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Ship-tracking Microsatellites Could Spot GPS Jammers from Space - Inside GNSS, Mar 2020
"It’s entirely plausible that HawkEye’s satellites could locate GPS jammers, according to Logan Scott of LS Consulting, an expert on both navigation and telecommunication signals. "
InsideGNSS  HawkEye360  GNSS  GPS  Interference 
5 days ago by pierredv
DOT holds first GPS backup technology demonstration - GPS World | RNTF Mar 2020
Government officials, advisers, and congressional staff gathered at NASA’s Langley Research Center on Friday, March 13. They were there to discuss the Department of Transportation’s (DoT’s) GPS Backup Technology Demonstration program and view the offerings of six different companies.
DoT  GPS  RNTF  vulnerability  spectrum-vulnerability 
18 days ago by pierredv
Pentagon report: DoD needs to test how satellites would perform under attack - SpaceNews.com
"The Defense Department’s director of operational test and evaluation warns in a new report that the military today is not able to assess the durability of its satellites if they came under attack."

Quote of Behler: "... the DoD currently has no real means to assess adequately the operational effectiveness, suitability and survivability of space-based systems in a representative environment."

"The 2019 report echoes many of the same problems the DOT&E office has identified in recent years on the Global Positioning System constellation. Testers said the disjointed management of the GPS enterprise of satellites, ground systems and user equipment continues to plague the program.

The report again cautions that the Air Force is not able to properly test the resilience of its new GPS 3 satellites against orbital threats. It also notes that GPS user receivers continue to face schedule slips and are years behind schedule."
SpaceNews  DoD  GPS 
8 weeks ago by pierredv
DoD PNT Task Force Charter: ‘Best investments may be non-GPS’ - GPS World : GPS World, Dana Goward, Jan 2020
Augmenting GPS with other systems was suggested as the most promising area of improvement in a recently released memo establishing a Defense Science Board task force on positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT).
GPS  PNT  GPSWorld  Dana-Goward  DoD 
12 weeks ago by pierredv
Grounded flights, lost drones and ‘crop circles’: the year in GNSS vulnerabilities | LinkedIn Dec 2019
In 2019 we saw massive worldwide disruption from GNSS jamming, spoofing and other vulnerabilities. Here’s a recap of the year’s most significant events.
cyber-spectrum  GNSS  vulnerability  GPS  jamming  spoofing 
december 2019 by pierredv
Ghost ships, crop circles, and soft gold: A GPS mystery in Shanghai - MIT Technology Review, Nov 2019
"A sophisticated new electronic warfare system is being used at the world’s busiest port. But is it sand thieves or the Chinese state behind it?"

"Nobody knows who is behind this spoofing, or what its ultimate purpose might be. These ships could be unwilling test subjects for a sophisticated electronic warfare system, or collateral damage in a conflict between environmental criminals and the Chinese state that has already claimed dozens of ships and lives. But one thing is for certain: there is an invisible electronic war over the future of navigation in Shanghai, and GPS is losing."
GPS  China  spoofing  MIT-Technology-Review  shipping  maritime 
november 2019 by pierredv
US Department of Defense PNT strategy: 'GPS is not enough' - GPS World : GPS World Oct 2019
Bullets
= GPS might be interfered with globally
= Multiple, diverse PNT sources, modular open system needed for receivers
= Civil use hampering military efforts to leverage GPS for military advantage
= DoD PNT efforts to be increasingly classified, not shared with civil users
GPS  GPSWorld  DoD  PNT 
october 2019 by pierredv
'China to Target GPS First in Cyber War' - Senator Sasse | RNTF Sep 2019
In the article below, the Senator is quoted as saying dominant scenarios for cyber war have China “…sort of blowing up everything in the near-space early in a conflict, which would take away lots of things like GPS​…”

Actually “blowing up” enough widely distributed GPS satellites to disable the entire system would be very difficult. It is much easier to envision the system being “virtually blown up” by two or three high powered Chinese satellites jamming GPS signals across the face of the planet.
RNTF  GPS  cyberwar  China 
september 2019 by pierredv
Stalking cheap Chinese GPS child trackers is as easy as 123... 456 – because that's the default password on 600k+ of these gizmos • The Register, Sep 2019
"Concerned parents who strap GPS trackers to their kids to keep tabs on the youngsters may be inadvertently putting their offspring in danger. Hundreds of thousands of the gizmos ship with pathetic security, including a default password of 123456, allowing them to be potentially monitored by strangers, it is claimed."

"White hats at Avast announced on Thursday they discovered 29 models of gadgets, designed to track their child wearers, had that weak default passcode. "

"once into an account, you can see the kid's GPS coordinates, eavesdrop on the built-in microphone, access any photos on the device, and potentially even make a call to the child"

"The security pros scanned a million account numbers, and said they found more than 600,000 vulnerable devices are in circulation"
TheRegister  GPS  China  cyber-spectrum  cybersecurity  hacking  Avast  surveillance  tracking 
september 2019 by pierredv
'BeiDou + GLONASS Better than GPS' - Global Times (China) | RNTF Sep 2019
Cover of article in Global Times, Sep 2019

Blog Editor’s Note: We reported on this cooperation last month and assessed the concerns for GPS and America. It is interesting this month to see China touting it in public as a way to offset GPS (and by extension, US) leadership around the world.

Some related items/thoughts:

There are already more Bei Dou satellites in view over much of the world than GPS satellites. Add in GLONASS satellites and you have something bigger than GPS + Galileo.
China is actively promoting Bei Dou as the PNT of choice for its neighbors. As one example, police/first responders in one Malaysian state have decided to use it exclusively, undoubtedly with some free equipment included in the deal.
Every time Russia or China disrupts GPS, which is often, users are nudged away from the American system and toward Russia’s and/or China’s.
GPS is a US military asset. Both China and Russia regard it as such, as can be seen in the below article. This means that both:
See it as a threat and something they need to counter
Jam and spoof GPS as mentioned above for tactical and strategic reasons
Have established their own satellite PNT systems
Have maintained and continue to cooperate in the operation of terrestrial PNT (Loran-C)
China has placed a PNT capability in Low Earth Orbit (GPS and other GNSS are in Medium Earth Orbit) and has been making other preparations that seem to indicate it will establish a LEO PNT constellation. Doing so would provide much more powerful signals and other functionalities that would place China firmly in the lead for global PNT.
RNTF  GPS  GNSS  BeiDou  GLONASS 
september 2019 by pierredv
Viewpoint: Russia, China Alliance on Navigation Satellites Threatens GPS - National Defense | RNTF aug 2019
"Russia and China have been increasingly moving toward greater synergies between their respective satellite navigation systems since at least 2015."

"At least a few industry insiders see this as part of an on-going effort to virtually combine the two systems and replace GPS as the leading global navigation system. This has far reaching geo-political implications and could impact GPS operations globally."

"Having such a large and robust satellite system could also add to the two nations’ predilection for interfering with international GPS signals over broad areas. . . . Jamming and spoofing GPS has tactical and strategic advantages for Russia and China. "
RNTF  GPS  China  Russia  GNSS  GLONASS  BeiDou 
august 2019 by pierredv
China's version of GPS now has more satellites than US original - Nikkei Asian Review, Aug 2019
Via RNTF https://rntfnd.org/2019/08/22/more-beidou-than-gps-in-130-of-195-countries/

"China's BeiDou satellite positioning system has overtaken its U.S. rival in size, a shift with potentially huge implications for both high-tech industry and national security. ... As of the end of June, there were 35 BeiDou satellites in operation, compared with 31 for GPS"

"Qianxun SI, a location services provider funded by Alibaba Group Holding and others, is using BeiDou signals and data from more than 2,000 ground stations to create a positioning service for self-driving vehicles with an accuracy in the centimeter range. Just as the U.S. became the leader in positioning services with GPS, China is working to develop new satellite-based technology and promote it around the world using BeiDou."

"When using BeiDou for car navigation, the receiver could theoretically transmit the car's location to a satellite in orbit, said Dean Cheng, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. He also believes Chinese satellites can jam signals in specific areas. The U.S. government is worried that such capabilities could be used in cyberattacks."
China  GPS  GNSS  BeiDou  RNTF 
august 2019 by pierredv
UK, 'Five Eyes' & the Future of SatNav & PNT | RNTF, Aug 2019
The United Kingdom has a golden opportunity with this initiative to be a world leader in PNT.

To capture this title, they must be innovative and not just field a British version of what the US, Russia, Europe, and China have already done. The UK must focus on users, reliability, resilience, and affordability.
RNTF  PNT  GNSS  GPS  UK  LEO 
august 2019 by pierredv
GNSS Threat Monitoring and Reporting: Past, Present, and a Proposed Future | RNTF Aug 2019
The authors of this excellent paper, which was named the Journal of Navigation’s best paper for 2018, propose a technical architecture to enable collection and use of diverse GNSS threat monitoring sources.
RNTF  GPS  GNSS  Interference  measurement 
august 2019 by pierredv
GNSS Threat Monitoring and Reporting: Past, Present, and a Proposed Future | The Journal of Navigation | Cambridge Core
Via RNTF blog, Aug 2019

Abstract

Vulnerability of satellite-based navigation signals to intentional and unintentional interference calls for a high-level overview of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) threats occurring globally to understand the magnitude and evolution of the problem. Therefore, a mechanism needs to be developed whereby disparate monitoring systems will be capable of contributing to a common entity of basic information about the threat scenarios they experience. This paper begins with a literature survey of 37 state-of-the-art GNSS threat monitoring systems, which have been analysed based on their respective operational features - constellations monitored and whether they possess the capability to perform interference-type classification, spoofing detection, and interference localisation. Also described is a comparative analysis of four GNSS threat reporting formats in use today. Based on these studies, the paper describes the Horizon2020 Standardisation of GNSS Threat Reporting and Receiver Testing through International Knowledge Exchange, Experimentation and Exploitation (STRIKE3) proposed integrated threat monitoring demonstration system and related standardised threat reporting message, to enable a high-level overview of the prevailing international GNSS threat scenarios and its evolution over time.
GNSS  GPS  Interference  measurement 
august 2019 by pierredv
NASA report: Passenger aircraft nearly crashes due GPS disruption - GPS World | RNTF - Aug 2019
A report filed with NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System and published in June outlines how a passenger aircraft flew off course during a period of GPS jamming and nearly crashed into a mountain. Fortunately, an alert radar controller intervened, and the accident was averted.
GPS  RNTF  GPSWorld  jamming  cyber-spectrum  spectrum-vulnerability 
august 2019 by pierredv
Navigation War in Persian Gulf Hits the News | RNTF, Aug 2019
Blog Editor’s Note: Below are a warning published by the US Maritime Administration, and a press report that quotes an unnamed US defense official. Long time readers will discern that there is a bit of confusion in the two reports about what exactly is going on in terms of spoofing (GPS or just communications?), jamming, and so on. But there is certainly a lot happening.

It should be no surprise that Iran is jamming GPS and perhaps spoofing signals as they have clearly done that before and these are common, easily employed techniques in today’s low intensity warfare.

This kind of navigation warfare has been going on around the world and in the Persian Gulf for quite some time. The first public report was when Iran bragged about capturing a CIA drone operating in Afghanistan in 2011 by spoofing its GPS receiver.

A couple thoughts on the below reports:

The “AIS spoofing” discussed is not the same thing as spoofing GPS signals. AIS is identification equipment carried by a vessel that be programmed to report that the vessel is any type the user wishes. So an Iranian patrol boat can enter into its AIS that it is an British oil tanker, for example in the hopes of deceiving other vessels that don’t have it in sight.
A “US defense official” claims that Iran has been “jamming GPS signals” in the hopes ships will wander into their waters. That would not really be effective, and it wouldn’t make sense, since they clearly have the ability to spoof signals. This could make the ships sail, not wander, into their territorial seas. The folks we have spoken to haven’t seen any signs, yet, of spoofing, but we wouldn’t be surprised if they discover it eventually.
We are not sure about the US defense official’s credibility, though, as at the end of the CNN article “The official said the Iranian jammers have no effect on US military warships and aircraft.” – Yeah, right.
RNTF  GPS  cyber-spectrum  jamming  spoofing  navigation 
august 2019 by pierredv
Fooling LiDAR, the auto-drive failsafe | RNTF Jul 2019
"In the experiments researchers succeeded in creating undetectable targets, exposing vulnerabilities in LiDAR detection systems through an evolution-based black box algorithm."

"Last summer we saw a paper from researchers who spoofed all the GNSS constellations at once, and at the very modest price of $400. – If you are on a fixed income and $400 seems to be a lot, think about the tens of billions of dollars invested to produce GNSS signals.

The next month we saw a paper from researchers who decided that spoofing the signal might not be enough to mislead a vehicle driver. So they figured out how to also send a false map that looked like were the driver was, but, along with spoofed GNSS signals, would help misdirect the target vehicle. Just perfect for kidnapping, stealing cargo, or luring a driver into some other dangerous situation.

This summer we saw a paper from Regulus that reported on their ability to cause a Tesla in auto-drive mode to suddenly brake, accelerate, and exit the highway early and at the wrong point (we understand their co-worker in the car was scared silly). Thanks to the car’s LiDAR (a radar-like sensor), they were not able to direct the car off the road.

Below is a report on a paper that shows that LiDAR, which many are regarding as the automated driving fail-safe, can also be fooled."
RNTF  GPS  spoofing  lidar  navigation  cyber-spectrum 
july 2019 by pierredv
US NIST Report - 'GPS is priceless, economic impact of loss minimal.' | RNTF
A critical take

"A report titled “Economic Benefits of the Global Positioning System (GPS)” by RTI International was released last month. Sponsored by the National Institutes for Standards and Technology, it offered seemingly contradictory conclusions."
RNTF  GPS  NIST  risk-assessment 
july 2019 by pierredv
Global Positioning System(GPS) Adjacent Band Compatibility Assessment | US Department of Transportation
DOT GPS Adjacent Band Compatibility Assessment: Final Report

DOT GPS Adjacent Band Compatibility Assessment: Final Report (Appendices A-F)

DOT GPS Adjacent Band Compatibility Assessment: Final Report (Appendices G-K)
DoT  GPS  interference 
june 2019 by pierredv
Russia denies role in Israeli airport GPS jamming - BBC News | RNTF
Blog Editor’s Note: Interesting follow-on report below from the BBC. Now we know it is spoofing vice jamming. Some of our thoughts:

The below article posits that this could be a spill over from Russian operations next door in Syria. Quite possible. It is the most likely explanation. At the same time, much of Russian operations in Syria involve “smart jamming,” or transmitting what seem to be valid GPS signals but with information that does not allow a receiver to calculate a position. According to the BBC, Israeli pilots have been reporting their receivers showing incorrect positions. This is not something you would see with smart jamming.
Russia is not the only actor in the region capable of spoofing. Virtually any nation or extra-governmental [OK, terrorist] organization would be capable of pulling this off.
It is also interesting to note that many of the approaches to the Tel Aviv airport are over the water. The interfering signal may be from a boat, a small buoy, or even a sub-surface device with only a small antenna showing above the water. Any of these would be very difficult to locate.
BBC  RNTF  Russia  Israel  aviation  GPS  spoofing 
june 2019 by pierredv
LTE impacts on GPS | NIST, Feb 2017
Abstract
This report describes the test methodology from “LTE impacts on GPS: Test and Metrology Plan” developed by National Advanced Spectrum and Communications Test Network (NASCTN), and data that are the result of executing the test method. The fundamental goals in developing the test plan development were: a transparent, reproducible, and well-calibrated test method, sound and statistically- valid data retrieval and processing methods, a clear path from measurement setup to data collection to processed results, and data to inform discussions between different interests on proper measurement requirements. The NASCTN team performed radiated testing to execute the test plan. These efforts amount to a test campaign intended to refine the test method and publish data for the stakeholder community. To this end, the team set out to: provide data of sufficient quality and relevance to support sound decision-making, articulate the importance of measurement uncertainty along with its relationship with the design and execution of the test method, and convey key implementation details that to support future execution of the test method.
NIST  LTE  GPS 
june 2019 by pierredv
Controversy on Way Forward for GNSS Receiver Resilience - SAE Could Be Way Forward | RNTF
"But what does “Toughen” really mean? We at RNTF suggest that it includes a receiver being able to resist jamming, spoofing, adjacent band interference, and other disruptions, and accessing more than one signal source. While that’s a start on describing “toughened,” it’s not exactly procurement language. It doesn’t provide a lot of help for users who want to go out and select a toughened receiver and buy today."

"we support SAE Project SAE1013 “Guidelines for Resilient GNSS Receivers” and its companion effort SAE 1014 “Standard for Interfacing Resilient PNT Receivers.”"
RNTF  GPS  SAE  resilience 
june 2019 by pierredv
Long Delay for Chimera Indicates Possible GPS & PNT Leadership Shortfall - Inside GNSS | RNTF
"Logan [Scott] first proposed Chimera in a 2003 paper. Yet it is only now, 16 years later, that the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) is starting to take a look at it."

See Logan's deck at https://www.gps.gov/governance/advisory/meetings/2019-06/scott.pdf
Dana-Goward  GPS  PNTF  Chimera  spoofing 
june 2019 by pierredv
GPS gives directions, but what does it take away? | Popular Science, M.R. O'Connor April 30, 2019
an excerpt from "Wayfinding: The Science and Mystery of How Humans Navigate the World, a new book by M.R. O'Connor.

“The GPS receiver’s answer to a spatial question (e.g., where to go) is provided by a mechanism that is physically detached from it (a network of satellites) and required no involvement of the traveler with the environment,” Aporta and his coauthor, Eric Higgs, wrote in their paper “Satellite Culture: Global Positioning Systems, Inuit Wayfinding, and the Need for a New Account of Technology.” “Although the act of physical travel will always involve some connection with the surroundings, this connection is... shallow.”

"So while devices liberate people from toil, freeing our time and energy, they also separate the means from the end. We are disconnected from the environment and the skills required for daily survival. Consider a thermostat: it allows us to control the temperature of our homes with a finger, yet by using it we are no longer responsible for physically gathering the resources needed to heat our own homes—the thermostat conceals the means of heat."
PopularScience  books  GPS  wayfinding 
june 2019 by pierredv
Hacker Finds He Can Remotely Kill Car Engines After Breaking Into GPS Tracking Apps - Motherboard Apr 2019
The hacker, who goes by the name L&M, told Motherboard he hacked into more than 7,000 iTrack accounts and more than 20,000 ProTrack accounts, two apps that companies use to monitor and manage fleets of vehicles through GPS tracking devices. The hacker was able to track vehicles in a handful of countries around the world, including South Africa, Morocco, India, and the Philippines. On some cars, the software has the capability of remotely turning off the engines of vehicles that are stopped or are traveling 12 miles per hour or slower, according to the manufacturer of certain GPS tracking devices.
automobile  GPS  hacking  cybersecurity  Motherboard 
april 2019 by pierredv
Highway gantries identify jammers - GPS World : GPS World Apr 2019
Via Dale Hatfield

"An ION GNSS+ 2018 presentation by Wim de Wilde and Jean-Marie Sleewaegen presentation showed how a multi-antenna GNSS receiver with built-in RF spectrum monitor and adequate processing tool can efficiently detect and classify jamming events and identify the offending car or truck. They conducted a five-day test with two Septentrio AsteRx-U dual-antenna receivers installed on an overhead structure above a busy highway."

"Over the five days of the experiment, 45 jamming events were recorded and analyzed, most of them intentional: continuous wave, chirp or even less-known pulse jammers."
GNSS  GPS  jamming  GPSWorld 
april 2019 by pierredv
Above Us Only Stars — C4ADS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In this report, we present findings from a year-long investigation ending in November 2018 on an emerging subset of EW activity: the ability to mimic, or spoof, legitimate GNSS signals in order to manipulate PNT data. Using publicly available data and commercial technologies, we detect and analyze patterns of GNSS spoofing in the Russian Federation, Crimea, and Syria which demonstrate that the Russian Federation is growing a comparative advantage in the targeted use and development of GNSS spoofing capabilities to achieve tactical and strategic objectives at home and abroad. We profile different use cases of current Russian state activity to trace the activity back to basing locations and systems in use.
“In Section One, we examine GNSS spoofing events across the entire Russian Federation, its occupied territories, and overseas military facilities. We identify 9,883 suspected instances across 10 locations that affected 1,311 civilian vessel navigation systems since February 2016. We demonstrate that these activities are much larger in scope, more diverse in geography, and longer in duration than any public reporting suggests to date.”

“Finally, in Section Four, we expose the use of GPS spoofing in active Russian combat zones, particularly Syria, for airspace denial purposes. This is a capability scarcely reported in the public domain. Using data from a scientific sensor on the International Space Station (ISS), we are able to identify ongoing activity that poses significant threats to civilian airline GPS systems in the region. . . . ”
GPS  GNSS  spoofing  cybersecurity 
april 2019 by pierredv
Can I sue because my GPS might be spoofed? | RNTF Apr 2019
The U.S. Supreme Court’s answer seems to be “yes.”

Earlier this year it declined to hear an appeal from Fiat Chrysler and let a class action suit against the company go ahead. The plaintiffs assert that their vehicles were designed without sufficient cyber-security protections.
RNTF  GPS  litigation  liability  cyber-spectrum  cybersecurity 
april 2019 by pierredv
HK$1 million in damage caused by GPS jamming that caused 46 drones to plummet during Hong Kong show | South China Morning Post, Oct 2019
Via Dale
"The GPS jamming that caused 46 drones to plummet during a display over Victoria Harbour during the weekend caused at least HK$1 million (US$127,500) in damage, according to a senior official from the Hong Kong Tourism Board."

"... the interference was likely to have been caused by someone standing by the harbour and pointing a device towards the drones, which landed on the water when they detected a signal interruption.

The distance from the water to the drone show suggested the jammer used on Saturday was a powerful device."
SouthChinaMorningPost  HongKong  drones  UAV  GPS  jamming 
april 2019 by pierredv
Furuno to launch single-band GNSS receivers for 5G - GPS World : GPS World
Furuno Electric Co. Ltd., based in Nishinomiya, Japan, has developed the GT-88 timing module and GF-8801/02/03/04/05 disciplined oscillator for users who require UTC time-synchronized signals to meet the new 5G requirements.
5G  cellular  GPS 
april 2019 by pierredv
Russia 'spoofing' GPS on vast scale to stop drones from approaching Putin, report says - Mar 2019
Russia manipulates global navigation systems by sending out false location data to civilian ships or other users on a vast scale, in an apparent attempt to prevent drones from approaching President Vladimir Putin or to safeguard sensitive sites at home and abroad, according to a report released Tuesday.

Although Russia's mimicking or "spoofing" of GPS signals has been exposed previously, new research by the U.S.-based nonprofit C4ADS shows that Moscow's trickery is more pervasive and indiscriminate than previously reported.
NBCNews  GPS  spoofing  Russia 
march 2019 by pierredv
Family tracking app leaked real-time location data for weeks - Engadget Mar 2018
"Family tracking apps can be very helpful if you're worried about your kids or spouse, but they can be nightmarish if that data falls into the wrong hands. Security researcher Sanyam Jain has revealed to TechCrunch that React Apps' Family Locator left real-time location data (plus other sensitive personal info) for over 238,000 people exposed for weeks in an insecure database. It showed positions within a few feet, and even showed the names for the geofenced areas used to provide alerts. You could tell if parents left home or a child arrived at school, for instance."

"While the data is safe for now, the incident illustrates a problem with tracking apps as a whole: it's difficult to verify that developers are securing your location info every step of the way. If they don't and there's a breach, it could lead to very real threats that could include physical danger."
Engadget  GPS  surveillance  data-leaks  hacking  spectrum-vulnerability  cyber-spectrum  vulnerability 
march 2019 by pierredv
Air Force experiment NTS-3 could point the way to the next generation of GPS - SpaceNews.com Mar 2019
"As an immediate response, the Air Force has begun deploying more-advanced GPS satellites, called GPS 3, designed to be more resistant to jamming and spoofing.

The Air Force also is looking for ways to shore up the PNT capabilities provided by GPS. One approach the Air Force believes could work is to supplement its medium Earth orbiting GPS constellation with an additional layer of smaller satellites in geosynchronous Earth orbit.

To test that idea, the Air Force Research Laboratory in 2022 will launch an experimental PNT satellite called NTS-3, short for Navigation Technology Satellite 3."

"As the U.S. military’s first Navigation Technology Satellite mission in 40 years, NTS-3 is intended to test new hardware including a digital signal generator that can be reprogrammed on orbit, enabling operators to quickly deploy new signals as they encounter electronic threats."

"The Air Force still has 31 GPS 2 satellites in service and has only just begun to deploy its GPS 3 constellation. "
SpaceNews  GPS  satellite  USAF  DoD 
march 2019 by pierredv
[pdf] A Holistic Approach to Protect, Toughen & Augment: Industry is Ready to Help With Resilient PNT - courtois.pdf
Jean-Yves Courtois, Chief Executive Officer, Orolia
at 22nd meeting of Space-based Positioning Navigation and Timing
Dec 5-6, 2018, Redondo Beach CA
See https://www.gps.gov/governance/advisory/meetings/2018-12/ for agenda
GPS  PNT 
march 2019 by pierredv
Lawmakers to form bipartisan caucus to promote the economic, national security benefits of GPS - SpaceNews.com Mar 2019
The Global Positioning System constellation will have its own caucus of supporters on Capitol Hill, Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.) and Sen. Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) announced on Monday.

The caucus will seek to promote the economic, national security and infrastructure benefits of GPS technology, and will drive attention to the risks and oversight challenges that face the GPS industry, the senators said in a news release.
SpaceNews  GPS  Congress 
march 2019 by pierredv
GPS Flaw: Security Expert Says He Won't Fly April 6 - Mar 2019
Don't look now, but there's another Y2K-like computer-calendar problem on the way, and this one arrives in just one month: April 6, 2019. That's the day millions of GPS receivers will literally run out of time, rolling over their time counters back to zero, thanks to limitations in timekeeping for older GPS devices. Many navigation systems may be affected, such as on ships or older aircraft, although your smartphone will be fine.
GPS 
march 2019 by pierredv
There's Something Very Weird Going on With Cars' GPS Systems at the Geneva Motor Show
"As you may know, the Geneva Motor Show public days are this week, and while we’ve been covering a number of interesting concepts and cars at the show, there’s also something happening there that no one can really explain. For some reason, many of the cars are showing their location as being in Buckingham, England, and the year as 2036. "

"He told me that the false GPS signal is “pissing off” the carmakers because it’s making their systems look bad and/or vulnerable.

Even when employees from the carmakers try to manually reset the GPS location and the date, the spoofed signals overwrite the manually-entered information, so that’s not an option.

Echivard also told me that because the signal is not “permanent” they are unable to triangulate its location. "
GPS  spoofing  automobile 
march 2019 by pierredv
GPS Jamming Interferes with Construction | RNTF Feb 2019
Blog Editor’s Note: We are not sure if this is another instance of Russia jamming GPS in Norway or part of the most recent spate of instances. Suffice it to say that Russia has been jamming GPS in northern Norway a lot. This is a good article as it reminds us that GPS is about much more than making transportation more efficient and safer.
GPS  jamming  spoofing  RNTF  Norway 
march 2019 by pierredv
GPS spoofing, low-cost GPS simulator - DEF CON 23 , 2015
DEFCON-23-Lin-Huang-Qing-Yang-GPS-Spoofing.pdf
HUANG Lin, YANG Qing
Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research
Qihoo 360 Technology Co Ltd
GPS  spoofing  DefCon  China  hacking 
february 2019 by pierredv
Big Telecom Sold Highly Sensitive Customer GPS Data Typically Used for 911 Calls - Motherboard Feb 2019
"Around 250 bounty hunters and related businesses had access to AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint customer location data, according to documents obtained by Motherboard. The documents also show that telecom companies sold data intended to be used by 911 operators and first responders to data aggregators, who sold it to bounty hunters. The data was in some cases so accurate that a user could be tracked to specific spots inside a building."

"Some of the data available to CerCareOne customers included a phone’s “assisted GPS” or A-GPS data, ... A-GPS is a technology that is used by first responders to locate 911 callers in emergency situations."
Motherboard  GPS  cellular  location  surveillance  AT&T  T-Mobile  Sprint 
february 2019 by pierredv
Spoofing GPS Locations with low cost TX SDRs, RTL-SDR Sep 2015
At this years Defcon 2015 conference researcher Lin Huang from Qihoo 360 presented her work on spoofing GPS signals. Qihoo 360 is a Chinese security company producing antivirus software. Lin works at Qihoo as a security researcher where her main job is to prevent their antivirus software and users from becoming vulnerable to wireless attacks. Her research brought her to the realm of GPS spoofing, where she discovered how easy it was to use relatively low cost SDRs like a USRP B210/BladeRF/HackRF to emulate GPS signals which could allow a wireless attacker to manipulate the GPS on smartphones and cars.
RTL-SDR  Defcon  GPS  spoofing 
february 2019 by pierredv
GNSS Interference and Spoofing Detection | BroadSense | Talen-X
Via Dale, Jan 2019

"BroadSense is a GPS interference and detection sensor designed to detect jamming and spoofing. Utilizing sophisticated GNSS receivers and 75+ advanced algorithms, BroadSense can detect when the GPS signal or GPS spectrum is compromised."
Talen-X  GPS  jamming  spoofing 
january 2019 by pierredv
Mass GPS Spoofing Attack in Black Sea? Jul 2017
"The RNT Foundation has received numerous anecdotal reports of maritime problems with AIS and GPS in Russian waters, though this is the first publicly available, well-document account, of which we are aware.

Russia has very advanced capabilities to disrupt GPS. Over 250,000 cell towers in Russia have been equipped with GPS jamming devices as a defense against attack by U.S. missiles. And there have been press reports of Russian GPS jamming in both Moscow and the Ukraine. In fact Russia has boasted that its capabilities “make aircraft carriers useless,” and the U.S. Director of National Intelligence recently issued a report that stated that Russia and others were focusing on improving their capability to jam U.S. satellite systems."
GPS  spoofing  Russia  Dana-Goward 
january 2019 by pierredv
More Ain't Necessarily Better! | RNTF Feb 2016
"And each new satellite increases the noise level in those radio bands, so finding and locking onto the extremely weak signals gets harder. Guenther Hein has shown that when the number of satellites passes 70, the noise they transmit exceeds the cosmic noise and reception deteriorates. Too many satellites, and you’d pick up none at all!"
RNTF  GPS  noise-floor 
january 2019 by pierredv
GPS disrupted for maritime in Mediterranean, Red Sea : GPS World, Nov 2018
"The U.S. Maritime Administration issued an expanded advisory for GPS disruptions in the Middle East. The new advisory renews and repeats warnings for the eastern Mediterranean and adds the Port of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia.

Reports have also been filed with the U..S Coast Guard Navigation Center about disruptions in Israel’s Port of Haifa and the Straits of Hormuz."
GPS  outage  degradation 
january 2019 by pierredv
GPS Problem Reports Status - US Coast Guard Navigation Center (NAVCEN)
"Civil GPS Users are encouraged to submit reports of GPS problems to NAVCEN. A form to submit reports can be found on our GPS Problem Reporting webpage. Some information from those reports is shared here along with input from interagency partners and the most likely cause of the report."
GPS  outage  vulnerability  degradation 
january 2019 by pierredv
GPS Anomaly Event - SVN23, chronos.co.uk
"GPS Satellite Vehicle Number (SVN) 23 launched in 1990 was retired from service in January 2016. It had occupied Pseudo-Random Noise (PRN) sequence 32 since 2008. According to NANU 2016008 it was marked unusable at 15:36 UTC on 25th January and decommissioned at 22:00 UTC later that same day. Unfortunately (for reasons not yet fully known) the UTC signal on some satellites was off by 13 microseconds. This Case Study charts the activity undertaken by the Chronos support team during and after this unprecedented GPS anomaly event. For some with long memories this is not the first time that SVN23 has caused a problem. The last time was 1st January 2004."
GPS  vulnerability  degradation 
january 2019 by pierredv
GPS.gov: Information About GPS Jamming
includes list of FCC advisories and enforcement actions
GPS  jamming  enforcement 
december 2018 by pierredv
The GPS Wars Are Here – Foreign Policy, Dec 2018
"Location-based services are universal, critical, and horribly vulnerable."
GPS  ForeignPolicy 
december 2018 by pierredv
Response to 5 July 2017 PNT Advisory Board Letter on Ligado Spectrum Proposal
"I was more than puzzled by the July 5, 2017 letter from the PNT Advisory Board (“PNT AB”) about Ligado’s spectrum proposal."
Dennis-Roberson  GPS  Ligado  Interference  harmful-interference 
december 2018 by pierredv
Russia jammed GPS during major NATO military exercise with US troops - CNNPolitics Nov 2018
The Russian military jammed GPS signals during a major NATO military exercise in Norway that involved thousands of US and NATO troops, the alliance said Wednesday, citing the Norwegian government.
Russia  GPS  NATO  CNN  jamming 
november 2018 by pierredv
RAIM SAPT — Getting Started - FAA
Welcome to the web site for the Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) Service Availability Prediction Tool (SAPT).

This website offers a Grid Display Tool and Summary Displays which can be used to graphically view RAIM outage predictions for specific equipment configurations.
FAA  RAIM  receiver  prediction  aviation  GPS 
october 2018 by pierredv
Protecting the power grid from GPS spoofing -- GCN Sep 2018
"It’s relatively simple for bad actors to bring down a power grid by spoofing the GPS signals the grid uses to time stamp sensor measurements, according to researchers at the University of Texas at San Antonio."

The sensors -- phasor measurement units -- are installed in fixed locations throughout the grid and transmit 30 measurements per second to the control center, where operators monitor grid performance and increase or decrease the supply of electricity depending on the readings. That data is time stamped with the signals received by the sensors’ on-board GPS receivers.

"The team is also exploring using the algorithm to protect against time-synchronization attacks against financial institutions, which use the GPS timing data to time stamp financial transactions."
GPS  utilities  electricity  finance  vulnerability 
september 2018 by pierredv
Algorithms Help Power Grids Survive GPS Spoofs - IEEE Spectrum Aug 2018
"Power grids increasingly rely on GPS to stay in sync, which makes them potentially vulnerable to attacks that broadcast false GPS signals. Now researchers have developed algorithms they say could help defend against such assaults, even if a third of a power grid's GPS signals were disrupted."

"PMUs are vulnerable to GPS spoofing attacks, wherein a hacker would place transmitters near a station to broadcast counterfeit GPS signals, which would be picked up by the PMUs. Fooling the PMUs of one or more power stations could lead to disruptions that could cascade throughout an entire power grid."
GPS  IEEE-Spectrum  spoofing  energy  utilities 
august 2018 by pierredv
GPS Experts Vote Unanimously to Oppose Ligado's Newest Proposal - Inside GNSS Aug 2018
The NationalSpace-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Advisory Board urged opposition to the proposal saying that even if the transmissions’ power was lowered to just under 10 watts it “will create totally unacceptable interference for a great number of GPS users in the United States.”
InsideGNSS  GPS  Ligado 
august 2018 by pierredv
FAA Mulls Recommendations For Planned GPS Interference | Aviation Week Aug 2018
"The FAA says it is studying the recommendations a special committee issued earlier this year to better notify aircraft operators of planned GPS signal interference events caused by Defense Department testing."

"Loss of GPS in an aircraft equipped to report its position by automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) “Out,” a capability the FAA requires by 2020, causes that aircraft to be lost as a target for onboard ADS-B “In” systems, affects aircraft depending on satellite-based augmentation systems for precision approaches and presents a problem for the FAA’s strategy to decommission some secondary surveillance radars (SSR) as ADS-B becomes its primary means of surveillance. The FAA is considering decommissioning 80% of terminal radars as ADS-B equipage by aircraft operators increases, the TOC says."

"In May 2017, the FAA asked the TOC, a committee managed by standards organization RTCA, to provide recommendations on improving practices related to “intentional” GPS interference caused by military testing events. The committee did not consider other sources of GPS interference such as solar weather, illegal jamming or signal spoofing."
AviationWeek  FAA  DoD  GPS  aviation  air-traffic-control 
august 2018 by pierredv
A survey of the existence of GPS interference in Europe « Electronic Environment
"One of the objectives of STRIKE3 is the deployment and operation of an international GNSS interference monitoring network to capture the scale and dynamics of the problem, and to work with international GNSS partners to develop, negotiate, promote and implement standards for threat reporting and receiver testing."

"This article presents measurement results from a survey of the existence of GPS interference and jammers within Europe. The measurement started in the late March 2016 and ended in the beginning of July 2016. Interference detection equipment were deployed ‘as is’ in seven European countries; Sweden, UK, France, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Finland, see fig. 1. In total eleven different site locations are covered among these countries."

"there is a huge variation in the number of weekly events at each site, with some sites having only a few detections per week whereas others have several hundred ... The most active sites appear to be those next to major roads or in city center locations. These are also the busiest sites in terms of vehicles (which may carry jammers) and other sorts of activity"

", the greatest number of chirp type events (which are likely to be intentional and are associated with vehicle jammers) are seen at site 8 and site 10, with a significant number also seen at site 5. Those three sites are close to busy roads and hence that probably explains the high number of these types of events."
EU  Horizon2020  GNSS  GPS  cybersecurity  vulnerability  measurement  jamming  spectrum 
july 2018 by pierredv
A $225 GPS spoofer can send sat-nav-guided vehicles into oncoming traffic * | Ars Technica Jul 2018
Paper at https://people.cs.vt.edu/gangwang/sec18-gps.pdf

"A new proof-of-concept attack demonstrates how hackers could inconspicuously steer a targeted automobile to the wrong destination or, worse, endanger passengers by sending them down the wrong way of a one-way road. The attack starts with a $225 piece of hardware that’s planted in or underneath the targeted vehicle that spoofs the radio signals used by civilian GPS services. It then uses algorithms to plot a fake “ghost route” that mimics the turn-by-turn navigation directions contained in the original route. Depending on the hackers’ ultimate motivations, the attack can be used to divert an emergency vehicle or a specific passenger to an unintended location or to follow an unsafe route. The attack works best in urban areas the driver doesn’t know well, and it assumes hackers have a general idea of the vehicle’s intended destination."

"While the proof-of-concept attack is attention-grabbing, a variety of things significantly limit its effectiveness in the real world. "
1) "physical spoofer be in close proximity to the navigation device"
2) " works best when attackers have a general idea of the targeted vehicle’s intended destination"
#) "attacks aren’t nearly as successful in rural or suburban areas or against people who are familiar with the area in which they’re traveling"
ArsTechnica  GPS  spoofing  cybersecurity  navigation  spectrum-vulnerability  cyber-spectrum 
july 2018 by pierredv
Differences between Signal Acquisition and Tracking - Inside GNSS
"the sensitivity for tracking in GPS receivers is generally better (typically about two to five decibels lower in signal power) than for acquisition"
GPS 
june 2018 by pierredv
Hacking, tracking, stealing and sinking ships | Pen Test Partners
Ship security is in its infancy – most of these types of issues were fixed years ago in mainstream IT systems.

The advent of always-on satellite connections has exposed shipping to hacking attacks. Vessel owners and operators need to address these issues quickly, or more shipping security incidents will occur. What we’ve only seen in the movies will quickly become reality.
maritime  shipping  hacking  GPS  cybersecurity 
june 2018 by pierredv
Military unmanned aircraft prove vulnerable to GPS jamming - Military & Aerospace Electronics - Apr 2018
According to American defense officials, the Russian military is deploying a weaponized form of GPS jamming that is effectively blocking some U.S. unmanned aircraft operations over Syria - and is even affecting drones equipped with anti-jamming technology
Russia  GPS  UAS  jamming  drones 
april 2018 by pierredv
GPS Visualization
While following along with PSAS’s GPS study group nights I really want to get a better visualization of what’s going on with GPS signals as they’re being created, sent, transformed, and variously mangled.
GPS  programming  github 
april 2018 by pierredv
Military Drones Prove Vulnerable to GPS Jamming - Apr 2018
"Maritime security experts have warned for years about the hazards that simple GPS jamming methods could pose to merchant shipping. According to American defense officials, the Russian military is deploying a weaponized form of GPS jamming that is effectively blocking some U.S. drone aircraft operations over Syria - and is even affecting drones equipped with anti-jamming technology. As more and more operators contemplate the deployment of autonomous vessels and aircraft in the maritime space, the vulnerability of high-specification military hardware to GPS jamming may pose a cautionary tale. "
GPS  GNSS  jamming  drones  marine  shipping  military  warfare  Russia  Syria 
april 2018 by pierredv
Analysts: Space weapons proliferating, there is more congestion and competition - SpaceNews.com Apr 2018
"As more countries and commercial companies invest in space programs, it is becoming harder to tell the difference between peaceful research projects and potentially destructive weapons, warns a new study by the Secure World Foundation. And an accelerating arms race in space raises huge concerns for the United States."

"The foundation on Wednesday released the report, “Global Counterspace Capabilities: An Open Source Assessment.” Counterspace is an umbrella term for any technology that could be used to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy space systems. Space weapons include direct-ascent, co-orbital, electronic warfare, directed energy and cyber."

"Like the United States, China has designated space as a military domain. Open source documents suggest China is pursuing “space superiority using offensive and defensive means.” It is still unclear whether China intends to deploy offensive space weapons in a future conflict or whether it has them as a deterrent against U.S. aggression."

"The report said cyberwarfare is a concern in space, but actual evidence of cyber attacks in the public domain is scant. "

"Researchers were not able to find open-source proof, however, that the United States has sufficient means to defend the GPS system if attacked. "
SpaceNews  SWF  space  warfare  counterspace  China  GPS  US  Russia 
april 2018 by pierredv
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