recentpopularlog in

tsuomela : incentives   67

Rationalizing the unreasonable: there are no good academics in the EU – Ctrl+Alt+Dem
"Attracting external funding has become, everywhere, one of the main priorities of academics, and writing funding application has consequently also become one of their main tasks. The idea is “competitiveness”: quality will be evident when academics, individually or in teams, acquire funding after a strict and rigorously exclusive peer-review process."
academic  academia  funding  grants  lottery  peer-review  competition  evaluation  europe  incentives 
june 2016 by tsuomela
» The big data brain drain The Sociological Imagination
"This provocative post by Jake VanderPlas argues that “the skills required to be a successful scientific researcher are increasingly indistinguishable from the skills required to be successful in industry” and that important implications follow from this for the future of higher education. There is a “new breed of scientist” that the academic world increasingly struggles to retain:"
big-data  science  business  rewards  incentives 
august 2014 by tsuomela
Henry Sauermann | Georgia Tech - Scheller College of Business
"Dr. Henry Sauermann joined the College in 2008. His research focuses on individuals’ motives and incentives, and how they interact with organizational and institutional mechanisms in shaping innovative activity. In particular, he studies how scientists’ motives and incentives relate to important outcomes such as innovative performance in firms, patenting in academia, or career choices and entrepreneurial intentions. This stream of research also explores important differences in these mechanisms across contexts such as industrial versus academic science or startups versus large established firms. In new projects, Dr. Sauermann studies the dynamics of motives and incentives over time, and explores non-traditional innovative institutions such as “Crowd Science” or “Citizen Science” (e.g., Additional work is underway to gain deeper insights into scientific labor markets and to derive implications for junior scientists, firms, and policy makers."
people  academic  business  motivation  citizen-science  innovation  incentives 
august 2013 by tsuomela
PLOS ONE: Verification in Referral-Based Crowdsourcing
"Online social networks offer unprecedented potential for rallying a large number of people to accomplish a given task. Here we focus on information gathering tasks where rare information is sought through “referral-based crowdsourcing”: the information request is propagated recursively through invitations among members of a social network. Whereas previous work analyzed incentives for the referral process in a setting with only correct reports, misreporting is known to be both pervasive in crowdsourcing applications, and difficult/costly to filter out. A motivating example for our work is the DARPA Red Balloon Challenge where the level of misreporting was very high. In order to undertake a formal study of verification, we introduce a model where agents can exert costly effort to perform verification and false reports can be penalized. This is the first model of verification and it provides many directions for future research, which we point out. Our main theoretical result is the compensation scheme that minimizes the cost of retrieving the correct answer. Notably, this optimal compensation scheme coincides with the winning strategy of the Red Balloon Challenge."
crowdsourcing  incentives  incentive-centered-design  recruitment  volunteer  citizen-science  accuracy  verification  reliability 
october 2012 by tsuomela
Meta-research | The GiveWell Blog
Meta-research refers to improving the incentives in the academic world, to bring them more in line with producing work of maximal benefit to society.
research  academia  publication  bias  incentives  behavior 
july 2012 by tsuomela
Anxiety Can Bring Out the Best -
Actually, a little anxiety may be just what you need to focus your efforts and perform at your peak, psychologists say.
psychology  anxiety  procrastination  personality  behavior  incentives  gtd 
june 2012 by tsuomela
Bill Clinton’s $80 Million Payday, or Why Politicians Don’t Care That Much About Reelection « naked capitalism
"In other words, Barack Obama and his franchise are emulating the Clinton’s, and are speaking not to voters, but to potential post-election patrons. That’s what their policy goals are organized around. So when you hear someone talking about how politicians just want to be reelected, roll your eyes. "
politics  incentives  career  lobbying 
may 2012 by tsuomela
Rise in Scientific Journal Retractions Prompts Calls for Reform -
"Ms. Bradford, of Science magazine, agreed. “I would agree that a scientist’s career advancement should not depend solely on the publications listed on his or her C.V.,” she said, “and that there is much room for improvement in how scientific talent in all its diversity can be nurtured.”

Even scientists who are sympathetic to the idea of fundamental change are skeptical that it will happen any time soon. “I don’t think they have much chance of changing what they’re talking about,” said Dr. Korn, of Harvard. "
science  sts  peer-production  incentives  academia  publisher  structure  social  reform  retractions  accuracy 
april 2012 by tsuomela
The Sorcerer's Apprentice: Bad thinking about finding love
"And so on. So executive summary: one of the problems of a cheap communication high barrier to network world is that it creates incentives to two kinds of strategy which are market failure producing. One is the fake offer, which leads to the spam cycle, the other is the failure incentivized actor." Annotated link
online  economics  dating  incentives  spam 
february 2012 by tsuomela
Stumbling and Mumbling: The "scarce talent" con
"Bank bosses have played a trick which countless ordinary workers do. The IT support guy who introduces lots of “security features” to his firm’s IT systems, or the secretary who has an incomprehensible filing system, make themselves indispensable by inconveniencing others."
banking  business  management  managerial  complexity  income  economics  rewards  incentives  talent 
february 2012 by tsuomela
Occupy Wall Street, Social Media, Gladwell and Risk - event mechanics - event mechanics
"I want to suggest that the dichotomy between high risk protest and low risk participation that Gladwell isolates as typifying most historical social mmovement protests versus most contemporary online social movement participation is actually spot on. What is remarkable about the Occupy Wall Street protests is not that the ‘internets’ have somehow produced an effective mode of protest, but that the risks involved in the esculation of protest from low-risk online participation (‘liking’ a social movement on Facebook, for example) into actual high-risk toe-to-toe in-the-street vaulting-the-barricades mobilisation have now become risks worth taking for the majority of participants. "
wall-street  protests  activism  risk  economics  class  incentives 
october 2011 by tsuomela
A simple model of disagreement among economists — Crooked Timber
"So what does this predict? Like Blinder’s aphorism, it suggests that we will observe a broad empirical correlation between (a) the extent of disagreement among economists, and (b) the involvement of economists in political disputes. ‘Eat your greens’ propositions that are popular among economists, but more or less equally uncongenial to all political actors in a given system will, as in Blinder’s formulation, be systematically ignored. But economists’ influence will not be particularly high when they disagree with each other, since different economists arguing for different sides of the political debate will at least partially cancel each other out. It will be far higher on those rare and fleeting occasions when economists unite in favor of the one or the other side actively participating in a political debate."
economics  model  behavior  incentives  politics 
march 2011 by tsuomela
Stumbling and Mumbling: Christine Bleakley & labour market imperfection
Here are some other examples of how "talent" (or lack thereof) exists in organizations rather than peopl
talent  economics  success  labor  work  rewards  incentives 
october 2010 by tsuomela
Science in the Open » Blog Archive » A collaborative proposal on research metrics
When we talk about open research practice, more efficient research communication, wider diversity of publication we always come up against the same problem. What’s in it for the jobbing scientist? This is so prevalent that it has been reformulated as “Singh’s Law” (by analogy with Godwin’s law) that any discussion of research practice will inevitably end when someone brings up career advancement or tenure. The question is what do we actually do about this?
open-science  open-research  incentives  metrics 
september 2010 by tsuomela
The Matthew Effect in Science: The reward and communication systems of science are considered -- Merton 159 (3810): 56 -- Science
As originally identified, the Matthew effect was construed in terms of enhancement of the position of already eminent scientists who are given disproportionate credit in cases of collaboration or of independent multiple discoveries. Its significance was thus confined to its implications for the reward system of science. By shifting the angle of vision, we note other possible kinds of consequences, this time for the communication system of science. The Matthew effect may serve to heighten the visibility of contributions to science by scientists of acknowledged standing and to reduce the visibility of contributions by authors who are less well known. We examine the psychosocial conditions and mechanisms underlying this effect and find a correlation between the redundancy function of multiple discoveries and the focalizing function of eminent men of science—a function which is reinforced by the great value these men place upon finding basic problems and by their self-assurance.
science  sociology  history  rewards  incentives  communication  publishing  winner-take-all 
september 2010 by tsuomela
A program designed to reduce energy consumption persuaded some Republicans to consume more. - By Ray Fisman - Slate Magazine
One problem with this approach is that we all define "better" differently, as a new study emphasizes. UCLA economists Dora Costa and Matthew Kahn analyzed the impact of an energy-conservation program in California that informed households about how their energy use compared with that of their neighbors. While the program succeeded in encouraging Democrats and environmentalists to lower their consumption, Republicans had the opposite reaction. When told of their relative thrift, they started cranking up the thermostat and leaving the lights on more often.
behavioral-economics  behavior  psychology  persuasion  nudge  incentives  incentive-centered-design  social-psychology 
july 2010 by tsuomela
Animal studies paint misleading picture : Nature News
Published animal trials overestimate by about 30% the likelihood that a treatment works because negative results often go unpublished, a study suggests.
science  news  biology  methodology  publishing  incentives 
march 2010 by tsuomela / Comment / Opinion - It is time to treat Wall Street like Main Street
George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton - "But economics has not stood still, and we now know there are at least four reasons why bonuses and pay-for-performance are a risky business. First, it can be hard to see whether employees make the right decisions; superiors do not hold the same information, and the results of decisions play out years later. Second, performance pay will attract exactly those who are willing to take on more risk. People interested in high but steady income will choose other careers. Third, to get their pay, employees may manipulate the system, against the interests of those who set up the incentives: like teachers who are threatened with losing their jobs and teach to the test. Finally, and most perniciously, performance pay can crowd out intrinsic rewards, as when children, having received gold stars for drawing pictures, later draw less than before in their own time. Why draw without getting paid?"
motivation  economics  behavior  bonus  income  business  incentives  incentive-centered-design  management  finance  extrinsic  intrinsic 
march 2010 by tsuomela
Stumbling and Mumbling: Finance & human capital
What I’m saying here is that there’s a problem for those who want to defend the financial sector. You can do one of two things:
1. You can defend bankers’ pay on the grounds that it’s a reward for high skills, in which case you shouldn’t worry much about the financial sector shrinking, as these skills would be useful elsewhere.
2. You can argue that shrinking finance would be expensive. But this requires you to ditch the Econ101 just-so stories about people being paid a return to human capital, and to recognize that salaries are a reward to power, not (just) to “skill.“
Is there really a plausible third possibility?
financial-engineering  finance  financial-services  money  power  economics  pay  rewards  incentives  talent 
september 2009 by tsuomela » Trust, Fairness, Shared Identity
Mark van Vugt of the VU University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands examines the social psychology of successful commons. His piece, “Triumph of the Commons: Helping the World to Share,” proposes “four key conditions for the successful management of shared environmental resources: information, identity, institutions and incentives,” or what he calls the 4i framework.
commons  values  information  identity  institutions  incentives 
august 2009 by tsuomela
Filling the Financial Regulatory Void « The Baseline Scenario
I would argue that the fundamental flaw in financial regulation is that it is based on the assumption that regulators are not self-interested individuals like the rest of us. We think about regulation only in terms of how to engineer the incentives of the regulated and ignore the fact that regulators themselves rarely have a stake in doing their job well, which in any other occupation would limit the motivation and types of individuals a position attracts.
government  regulation  regulatory-capture  reform  failure  banking  finance  financial-services  incentives 
august 2009 by tsuomela
Why markets can’t cure healthcare - Paul Krugman Blog -
One of the most influential economic papers of the postwar era was Kenneth Arrow’s Uncertainty and the welfare economics of health care, which demonstrated — decisively, I and many others believe — that health care can’t be marketed like bread or TVs. Let me offer my own version of Arrow’s argument.
markets  economics  health  medicine  insurance  policy  government  incentives 
july 2009 by tsuomela
Ascription is an Anathema to any Enthusiasm › Moral Hazard Pay
The change of control clauses in executive contracts are part and parcel of the “bribe the pirate” pattern seen in publicly traded companies. Given the desire of shareholders to have executives to take large amounts of risk, since that shareholders can diversify away most of that, you do two things: let them share the upside, remove the down side.
business  ethics  moral-hazard  morality  piracy  corporation  principal-agent  incentives 
march 2009 by tsuomela
Interfluidity :: Tax clawbacks: doing it right
The requirements of the Constitution seem perfectly consistent with imposing a clawback that permanently alters the incentives of the people who run systemically important banks. A good law would be both retrospective and prospective. It would help defray the costs of the current crisis while firmly establishing the principle that the individuals who run critical financial institutions can be decompensated if they let those institutions melt down on their watch. The analogy to Superfund is quite close, I think.
economics  crisis  bonus  aig  taxes  policy  regulation  incentives 
march 2009 by tsuomela
Social Production, the Good Life, and the Ways of Desire « Easily Distracted
"I’d still argue that a sense that the material world around us is dense in objects and spectacle, that we have a sense of what I’ve called fecundity, is important to middle-class well-being." and more nuanced thoughts on consumerism and excess.
consumerism  middle-class  class  social-production  social  economics  incentives  culture 
march 2009 by tsuomela
Stumbling and Mumbling: Rational group delusions
Benabou shows how groupthink can spread even if individuals are rational. Let’s say your boss and a few of his associates get a damn fool idea ... What do you do?
You could speak up. But the costs of this might be high
psychology  group  behavior  groupthink  bias  rational  economics  business  hierarchy  incentives  whistleblowing  inertia 
march 2009 by tsuomela / Comment / Opinion - How bank bonuses let us all down
Here you can see that this mismatch between the bonus payment frequency (typically, one year) and the time to blow up (about five to 20 years) is the cause of the accumulation of positions that hide risk by betting massively against small odds. As traders say, they have the “free option” on their performance: they get the profits, not the losses. I hold that this vicious asymmetry is the driving factor behind investment banking.
economics  crisis  bailout  finance  financial-services  incentives  talent  rewards  ceo  income 
february 2009 by tsuomela
Principal-agent problem - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In political science and economics, the principal-agent problem or agency dilemma treats the difficulties that arise under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information when a principal hires an agent.
economics  political-science  wikipedia  reference  agents  principal-agent  problems  incentives 
january 2009 by tsuomela
Persephone's Box: On Being Happy and/or Good
I propose that what we find pleasurable, what makes us happy, is determined by the axis of two dispositions: conscience and drive. My argument on the relationship between virtue and happiness rests on the premise that where we are on the continuum of each is primarily innate.
philosophy  environment  behavior  incentives  values  psychology  pleasure 
january 2009 by tsuomela
Stumbling and Mumbling: What nationalization misses
the clampdown (pdf) on bank executives’ pay mistakes the symptom for the disease. The disease is that owners have given bosses too much autonomy, in the belief - now proven to be false - that a single individual, or small group, has the know-how to control a complex organization. Big payouts for bosses are just the effect of giving them excessive power.
Everyone knows centrally planned economies are a stinkingly bad idea. The lesson of the collapse of many banks is that centrally planned companies are also a bad idea. And they’re a bad idea for the same reason - that, in complex organisms such as economies or big companies, fragmented and tacit knowledge cannot be centralized, and “leadership“ often degenerates into mere rent-seeking.
economics  regulation  money  rewards  incentives  rent  business  salary 
october 2008 by tsuomela
Why Share in Peer-to-Peer Networks : Deep Blue at the University of Michigan
We explore two possible explanations: private provision of public goods and generalized reciprocity. We investigate a particular form of private incentives to share content: redistributing traffic in the network to the advantage of the sharing peer.
p2p  commons  sharing  public-goods  reciprocity  incentive-centered-design  incentives 
july 2008 by tsuomela

Copy this bookmark:

to read