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jerryking : red_lines   4

Lex. London and Europe:hard-wired advantages
July 7, 2017 | Financial Times | Lex.

This hints at a wider strength. Laying cables across the sea was a high-risk venture in the 1850s. The risk was deemed worth taking because London was the financial centre of a trading empire. The city’s present-day concentration of expertise in areas like forex, trade finance, risk management, insurance and law is also a function of this mercantile history. Other European financial centres tend to have more specific strengths, such as asset management in Dublin and Luxembourg, or banking in Frankfurt.

More fibre could be installed across Europe, but that alone will not alter much. Europe’s politicians and regulators will find it harder to replicate London’s other strengths, however much they may wish to capitalise on the UK’s departure from the EU or secure regulatory oversight of euro-related clearing.

Their best hope of doing so is ham-fisted policymaking in the UK. There are precedents aplenty. President John Kennedy gifted London the Eurobond market in the 1960s. The Parti Québécois helped Toronto supplant Montreal as Canada’s financial capital in the 1980s. It is much easier to drive business away than it is to attract it — something the UK government, pondering its “red lines” over things like immigration and the remit of the ECJ, should bear in mind.
transatlantic  London  ECB  regulators  policymaking  competitive_advantage  epicenters  Brexit  poaching  red_lines 
august 2017 by jerryking
What Can the Next President Do About Russia? - WSJ
By ROBERT D. KAPLAN
Updated Oct. 16, 2016

Of the two great autocratic powers in Eurasia, Russia is emerging as a greater short-term threat than China. The Chinese hope to gradually dominate the waters off the Asian mainland without getting into a shooting war with the U.S. Yet while Beijing’s aggression is cool, Moscow’s is hot....Russia’s economic situation is much worse than China’s, and so the incentive of its leaders to dial up nationalism is that much greater. But the larger factor, one that Western elites have trouble understanding, cannot be quantified: A deeply embedded sense of historical insecurity makes Russian aggression crude, brazen, bloodthirsty and risk-prone. ....How does the U.S. build leverage on the ground, from the Baltic Sea to the Syrian desert, that puts America in a position where negotiations with Russia can make a strategic difference?....

For without the proper geopolitical context, the secretary of state is a missionary, not a diplomat. ...In the cyber domain the U.S. has not sufficiently drawn red lines. What kind of Russian hacking will result in either a proportionate, or even disproportionate, punitive response? The Obama administration seems to be proceeding ad hoc, as it has done with Russia policy in general. The next administration, along with projecting military force throughout the Russian near abroad, will have to project force in cyberspace, too.
Russia  Vladimir_Putin  Robert_Kaplan  threats  deterrence  nationalism  Baltics  NATO  U.S.foreign_policy  leverage  geopolitics  log_rolling  diplomacy  realism  balance_of_power  realpolitik  cyber_warfare  autocracies  insecurity  hacking  maritime  punitive  retribution  retaliation  South_China_Sea  ad_hoc  red_lines  China  autocrats 
october 2016 by jerryking
Hard Lines, Red Lines and Green Lines - NYTimes.com
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Published: September 22, 2012

Aung San Suu Kyi’s famous dictum that “it is not power that corrupts but fear. Fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it, and fear of the scourge of power corrupts those who are subject to it.”
... It is deeply true and relevant today, when so few leaders now dare to throw caution and polls to the wind and tell people the truth about anything hard or controversial.
Tom_Friedman  leadership  Obama  Aung_San_Suu_Kyi  leaders  corruption  political_power  red_lines 
september 2012 by jerryking

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