risk-assessment  cognitive_skills  biases  Malcolm_Gladwell  certainty  overconfidence  psychology  incentives  catastrophes  groupthink  compounded  financial_markets  energy_exploration  space_exploration  air_travel  multiplicative  risk-perception  optimism_bias  risk-acclimatization  Richard_Feynman  cumulative  bad_news 
may 2010 by jerryking
Making Old Media New Again - WSJ.com
APRIL 13, 2009 | Wall Street Journal | by L. GORDON CROVITZ

See Richard Tofel, "Restless Genius: Barney Kilgore, The Wall Street
Journal and the Invention of Modern Journalism."

The Journal changed. Technology increasingly meant readers would know
the basic facts of news as it happened. Kilgore crafted the front page
"What's News -- " column to summarize what had happened, but focused on
explaining what the news meant, outline the implications for the
economy, industry and commodity and financial markets.
5_W’s  books  creative_renewal  digital_media  financial_markets  implications  journalism  L._Gordon_Crovtiz  news  newspapers  print_journalism  WSJ 
april 2009 by jerryking
Mad Max and the Meltdown - WSJ.com
Daniel Henniger piece on the dangers that can arise in
financial markets as society pulls back on religious-inspired, moral
codes of personal behaviour. The erosion of responsibility, restraint
and remorse.
religion  capitalism  christmas  crisis  Daniel_Henninger  moral_codes  personal_responsibility  economics  financial_markets  values  personal_behaviour  shame  remorse  self-restraint 
january 2009 by jerryking

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