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jerryking : warfare   25

The Dead Prussian Podcast
A podcast about war and warfare
podcasts  war  warfare 
july 2019 by jerryking
America v China: How trade wars become real wars
March 11, 2017 | FT | by Gideon Rachman 2 HOURS AGO

Successive American presidents also believed that capitalism would act as a Trojan Horse — undermining one-party rule within China. As former US president George W Bush once said: “Trade freely with China, and time is on our side.” The American establishment believed that a more liberal China would be less likely to challenge the US on the international stage. One of the central tenets of liberal internationalism is that democracies do not wage war with each other.

But political developments in Xi’s China have refuted the expectations of the liberal internationalist worldview that shaped successive American presidencies. China has not become more democratic. Nor is it any longer willing to live quietly within a US-designed and dominated world order.
protectionism  U.S.  Donald_Trump  Xi_Jinping  U.S.-China_relations  trade_wars  free-trade  geopolitics  warfare  international_trade  China_rising 
march 2018 by jerryking
The Guerrilla Myth -
January 18, 2013 | WSJ | Max Boot.

The Guerrilla Myth
Unconventional wars are our most pressing national security concern. They're also the most ancient form of war in the world. Max Boot on the lessons of insurgency we seem unable to learn.
warfare  security_&_intelligence  counterinsurgency  unconventional_warfare  guerrilla_warfare 
january 2013 by jerryking
Book Review: General Albert C. Wedemeyer -
September 9, 2012 | WSJ | By JONATHAN W. JORDAN.
The Man With a Plan
A warrior who helped lead the Allies to victory armed with charts, graphs and a meticulous attention to detail.

Albert Coady Wedemeyer (1897-1989) was from an upper-middle-class family in Omaha, Neb. Fascinated by European history and the grand strategy of empires as a youth, he was inexorably drawn to the life of a soldier and graduated from West Point in 1919. He foresaw another war with Germany and, in the late 1930s, attended the German army's prestigious general-staff school, the Kriegsakademie. There he learned the art of blitzkrieg alongside his future enemies. He watched Nazi brownshirts strut around Berlin, venting their hatred against Jews. He was in Vienna during the Anschluss, and he saw the Czechoslovakian crisis unfold from the German perspective.

Wedemeyer's report summarizing German tactics and organization brought him to the attention of George C. Marshall, who in 1939 became the Army's chief of staff. Marshall assigned Wedemeyer to the War Plans Division and tasked him with reducing America's mobilization requirements to a single document. In the summer of 1941, in response to a request from Roosevelt, Wedemeyer's team expanded this into a blueprint on how to defeat America's likely enemies in a future war.
1919  book_reviews  WWII  U.S._Army  logistics  generalship  warfare  war  blitzkrieg  military_academies  George_Marshall  mobilization  grand_strategy  '30s  blueprints  detail_oriented  West_Point 
september 2012 by jerryking
The Open-Source War - New York Times
October 15, 2005 | NYT | By JOHN ROBB

The other likely explanation is one the military itself makes: that the insurgency isn't a fragile hierarchical organization but rather a resilient network made up of small, autonomous groups. This means that the insurgency is virtually immune to attrition and decapitation. It will combine and recombine to form a viable network despite high rates of attrition. Body counts - and the military should already know this - aren't a good predictor of success.

Given this landscape, let's look at alternative strategies. First, out-innovating the insurgency will most likely prove unsuccessful. The insurgency uses an open-source community approach (similar to the decentralized development process now prevalent in the software industry) to warfare that is extremely quick and innovative. New technologies and tactics move rapidly from one end of the insurgency to the other, aided by Iraq's relatively advanced communications and transportation grid - demonstrated by the rapid increases in the sophistication of the insurgents' homemade bombs. This implies that the insurgency's innovation cycles are faster than the American military's slower bureaucratic processes (for example: its inability to deliver sufficient body and vehicle armor to our troops in Iraq)
open_source  warfare  networks  insurgencies  innovation_cycles  accelerated_lifecycles  attrition_rates 
july 2012 by jerryking
Unconventional Wisdom -
April 10, 2008 | WSJ | By ROBERT D. KAPLAN.

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare
Edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian
(Osprey, 304 pages, $27.95)
Robert_Kaplan  book_reviews  unconventional_warfare  lessons_learned  books  Prussian  warfare  Carl_von_Clausewitz  counterinsurgency 
june 2012 by jerryking
A failure in generalship
May 2007 | Armed Forces Journal | By Lt. Col. Paul Yingling.

Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted that passion, probability and policy each play their role in war....generals must provide policymakers and the public with a correct estimation of strategic probabilities. The general is responsible for estimating the likelihood of success in applying force to achieve the aims of policy...“Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife,” by John Nagl
leadership  politics  war  warfare  strategy  strategic_thinking  organizational_culture  civilian-military_relations  Prussian  books  Carl_von_Clausewitz  generalship  probabilities  contextual  militaries  policymakers  policymaking 
may 2012 by jerryking
Microdrones, Some as Small as Bugs, Are Poised to Alter War -
June 19, 2011

From blimps to bugs, an explosion in aerial drones is transforming the
way America fights and thinks about its wars. Predator drones, the
Cessna-sized workhorses that have dominated unmanned flight since the
Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, are by now a brand name, known and feared
around the world....Large or small, drones raise questions about the
growing disconnect between the American public and its wars. Military
ethicists concede that drones can turn war into a video game, inflict
civilian casualties and, with no Americans directly at risk, more easily
draw the United States into conflicts. Drones have also created a
crisis of information for analysts on the end of a daily video
warfare  drones  DARPA  information_overload  war 
june 2011 by jerryking
Book Review: Beetle -
* OCTOBER 23, 2010 By ANTONY BEEVOR. There have been countless
biographies of the generals of World War II, and many are excellent.
This biography of Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's chief of staff, is
one of the best. Smith has never received the attention and the credit
that he deserves. A chief of staff is perhaps bound to be an unsung
hero, but "Beetle" Smith was far more than just a tough and able
administrator. In the words of a fellow officer, he possessed "all the
charm of a rattlesnake." Yet the bad-cop routine—one he used almost
entirely with fellow Americans and not with Allies—was forced upon him
because Eisenhower, his supreme commander, desperately wanted to be
liked by everybody.
book_reviews  WWII  U.S._Army  chief_of_staff  generalship  warfare  war  Dwight_Eisenhower  biographies 
october 2010 by jerryking
Op-Ed Contributor - Lose a General, Win a War -
June 23, 2010 | New York Times | By THOMAS E. RICKS. FOR
most of the U.S.'s history, the armed services have had a strong and
worthy tradition of firing generals who get out of line....If President
Obama is to be faulted, it is for leaving that group in position after
it became apparent last fall that the men could not work well together.

No policy can be successful if those sent to put it in place undermine
one another with snide comments to reporters and leaked memorandums like
the cable disparaging Mr. Karzai written by Ambassador Karl Eikenberry
last year. For this reason, the president should finish cleaning house
and fire Ambassador Eikenberry and the special envoy, Richard Holbrooke.
Obama  Stanley_McChrystal  U.S._military  U.S._Navy  WWII  leadership  firings  U.S._Army  civilian-military_relations  generalship  warfare  war 
june 2010 by jerryking
How America's Top Military Officer Uses Business to Boost National Security
May 1, 2010 | Fast Company | Jeff Chu. "He wanted to know what
kind of environment can be created in which business can thrive and
what role govts. have to play," "What is it that makes businesses
successful?" What does this have to do with his job or the military's?
"Our financial health is directly related to our national security,"
"The biggest driver globally is the economy ... I need to understand the
global trends that work those engines. Where are these guys putting
their $? If they're betting on certain outcomes -- good or bad -- why?"
Mullen's principles on the use of US military force: don't go it alone;
don't be overweight in foreign policy; closer coordination between
military and civilian agencies. "If his advice were only how to fight
hi-tech wars, and if his solution were just to apply more force, he
would be less relevant," Brent Scowcroft, "He recognizes that the new
face of war is a very complex...part combat, part nation building, and
part hearts and minds."
leadership  U.S._military  JCS  Michael_Mullen  nation_building  ethnography  geopolitics  21st._century  indispensable  storytelling  messaging  generalship  security_&_intelligence  Brent_Scowcroft  strategic_thinking  questions  war  warfare  complexity  curiosity  APNSA 
april 2010 by jerryking
The Accidental Guerrilla (SWJ Blog)
Posted by SWJ Editors on January 28, 2009 3:53 AM | Permalink|

A must read - now available for pre-order: The Accidental Guerrilla:
Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One by Dr. David Kilcullen.
[355.425 KIL355.425 KIL]
book_reviews  warfare  guerrilla_warfare 
september 2009 by jerryking
LeMay and the Tragedy of War -
MAY 15, 2009 | Wall Street Journal | by WARREN KOZAK
warfare  USAF  civil_liberties  priorities  greater_good  WWII 
may 2009 by jerryking
Book Review of 'The Accidental Guerrilla' -
March 14, 2009 |The Wall Street Journal| book review by Max
Boot of "The Accidental Guerrilla"By David Kilcullen Oxford, 346 pages,
$27.95. Kilcullen offers "best practices" for counterinsurgency, but
stresses that there is no "one size fits all" formula.
warfare  book_reviews  security_&_intelligence  best_practices  counterinsurgency  unconventional_warfare  guerrilla_warfare  one-size-fits-all 
march 2009 by jerryking
Farewell, Tranquil Mind -
FEBRUARY 23, 2009, 1:08 P.M. ET book review by BRET STEPHENS of '7 Deadly Scenarios'
By Andrew F. Krepinevich
(Bantam, 334 pages, $27)
book_reviews  Bret_Stephens  21st._century  warfare  scenario-planning 
february 2009 by jerryking

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