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jerryking : new_tech_cold_war   10

Consciously decoupling the US economy
December 1 , 2019 | Financial Times | Rana Foroohar.

The US is economically decoupling from the rest of the world.....Europe is being pulled into China’s technology orbit via the 5G standards and technologies that make up part of the Belt and Road Initiative......one of the most important things the US could do right now to ensure both national security and its own position in the 21st-century digital economy would be to work with allies on transatlantic standards for emerging technologies like 5G, artificial intelligence and so on....... decoupling is no longer a fringe idea......the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is now admitting that we are in a more fragmented world — one that won’t reset to the 1990s — and advocating what amounts to a US industrial policy--- a major shift in thinking. Deglobalisation, the idea of the US and China decoupling economically, is now mainstream.....heightened awareness of the relationship between national security and technology........it is becoming a given that the US needs a more coherent national economic strategy in a world in which state capitalism is in the ascendant. The question is how to get there. And that’s where the internal contradictions in America’s laissez-faire, free-market system start to become a problem......what role should government play?........What should the private sector expect from government and what should they be willing to do in exchange (e.g. Will FAANG repatriate profits to the U.S.? Will Silicon Valley and Wall Street volunteer to retrain the millions of underemployed millennials? How can we move from 40 years of supply-side thinking that has benefited multinational companies, towards something that better supports local economies and workers? ...if America is going to compete with a state-run economy like China in the digital era — one that seems to support a winner-takes-all dynamic — we are going to need bigger, public-sector directed shifts.
5G  adversaries  CFR  China  China_rising  decoupling  deglobalization  digital_economy  industrial_policies  military-industrial_complex  multinationals  new_tech_Cold_War  One_Belt_One_Road  public_sector  Rana_Foroohar  security_&_intelligence  state_capitalism  supply_chains  tariffs  technical_standards  technology  U.S.-China_relations  winner-take-all 
december 2019 by jerryking
Opinion | The World-Shaking News That You’re Missing
Nov. 26, 2019 | The New York Times | By Thomas L. Friedman

** “Has China Won? by  Kishore Mahbubani

A new wall — a digital Berlin Wall — had begun to be erected between China and America. And the only thing left to be determined, a Chinese business executive remarked to me, “is how high this wall will be,” and which countries will choose to be on which side.

This new wall, separating a U.S.-led technology and trade zone from a Chinese-led one, will have implications as vast as the wall bisecting Berlin did. Because the peace, prosperity and accelerations in technology and globalization that have so benefited the world over the past 40 years were due, in part, to the interweaving of the U.S. and Chinese economies.

The messy, ad hoc decoupling of these two economies, driven by miscalculations by leaders on both sides, will surely disrupt those trends and the costs could be huge. We might want to talk about that.

Former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson gave a speech here a year ago trying to kick-start that discussion. “For 40 years,” Paulson noted, “the U.S.-China relationship has been characterized by the integration of four things: goods, capital, technology and people. And over these 40 years, economic integration between the two countries was supposed to mitigate security competition. But an intellectually honest appraisal must now admit both that this hasn’t happened and that the reverse is taking place.” That reversal is happening for two reasons. First, because the U.S. is — rightly — no longer willing to accept China’s unfair trade practices. Second, because, now that China is a technology powerhouse — and technological products all have both economic and military applications........“after 40 years of integration, a surprising number of political and thought leaders on both sides advocate policies that could forcibly de-integrate the two countries across all four of these baskets.” the digital Berlin Wall took a big step up on May 17, when Trump blacklisted China’s Huawei.......Lots of Chinese tech companies are now thinking: We will never, ever, ever leave ourselves again in a situation where we are totally dependent on America for key components. Time to double down on making our own......similarly, U.S. manufacturers are thinking twice about building their next factory in China or solely depending on a supply chain from there.....this is the sound of two giant economies starting to decouple.....the State Department has been restricting visas for Chinese graduate students studying in sensitive fields — like aviation, robotics and advanced manufacturing ....
What to do?
Friedman is worried that by imposing more and more export and visa controls we will be cutting ourselves off from the access we need to the global investment pools, customers and collaborative scientists and engineers to maintain our technological lead.

I still believe that the most open systems win — they get all the signals of change first, they attract the most high-I.Q. risk-takers/innovators and they enrich and are enriched by the most global flows of talent, ideas and capital. That used to be us.....

China is our economic competitor, economic partner, source of talent and capital, geopolitical rival, collaborator and serial rule-breaker. It is not our enemy or our friend.

The only effective way to manage a relationship this complex is:
1) with an all-of-government approach. You can’t have the Justice Department doing one thing, the Pentagon another, the Treasury another, the trade negotiators another, the State Department another and the president tweeting another. And
2), we need as many Pacific and European allies as possible so it’s “The Whole World Versus China”
blacklists  books  China  China_rising  co-ordinated_approaches  decoupling  Donald_Trump  doubling_down  dual-use  economic_disengagement  economic_integration  espionage  future  Hank_Paulson  Huawei  miscalculations  new_tech_Cold_War  open_borders  security_&_intelligence  seismic_shifts  self-sufficiency  signals  students  supply_chains  technology  Tom_Friedman  undermining_of_trust  U.S.-China_relations  visa_students  walled_gardens  Xi_Jinping 
november 2019 by jerryking
How China’s formidable cyber capabilities sparked a tech cold war
July 22, 2019 | | Financial Times | Geoff Dyer.

Chinese Spies: From Chairman Mao to Xi Jinping, by Roger Faligot, translated by Natasha Lehrer, Hurst, RRP£30, 568 pages.... the mercantilist mindset of the US administration and partly in the insecurities of a section of Washington’s foreign policy establishment, prompting the search for new demons to slay. But it is also an inevitable reaction to the aggressive intelligence and surveillance capabilities that China has installed.
Roger Faligot’s history of spying in the Chinese Communist party highlights the turbocharged growth in the nation’s intelligence services......Spying has been baked into the fabric of the Chinese Communist party since its earliest days......Faligot’s subject is the Chinese Communist party and its efforts to develop what he describes as the largest intelligence service in the world. He places particular emphasis on the state security ministry, known as the Guoanbu, the biggest of the non-military spying agencies......The central figure was Zhou Enlai, China’s premier from 1949 to 1976. Zhou’s early career is known more for the diplomatic skills he demonstrated during the second world war but he also developed a taste for clandestine activities as a young man in his twenties in Paris.
......Returning to China in 1928 after a spell at the GRU spy school in the Lenin Hills outside Moscow, Zhou established a series of intelligence networks which, Faligot writes, have a “direct link” with “today’s service”......Two themes, in particular, come through. First, right from the outset, China’s spy agencies latched on to the internet — both as a powerful weapon and as a tool for greater social control....As well as overseas intrusion, the intelligence agencies have been “given a mission to organise a vast system of control of the Chinese population”. Many of the new techniques were first developed in Xinjiang and Tibet, including the compulsory registration of internet users, which has been used to root out cyber-dissidents. ....The second theme is the way that these capabilities have now been harnessed by one all-powerful leader............Xi has conducted a sweeping anti-corruption drive whose biggest scalp was Zhou Yongkang, who in 2015 became the first ever former member of the politburo standing committee to be convicted of serious crimes and sentenced to life in prison. Arresting Zhou allowed Xi to take out a political rival. But it also allowed him to orchestrate a putsch of the security services, which Zhou had been in charge of in the previous administration. During his period as China’s effective spy chief, Zhou had set up what Faligot calls a “parallel diplomacy service” and had also been snooping on all the other senior Chinese leaders. The purge of “the old Zhou Yongkang system,” Faligot concludes, allowed Xi “to retake control of the CCP, the PLA and the secret services.”
books  book_reviews  China  Chinese_Communist_Party  Cold_War  cyberattacks  cyber_warfare  GRU  Guoanbu  new_tech_Cold_War  security_&_intelligence  Tibet  turbocharge  U.S.-China_relations  Xi_Jinping 
july 2019 by jerryking
The challenger - Technopolitics
Mar 15th 2018 | HONG KONG AND SAN FRANCISCO.

Technology is rarely, in and of itself, ideological. But technosystems have an ideological side—witness the struggles of open-source advocates against proprietary-software developers—and can be used to ideological ends. The global spread of a technosystem conceived in, and to an unknown extent controlled by, an undemocratic, authoritarian regime could have unprecedented historical significance.

China is not just in a better position to challenge America’s hegemony than it used to be. It is a good time to do so, too. It is not only the roll out of 5G. AI has started to move from the tech world to conventional businesses; quantum computing seems about to become useful. All this creates openings for newcomers, especially if backed by a state that takes a long view and doesn’t need a quick return......To focus on individual companies, though, is to miss the point. China’s leaders want to bind firms, customers and government agencies together with “robust governance”, in the words of Samm Sacks of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a think-tank in Washington, DC. They want to build a technosystem in which incentives to use other people’s technology are minimised. These are, as it happens, the same goals as those of the companies which run America’s large technology platforms, whether they are operating systems, social networks or computing clouds.

Gardening tools

A cardinal rule of managing such walled gardens is to control access. Developers of apps for Apple’s iPhone have to go through a lengthy application process with an uncertain outcome; for example, in an unexpected but welcome development, the firm now seems to reject apps using emojis. Similarly, foreign technology firms that want to sell their wares in China face at least six different security reviews, each of which can be used to delay or block market access. As with America’s worries about Huawei, this is not entirely unreasonable. The NSA has in the past exploited, or created, vulnerabilities in hardware sold by American companies. Local firms, for their part, are pushed to use “indigenous and controllable core cyber-security technology”, in the words of a report presented at last year’s National People’s Congress.

In the driving seat
Good platform managers also ensure that all parts of the system work for the greater good. In China this means doing the government’s bidding, something which seems increasingly expected of tech companies. About three dozen tech companies have instituted Communist Party committees in the past few years. There are rumours that the party is planning to take 1% stakes in some firms, including Tencent, not so much to add to the government’s control as to signal it—and to advertise that the company enjoys official blessing.

Many of China’s tech firms help develop military applications for technology, too, something called “civil-military fusion”. Most American hardware-makers do the same; its internet giants, not so much. “There’s a general concern in the tech community of somehow the military-industrial complex using their stuff to kill people incorrectly, if you will,” Eric Schmidt, the head of the Pentagon’s Defence Innovation Advisory Board said last November, when he was still Alphabet’s executive chairman. When it recently emerged that Google was helping the Pentagon with the AI for a drone project, some of its employees were outraged.

And then there is the walled gardens’ most prized bloom: data. China’s privacy regulations can look, on the face of it, as strict as Europe’s. But privacy is not a priority in practice. Control is.
China  U.S._Navy  ecosystems  Silicon_Valley  semiconductors  artificial_intelligence  quantum_computing  intellectual_property  military-industrial_complex  dual-use  walled_gardens  new_tech_Cold_War  self-sufficiency 
april 2018 by jerryking
‘Splinternet’ to herald a trade war for the ages
Rana Foroohar | FT| March 5, 2018.

Steel and aluminium tariffs announced by President Trump have, of course, sucked up all the attention in recent days....but the bigger fight will likely be over intellectual property, and who gets what slice of that pie in the coming years. Most corporate wealth is now held in the top 10 per cent of IP rich companies, most of which sit on the West Coast of the US......China, however, is gaining ground in key areas like AI and quantum computing, and has also ringfenced most of the tech sector as a “strategically important” area in which domestic companies are given preference......A more interesting question is whether data and technology will become the subject of broader national defence-related protectionism. In many ways you could make a much easier case for section 232, the “national defence” clause that Mr Trump invoked around steel, in technology. The steel sector in the US has plenty of spare capacity and section 232 also stipulates that national allies could fill any gap, something which the president seems to have overlooked. Technology, meanwhile, is much more proprietary and sensitive — not to mention crucial for every industry and every part of national security.

A tech-based trade war would likely splinter the US, China and Europe into three separate regions. The EU is already going in a very different direction to the US in terms of regulation of the high tech sector, with more stringent privacy rules and limits on how much data can be used by companies for AI, and in what fashion.....Such a Balkanisation, which experts now refer to as “the Splinternet”, would change the functioning of the internet as we know it. It would also represent a trade battle for the ages.
China  crossborder  decoupling  digital_economy  FAANG  intellectual_property  international_trade  NAFTA  new_tech_Cold_War  privacy  protectionism  Rana_Foroohar  tariffs  trade_wars 
march 2018 by jerryking

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