recentpopularlog in

pierredv : spoofing   49

China Arrests 1,500 People for Sending Spam Text Messages from Fake Mobile Base Stations, Mar 2014
"Chinese authorities have detained a total of 1,530 suspects in a crackdown on spam text messages being sent by illegal telecoms equipment, according to Chinese news agency ECNS. Over 2,600 fake mobile base stations were seized and 24 sites manufacturing illegal telecoms equipment shut down as part of a massive nationwide operation involving nine central government and Communist Party of China departments."
spam  spoofing  IMSI-catchers 
26 days ago by pierredv
Navigation War in Persian Gulf Hits the News | RNTF, Aug 2019
Blog Editor’s Note: Below are a warning published by the US Maritime Administration, and a press report that quotes an unnamed US defense official. Long time readers will discern that there is a bit of confusion in the two reports about what exactly is going on in terms of spoofing (GPS or just communications?), jamming, and so on. But there is certainly a lot happening.

It should be no surprise that Iran is jamming GPS and perhaps spoofing signals as they have clearly done that before and these are common, easily employed techniques in today’s low intensity warfare.

This kind of navigation warfare has been going on around the world and in the Persian Gulf for quite some time. The first public report was when Iran bragged about capturing a CIA drone operating in Afghanistan in 2011 by spoofing its GPS receiver.

A couple thoughts on the below reports:

The “AIS spoofing” discussed is not the same thing as spoofing GPS signals. AIS is identification equipment carried by a vessel that be programmed to report that the vessel is any type the user wishes. So an Iranian patrol boat can enter into its AIS that it is an British oil tanker, for example in the hopes of deceiving other vessels that don’t have it in sight.
A “US defense official” claims that Iran has been “jamming GPS signals” in the hopes ships will wander into their waters. That would not really be effective, and it wouldn’t make sense, since they clearly have the ability to spoof signals. This could make the ships sail, not wander, into their territorial seas. The folks we have spoken to haven’t seen any signs, yet, of spoofing, but we wouldn’t be surprised if they discover it eventually.
We are not sure about the US defense official’s credibility, though, as at the end of the CNN article “The official said the Iranian jammers have no effect on US military warships and aircraft.” – Yeah, right.
RNTF  GPS  cyber-spectrum  jamming  spoofing  navigation 
10 weeks ago by pierredv
Fooling LiDAR, the auto-drive failsafe | RNTF Jul 2019
"In the experiments researchers succeeded in creating undetectable targets, exposing vulnerabilities in LiDAR detection systems through an evolution-based black box algorithm."

"Last summer we saw a paper from researchers who spoofed all the GNSS constellations at once, and at the very modest price of $400. – If you are on a fixed income and $400 seems to be a lot, think about the tens of billions of dollars invested to produce GNSS signals.

The next month we saw a paper from researchers who decided that spoofing the signal might not be enough to mislead a vehicle driver. So they figured out how to also send a false map that looked like were the driver was, but, along with spoofed GNSS signals, would help misdirect the target vehicle. Just perfect for kidnapping, stealing cargo, or luring a driver into some other dangerous situation.

This summer we saw a paper from Regulus that reported on their ability to cause a Tesla in auto-drive mode to suddenly brake, accelerate, and exit the highway early and at the wrong point (we understand their co-worker in the car was scared silly). Thanks to the car’s LiDAR (a radar-like sensor), they were not able to direct the car off the road.

Below is a report on a paper that shows that LiDAR, which many are regarding as the automated driving fail-safe, can also be fooled."
RNTF  GPS  spoofing  lidar  navigation  cyber-spectrum 
july 2019 by pierredv
Russia denies role in Israeli airport GPS jamming - BBC News | RNTF
Blog Editor’s Note: Interesting follow-on report below from the BBC. Now we know it is spoofing vice jamming. Some of our thoughts:

The below article posits that this could be a spill over from Russian operations next door in Syria. Quite possible. It is the most likely explanation. At the same time, much of Russian operations in Syria involve “smart jamming,” or transmitting what seem to be valid GPS signals but with information that does not allow a receiver to calculate a position. According to the BBC, Israeli pilots have been reporting their receivers showing incorrect positions. This is not something you would see with smart jamming.
Russia is not the only actor in the region capable of spoofing. Virtually any nation or extra-governmental [OK, terrorist] organization would be capable of pulling this off.
It is also interesting to note that many of the approaches to the Tel Aviv airport are over the water. The interfering signal may be from a boat, a small buoy, or even a sub-surface device with only a small antenna showing above the water. Any of these would be very difficult to locate.
BBC  RNTF  Russia  Israel  aviation  GPS  spoofing 
june 2019 by pierredv
Long Delay for Chimera Indicates Possible GPS & PNT Leadership Shortfall - Inside GNSS | RNTF
"Logan [Scott] first proposed Chimera in a 2003 paper. Yet it is only now, 16 years later, that the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) is starting to take a look at it."

See Logan's deck at
Dana-Goward  GPS  PNTF  Chimera  spoofing 
june 2019 by pierredv
How to Stop Spam Robocalls With STIR/SHAKEN, New York Intelligencer, May 2018
Phone spam skyrocketed thanks to two things
= VOIP "means that open-source software can let a single computer hooked up to the web make thousands of calls an hour"
= "easy ability of anyone to “spoof” a phone number"

"since mid-2015, a consortium of engineers from phone carriers and others in the telecom industry have worked on [addressing phone spoofing]. The solution: the STIR (Secure Telephone Identity Revisited) and SHAKEN (Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENs) standards. The idea: make it so every phone has a certificate of authenticity attached to it — a kind of digital signature — that allows you to once again trust your caller ID."

"STIR/SHAKEN has spent the last year or so running in a test-bed environment overseen by ATIS. ... For this system to work, carriers on both sides of a phone call need to be involved. Verizon has stated that it plans to begin to implement STIR/SHAKEN in parts of its network this year, with a bigger rollout scheduled for 2019"

<Lots of open questions and problems>
= UI not defined
= extra hoops for legitimate VOIP users
= "will only work in the U.S., and robocalls and phone spam are at this point a global problem"
= easy to set up shop anew if flagged as spammer
spam  robocalls  FCC  spoofing 
may 2019 by pierredv
Botnik Studios - Harry Potter
Via New Scientist, 5 Jan 2019, issue 3211

Apparently uses a predictive text keyboard
AI  prediction  fiction  HarryPotter  spoofing 
may 2019 by pierredv
Protecting 5G against IMSI catchers - Ericsson Jun 2017
"IMSI catchers are devices used to intercept wireless traffic and trace subscribers by their long-term identifiers (IMSIs). While the phenomenon is often exaggerated, IMSI catchers do pose a threat to subscriber privacy. On-going 5G standardization done in 3GPP is a golden opportunity to improve subscribers’ privacy by constructing a protocol architecture that protects against IMSI catchers."

"The mobile device needs to transmit its long-term identifier IMSI to the network at times. The concept we propose builds on an old idea that the mobile device encrypts its IMSI using home network’s asymmetric key before it is transmitted over the air-interface."
Ericsson  cyber-spectrum  5G  IMSI-catchers  spoofing 
may 2019 by pierredv
The radio navigation planes use to land safely is insecure and can be hacked | Ars Technica May 2019
Radios that sell for $600 can spoof signals planes use to find runways.

"Like many technologies built in earlier decades, the ILS was never designed to be secure from hacking. Radio signals, for instance, aren’t encrypted or authenticated. Instead, pilots simply assume that the tones their radio-based navigation systems receive on a runway’s publicly assigned frequency are legitimate signals broadcast by the airport operator. This lack of security hasn’t been much of a concern over the years, largely because the cost and difficulty of spoofing malicious radio signals made attacks infeasible.

Now, researchers have devised a low-cost hack that raises questions about the security of ILS, which is used at virtually every civilian airport throughout the industrialized world. Using a $600 software defined radio, the researchers can spoof airport signals in a way that causes a pilot’s navigation instruments to falsely indicate a plane is off course. "

"... all are careful to note that this kind of spoofing isn't likely to cause a plane to crash in most cases. ILS malfunctions are a known threat to aviation safety, and experienced pilots receive extensive training in how to react to them"
aviation  spoofing  cyber-spectrum  ArsTechnica  ILS 
may 2019 by pierredv
Above Us Only Stars — C4ADS

In this report, we present findings from a year-long investigation ending in November 2018 on an emerging subset of EW activity: the ability to mimic, or spoof, legitimate GNSS signals in order to manipulate PNT data. Using publicly available data and commercial technologies, we detect and analyze patterns of GNSS spoofing in the Russian Federation, Crimea, and Syria which demonstrate that the Russian Federation is growing a comparative advantage in the targeted use and development of GNSS spoofing capabilities to achieve tactical and strategic objectives at home and abroad. We profile different use cases of current Russian state activity to trace the activity back to basing locations and systems in use.
“In Section One, we examine GNSS spoofing events across the entire Russian Federation, its occupied territories, and overseas military facilities. We identify 9,883 suspected instances across 10 locations that affected 1,311 civilian vessel navigation systems since February 2016. We demonstrate that these activities are much larger in scope, more diverse in geography, and longer in duration than any public reporting suggests to date.”

“Finally, in Section Four, we expose the use of GPS spoofing in active Russian combat zones, particularly Syria, for airspace denial purposes. This is a capability scarcely reported in the public domain. Using data from a scientific sensor on the International Space Station (ISS), we are able to identify ongoing activity that poses significant threats to civilian airline GPS systems in the region. . . . ”
GPS  GNSS  spoofing  cybersecurity 
april 2019 by pierredv
Russia 'spoofing' GPS on vast scale to stop drones from approaching Putin, report says - Mar 2019
Russia manipulates global navigation systems by sending out false location data to civilian ships or other users on a vast scale, in an apparent attempt to prevent drones from approaching President Vladimir Putin or to safeguard sensitive sites at home and abroad, according to a report released Tuesday.

Although Russia's mimicking or "spoofing" of GPS signals has been exposed previously, new research by the U.S.-based nonprofit C4ADS shows that Moscow's trickery is more pervasive and indiscriminate than previously reported.
NBCNews  GPS  spoofing  Russia 
march 2019 by pierredv
There's Something Very Weird Going on With Cars' GPS Systems at the Geneva Motor Show
"As you may know, the Geneva Motor Show public days are this week, and while we’ve been covering a number of interesting concepts and cars at the show, there’s also something happening there that no one can really explain. For some reason, many of the cars are showing their location as being in Buckingham, England, and the year as 2036. "

"He told me that the false GPS signal is “pissing off” the carmakers because it’s making their systems look bad and/or vulnerable.

Even when employees from the carmakers try to manually reset the GPS location and the date, the spoofed signals overwrite the manually-entered information, so that’s not an option.

Echivard also told me that because the signal is not “permanent” they are unable to triangulate its location. "
GPS  spoofing  automobile 
march 2019 by pierredv
GPS Jamming Interferes with Construction | RNTF Feb 2019
Blog Editor’s Note: We are not sure if this is another instance of Russia jamming GPS in Norway or part of the most recent spate of instances. Suffice it to say that Russia has been jamming GPS in northern Norway a lot. This is a good article as it reminds us that GPS is about much more than making transportation more efficient and safer.
GPS  jamming  spoofing  RNTF  Norway 
march 2019 by pierredv
GPS spoofing, low-cost GPS simulator - DEF CON 23 , 2015
Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research
Qihoo 360 Technology Co Ltd
GPS  spoofing  DefCon  China  hacking 
february 2019 by pierredv
3G & 4G Networks Are Prone to Stingray Surveillance Attacks - Jul 2017
"3G and 4G LTE devices deployed worldwide have a critical security vulnerability that could be used by Stingray devices, security researchers revealed at the Black Hat Conference in Las Vegas. Researchers said all the modern and high-speed networks have a protocol flaw that enables mobile devices to connect with the cell operator, allowing attackers to track and monitor users."

"Many believe that the modern protocols, unlike 2G, protect users against easy-to-use tracking and surveillance. However, latest research reveals a flaw in the authentication and key agreement, which enables a phone to communicate securely with the user’s cell network."

"While this flaw doesn’t reportedly allow attackers to intercept calls or messages, it does enable them to monitor consumption patterns and track the phone location."
StingRay  IMSI-catcher  3G  4G  cellular  spectrum-vulnerability  cyber-spectrum  spoofing 
february 2019 by pierredv
Spoofing GPS Locations with low cost TX SDRs, RTL-SDR Sep 2015
At this years Defcon 2015 conference researcher Lin Huang from Qihoo 360 presented her work on spoofing GPS signals. Qihoo 360 is a Chinese security company producing antivirus software. Lin works at Qihoo as a security researcher where her main job is to prevent their antivirus software and users from becoming vulnerable to wireless attacks. Her research brought her to the realm of GPS spoofing, where she discovered how easy it was to use relatively low cost SDRs like a USRP B210/BladeRF/HackRF to emulate GPS signals which could allow a wireless attacker to manipulate the GPS on smartphones and cars.
RTL-SDR  Defcon  GPS  spoofing 
february 2019 by pierredv
GNSS Interference and Spoofing Detection | BroadSense | Talen-X
Via Dale, Jan 2019

"BroadSense is a GPS interference and detection sensor designed to detect jamming and spoofing. Utilizing sophisticated GNSS receivers and 75+ advanced algorithms, BroadSense can detect when the GPS signal or GPS spectrum is compromised."
Talen-X  GPS  jamming  spoofing 
january 2019 by pierredv
Mass GPS Spoofing Attack in Black Sea? Jul 2017
"The RNT Foundation has received numerous anecdotal reports of maritime problems with AIS and GPS in Russian waters, though this is the first publicly available, well-document account, of which we are aware.

Russia has very advanced capabilities to disrupt GPS. Over 250,000 cell towers in Russia have been equipped with GPS jamming devices as a defense against attack by U.S. missiles. And there have been press reports of Russian GPS jamming in both Moscow and the Ukraine. In fact Russia has boasted that its capabilities “make aircraft carriers useless,” and the U.S. Director of National Intelligence recently issued a report that stated that Russia and others were focusing on improving their capability to jam U.S. satellite systems."
GPS  spoofing  Russia  Dana-Goward 
january 2019 by pierredv
Connected Vehicle Security Vulnerabilities | IoT Security Headlines, Mar 2018
"In the history of mandatory regulation of computerized vehicles, an E-Letter entitled, “Black box is not safe at all,” was published in Science [1] in 2017. It mentioned that on-board diagnostics (OBD-II) specifications were made mandatory for all cars sold in the United States in 1996. The European Union made European OBD (EOBD) mandatory for all gasoline (petrol) vehicles sold in the European Union starting in 2001."
cyber-spectrum  automobile  transportation  spectrum-vulnerability  cybersecurity  hacks  jamming  spoofing 
december 2018 by pierredv
Algorithms Help Power Grids Survive GPS Spoofs - IEEE Spectrum Aug 2018
"Power grids increasingly rely on GPS to stay in sync, which makes them potentially vulnerable to attacks that broadcast false GPS signals. Now researchers have developed algorithms they say could help defend against such assaults, even if a third of a power grid's GPS signals were disrupted."

"PMUs are vulnerable to GPS spoofing attacks, wherein a hacker would place transmitters near a station to broadcast counterfeit GPS signals, which would be picked up by the PMUs. Fooling the PMUs of one or more power stations could lead to disruptions that could cascade throughout an entire power grid."
GPS  IEEE-Spectrum  spoofing  energy  utilities 
august 2018 by pierredv
Security Flaws On Comcast’s Login Page Exposed Customers’ Personal Information - BuzzFeed aug 2018
Comcast Xfinity inadvertently exposed the partial home addresses and Social Security numbers of more than 26.5 million customers, according to security researcher Ryan Stevenson, who discovered the security flaws. Two previously unreported vulnerabilities in the high-speed internet service provider’s online customer portal made it easy for even an unsophisticated hacker to access this sensitive information.
BuzzFeed  security  privacy  Comcast  spoofing 
august 2018 by pierredv
A $225 GPS spoofer can send sat-nav-guided vehicles into oncoming traffic * | Ars Technica Jul 2018
Paper at

"A new proof-of-concept attack demonstrates how hackers could inconspicuously steer a targeted automobile to the wrong destination or, worse, endanger passengers by sending them down the wrong way of a one-way road. The attack starts with a $225 piece of hardware that’s planted in or underneath the targeted vehicle that spoofs the radio signals used by civilian GPS services. It then uses algorithms to plot a fake “ghost route” that mimics the turn-by-turn navigation directions contained in the original route. Depending on the hackers’ ultimate motivations, the attack can be used to divert an emergency vehicle or a specific passenger to an unintended location or to follow an unsafe route. The attack works best in urban areas the driver doesn’t know well, and it assumes hackers have a general idea of the vehicle’s intended destination."

"While the proof-of-concept attack is attention-grabbing, a variety of things significantly limit its effectiveness in the real world. "
1) "physical spoofer be in close proximity to the navigation device"
2) " works best when attackers have a general idea of the targeted vehicle’s intended destination"
#) "attacks aren’t nearly as successful in rural or suburban areas or against people who are familiar with the area in which they’re traveling"
ArsTechnica  GPS  spoofing  cybersecurity  navigation  spectrum-vulnerability  cyber-spectrum 
july 2018 by pierredv
Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon | New Scientist 19 Aug 2017
"[Todd] Humphreys thinks this is Russia experimenting with a new form of electronic warfare. Over the past year, GPS spoofing has been causing chaos for the receivers on phone apps in central Moscow to misbehave. "

" There have not yet been any authenticated reports of criminal spoofing, but it should not be difficult for criminals to use it to divert a driverless vehicle or drone delivery, or to hijack an autonomous ship. Spoofing will give everyone affected the same location, so a hijacker would just need a short-ranged system to affect one vehicle."
NewScientist  GPS  spoofing  Russia  navigation 
december 2017 by pierredv
Iridium’s time sequencing solution may be a player in 5G to augment GPS | FierceWireless Nov 2017
"Iridium Communications doesn’t discuss 5G all that much, but its time sequencing solution could be of interest to mobile carriers that rely on the GPS clock in urban canyons, where GPS doesn’t perform well inside buildings."

"Last year, Iridium officially launched its Satellite Time and Location (STL) technology, enabling end users to access accurate navigation and timing anywhere on the planet, even indoors. The company says the unique architecture of its 66-low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellation makes uniquely capable of this offering."

"Iridium has been working with Satelles, a division of iKare Corporation, to provide technology that would address the problem. Due to STL's signal strength, it can help make GPS systems more difficult to "spoof," which has been a growing problem n the GPS world. The solution transmits its signals through Iridium's satellite constellation to deliver a unique code to each position on the ground that can be independently authenticated, proving that a device is located in a specific place in the world, thereby enabling applications to be "location aware," and allowing operation or access only if the user is in the location expected."
Iridium  GPS  GNSS  5G  spoofing 
november 2017 by pierredv
Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon | New Scientist
Via Dale Hatfield

"Reports of satellite navigation problems in the Black Sea suggest that Russia may be testing a new system for spoofing GPS, New Scientist has learned. This could be the first hint of a new form of electronic warfare available to everyone from rogue nation states to petty criminals."
GPS  spoofing  NewScientist 
august 2017 by pierredv
Industry Experts Discuss GPS Vulnerabilities, Mitigation Techniques - Mar 2017
via Dale Hatfield

"Windstream Communications performed a study on GPS vulnerabilities and found that intentional attacks comprised just 3 percent of the cases studied. "
GPS  Windstream  Trimble  ATIS  DHS  jamming  spoofing 
march 2017 by pierredv
Innovation: GNSS Spoofing Detection : GPS World
"From the outset, the GPS P code, intended for use by military and other so-called authorized users, was designed to be encrypted to prevent straightforward spoofing. The anti-spoofing is implemented using a secret “W” encryption code, resulting in the P(Y) code. The C/A code and the newer L2C and L5 codes do not have such protection; nor, for the most part, do the civil codes of other GNSS. But, it turns out, even the P(Y) code is not fully protected from sophisticated meaconing attacks."

(meacon = m(islead)+(b)eacon)

"The radionavigation community has known about the dangers of GNSS spoofing for a long time, as highlighted in the 2001 Volpe Report (see Further Reading). "

"it is expected that this system will be able to detect spoofing using antenna motions as small as 4.8 centimeters, that is, a quarter wavelength of the GPS L1 signal."

Via Dale hatfield
GPSWorld  GPS  spoofing 
january 2017 by pierredv
Melbourne man arrested for broadcasting fake messages to pilots • The Register
Australian Federal Police (AFP) confirmed to Vulture South Sant is not alleged to have "hacked" any aviation system, contrary to reports, but merely used broadcasting equipment to make transmissions to pilots in contravention of aviation security laws.
TheRegister  aviation  hacking  spoofing 
november 2016 by pierredv
IEEE Xplore Document - LTE/LTE-A jamming, spoofing, and sniffing: threat assessment and mitigation
Abstract: LTE is currently being proposed for use in a nationwide wireless broadband public safety network in the United States as well as for other critical applications where reliable communication is essential for safety. Unfortunately, like any wireless technology, disruption of these networks is possible through radio jamming. This article investigates the extent to which LTE is vulnerable to RF jamming, spoofing, and sniffing, and assesses different physical layer threats that could affect next-generation critical communication networks. In addition, we examine how sniffing the LTE broadcast messages can aid an adversary in an attack. The weakest links of LTE are identified and used to establish an overall threat assessment. Lastly, we provide a survey of LTE jamming and spoofing mitigation techniques that have been proposed in the open literature.
"more effective jamming methods can be realized by exploiting the specific protocol features of LTE"
"it is clear that LTE is highly vulnerable to adversarial jamming"
“even the most complex attacks can easily be implemented with widely available open source libraries, low-cost software radio hardware with a budget under $1500, and basic Linux programming skills.”
IEEE  IEEECommMag  LTE  jamming  spoofing  threat  SDR 
september 2016 by pierredv
Drone Hack: Spoofing Attack Demonstration on a Civilian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle : GPS World Aug 2012
By Daniel Shepard, Jahshan A. Bhatti, and Todd E. Humphreys

"A radio signal sent from a half-mile away deceived the GPS receiver of a UAV into thinking that it was rising straight up. In this way, the UAV’s dependence on civil GPS allowed the spoofer operator to force the UAV vertically downward in dramatic fashion as part of multiple capture demonstrations."
"The spoofer is implemented on a portable software-defined radio platform with a digital signal processor (DSP) at its core"
"These tests have demonstrated that civilian UAVs will be vulnerable to control by malefactors with a civil GPS spoofer looking to hijack or crash these UAVs unless their vulnerability to GPS spoofing is addressed. "
"Constructing from scratch a sophisticated GPS spoofer like the one developed by UT is not easy, nor is it within the capability of the average anonymous hacker."
GPSWorld  GPS  drones  spoofing  SDR 
september 2016 by pierredv
Spoofing GPS Locations with low cost TX SDRs -
"At this years Defcon 2015 conference researcher Lin Huang from Qihoo 360 presented her work on spoofing GPS signals. Qihoo 360 is a Chinese security company producing antivirus software. Lin works at Qihoo as a security researcher where her main job is to prevent their antivirus software and users from becoming vulnerable to wireless attacks. Her research brought her to the realm of GPS spoofing, where she discovered how easy it was to use relatively low cost SDRs like a USRP B210/BladeRF/HackRF to emulate GPS signals which could allow a wireless attacker to manipulate the GPS on smartphones and cars."
RTL-SDR  GPS  spoofing  Qihoo  Defcon 
august 2016 by pierredv
GPS Under Attack as Crooks, Rogue Workers Wage Electronic War - NBC News
"Predictably, criminals have found ways to profit from GPS weaknesses with illegal jamming devices. The devices, once available only to those with considerable technical savvy, are now widely advertised on the internet for $50 or less and require no expertise to operate."
"The closest thing to official confirmation of a criminal spoofing incident came when a Homeland Security Department official said at a security conference in December that Mexican drug cartels were trying to jam and spoof GPS signals to interfere with U.S. government drones patrolling the border."
GPS  jamming  FBI  theft  crime  spoofing  NBC  SDR 
august 2016 by pierredv
Securing military GPS from spoofing and jamming vulnerabilities - Military Embedded Systems
"The U.S. NAVSTAR GPS and global navigation satellite system (GNSS) are essential to military navigation, but how secure is military GPS to spoofing and jamming threats?

The short answer is that there are numerous changes underway to make military GPS more robust to these threats, as well as efforts to develop supplemental technology capable of operating even within GPS-denied environments."
"Electrically steerable directional antennas are “the best bet to combat jamming,” according to Fischer."
GPS  jamming  spoofing  PNT  GNSS  antennas 
august 2016 by pierredv
Protecting GPS From Spoofers Is Critical to the Future of Navigation - IEEE Spectrum
"The drone demonstration starkly indicated GPS’s vulnerabilities, but we believe that other targets are far more worrisome. Cellphone towers, stock exchanges, and the power grid all rely at least partly on GPS for precise timing. A well-coordinated spoof could interrupt communications, confuse automated financial traders, and inflict crippling power outages. In a worst-case scenario, a spoofer’s operator could overtake airplanes or ships to induce a crash, facilitate a heist, or even kidnap a VIP."
"There are three main ways to protect against GPS spoofing: cryptography, signal-distortion detection, and direction-of-arrival sensing."
IEEE-Spectrum  spoofing  GPS  navigation  shipping  * 
july 2016 by pierredv
Disruptive Robocalling - Global Guerrillas
"In my scenario, robocalling was used to shut down polling places to skew election results and plunge the US into chaos:

Robocalls pour in to police departments and polling places in heavily (Rep or Dem) polling locations with bomb/terrorist threats. Widespread poll closures occur. Calls continue until late."
hacking  jamming  spoofing  POTS  robocalling  risk-assessment 
july 2016 by pierredv
Cheating at Pokémon Go with a HackRF and GPS Spoofing -
Since the game is GPS based, Stefan Kiese decided to see if he could cheat at the game by spoofing his GPS location using a HackRF software defined radio. When playing the game, players often walk from Pokéstop to Pokéstop, collecting Pokémon along the way, and replenishing their items. By spoofing the GPS signal he is able to simulate walking around in the physical world, potentially automating the collection of Pokémon and replenishment of items at Pokéstops.
Pokemon  GPS  SDR  HackRF  hacking  spoofing 
july 2016 by pierredv
How worried are you hackers will discover our locations? : GPS World June 2016
"Hackers using common software-defined radio tools have discovered a cheap way to make a GPS emulator to falsify the GPS location of smartphones and in-car navigation systems."
"As for a hacker corrupting a location, this is a serious problem that needs addressing if connected cars are ever to trust one another’s data."
GPS  GPSWorld  location  spoofing 
july 2016 by pierredv
Remote Attacks on Automated Vehicles Sensors: Experiments on Camera and LiDAR (pdf)
Research paper by Petit, Stottelaar, Feiri and Kargl
via Dale Hatfield, June 2016
jamming  spoofing  automation  automobile 
june 2016 by pierredv
Lost in Space: How secure is the Future of Mobile Positioning? | IEEE Communications Society
"The secret to our device being both lower cost and more sophisticated (for spoofing) than an off-the-shelf signal simulator was that it was built as a software-defined radio" "But a software-defined spoofer also has a significant downside: if the code were ever leaked to the public, then anyone who had read our papers, knew the basics of programming, and could wire together a few circuit boards could replicate our box. It wouldn’t take years and a team of PhDs like the first time."
GPS  spoofing  SDR 
february 2016 by pierredv
Expert Advice: The Low Cost of Protecting America : GPS World
"The U.S. National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Advisory Board published a seminal white paper in 2010 on the topic, strongly recommending the establishment of an eLoran system." "A well-configured eLoran system can provide navigation accuracy to within 8 to 10 meters and timing accuracy to within 30 nanoseconds. This meets the needs of an estimated 95 percent of users in the United States." "There are also signs that the U.S. intelligence, cyber, and defense communities are becoming more and more concerned. North Korea’s repeated jamming of satellite navigation and timing signals has delivered a particularly powerful lesson. South Korea has reacted by committing to establishment of a robust eLoran system. The UK has established an eLoran system and is expanding it. Russia and China have retained their versions "
GPS  GPSWorld  eLoran  navigation  public  private  partnership  jamming  aviation  spoofing  NPEC  DHS  DoD  South  Korea 
february 2014 by pierredv
Yacht Captain Dares Researchers to Trick His GPS, Gets Unwelcome Result | MIT Technology Review August 2013
"University of Texas researchers recently tricked the navigation system of an $80 million yacht and sent the ship off course in an experiment that showed how any device with civilian GPS technology is vulnerable to a practice called spoofing."
spoofing  jamming  MIT-Technology-Review  GPS  maritime 
august 2013 by pierredv
GPS jamming rife, could PARALYSE Blighty, say usual suspects • The Register
Rather a balanced and slightly jaded account of the doom-mongering regarding GPS jamming and spoofing "Technical experts are once again predicting imminent doom caused by interference with Global Positioning System (GPS) sat-nav receivers. A nationwide UK network of detectors has reportedly discovered widespread employment of GPS jammer devices, and calls are being made for a harsh crackdown on users of such devices."
GPS  navigation  jamming  spoofing  TheRegister 
february 2012 by pierredv
Straight Talk on Anti-Spoofing | GPS World Jan 2012
"Disruption created by intentional generation of fake GPS signals could have serious economic consequences. This article discusses how typical civil GPS receivers respond to an advanced civil GPS spoofing attack, and four techniques to counter such attacks: spread-spectrum security codes, navigation message authentication, dual-receiver correlation of military signals, and vestigial signal defense. Unfortunately, any kind of anti-spoofing, however necessary, is a tough sell." "Effective techniques exist to defend receivers against spoofing attacks. This article summarizes state-of-the-art anti-spoofing techniques and suggests a path forward to equip civil GPS receivers with these defenses. "
cybersecurity  GPS  hacking  navigation  GPSWorld  spoofing  jamming 
january 2012 by pierredv

Copy this bookmark:

to read