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tsuomela : reasoning   43

This is the best book to help you understand the wild 2016 campaign - Vox
"Back in May, Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels released Democracy for Realists, based on years of scholarship they’ve done on the ugly realities of how American voting behavior really works. It sheds crucial light on a question that liberals have been banging their heads over for months — why on earth would anyone vote for Donald Trump? Their analysis is both troubling and important: Throughout history, people in general have cast their votes for no particularly good reason at all, so there’s no reason to expect Trump supporters to be any different. "
book  review  political-science  democracy  voting  psychology  reasoning  decision-making  cognition 
october 2016 by tsuomela
What’s the liberal equivalent of climate denial? - Vox
"So here's one way to potentially unite Krugman, Chait and Kahan: Republicans and Democrats are similarly prone to partisan self-deception on the individual level, but the weakness of the Republican Party establishment has left the Democratic Party more capable of checking its worst impulses on the national level."
politics  motivated-cognition  reasoning  liberal  conservative  bias  partisanship  political-science  fringes 
april 2014 by tsuomela
Why do people pay for useless advice? Implications of gambler's and hot-hand fallacies in false-expert settingsIZA - Institute for the Study of Labor
"We investigated experimentally whether people can be induced to believe in a non-existent expert, and subsequently pay for what can only be described as transparently useless advice about future chance events. Consistent with the theoretical predictions made by Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010), we show empirically that the answer is yes and that the size of the error made systematically by people is large. "
economics  research  statistics  probability  expertise  reasoning  chance  bias  prediction  cognition 
june 2012 by tsuomela
Are the Left and Right Equally Biased?–Debating Dan Kahan
"My guest was Yale’s Dan Kahan, who was also on the show a year earlier, discussing his cultural cognition model. This is a very powerful and increasingly influential account of how different ideological groups–hierarchs, individualists, egalitarians, communitarians–are biased towards rejecting science on particular topics that are, shall we say, in their emotionally defensive “zones.”

Kahan ascribes this to motivated reasoning--e.g., our preexisting emotional commitments, or group commitments, skew our reading of evidence (scientific or otherwise) and lead us to elaborately defend our prior commitments. And because hierarchical-individualists have a very different vision of the “good” society and how it is organized than do egalitarian-communitarians, they accordingly reason very differently about scientific issues that threaten their values (like global warming) than do those on the other side."
politics  psychology  motivated-cognition  reasoning  group  cognition  bias 
april 2012 by tsuomela
The Argumentative Theory | Conversation | Edge
""The article,” Haidt said, "is a review of a puzzle that has bedeviled researchers in cognitive psychology and social cognition for a long time. The puzzle is, why are humans so amazingly bad at reasoning in some contexts, and so amazingly good in others?"

"Reasoning was not designed to pursue the truth. Reasoning was designed by evolution to help us win arguments. That's why they call it The Argumentative Theory of Reasoning. So, as they put it, "The evidence reviewed here shows not only that reasoning falls quite short of reliably delivering rational beliefs and rational decisions. It may even be, in a variety of cases, detrimental to rationality. Reasoning can lead to poor outcomes, not because humans are bad at it, but because they systematically strive for arguments that justify their beliefs or their actions. This explains the confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, and reason-based choice, among other things.""
cognition  psychology  bias  decision-making  argument  evolution  rationality  reasoning  theory  confirmation-bias  belief  justification 
may 2011 by tsuomela
How do morals change? : Article : Nature
Emotions such as empathy and disgust might be at the root of morality, but psychologists should also study the roles of deliberation and debate in how our opinions shift over time, argues Paul Bloom.
morality  ethics  philosophy  psychology  emotion  reasoning  deliberation 
april 2010 by tsuomela
George Lakoff: Why "Rational Reason" Doesn't Work in Contemporary Politics |
Lakoff adds to his theory the distinction between real and false reason. "Real reason is embodied in two ways. It is physical, in our brain circuitry. And it is based on our bodies as the function in the everyday world, using thought that arises from embodied metaphors. And it is mostly unconscious. False reason sees reason as fully conscious, as literal, disembodied, yet somehow fitting the world directly, and working not via frame-based, metaphorical, narrative and emotional logic, but via the logic of logicians alone."
metaphor  politics  distributed  cognition  embodiment  physical  neuroscience  conservatism  enlightenment  reasoning  rationality  reason 
march 2010 by tsuomela
The Reality-Based Community: The Passions and the Interests
This reasoning, though, is brutal--too brutal to acknowledge. While we're a pretty selfish country, "I'm all right, Jack" is not an argument people comfortably make when others' lives are at stake. But "if this passes, they'll euthanize me and my friends" is another kind of argument altogether. It's false, but easy to seize on as a morally comfortable pretext for opposing a bill that threatens one's self-interest.
reasoning  psychology  politics  rationalization  age  selfishness  justification  elderly  town-hall  protests  disruption 
august 2009 by tsuomela
Overcoming Bias : How Wrong Can We Be?
This all seems to add up to a consistent expert consensus that humans quite often, perhaps even usually, just don’t know why they do what they do. And this is extremely disturbing, as it calls into question our own opinions about why we do what we do.
reason  reasoning  bias  model  economics  failure  cognitive-science  mistakes  cognition 
august 2009 by tsuomela
Less Wrong: Why You're Stuck in a Narrative
Essentially, the narrative fallacy is our tendency to turn everything we see into a story - a linear chain of cause and effect, with a beginning and an end. Obviously the real world isn't like this - events are complex and interrelated, direct causation is extremely rare, and outcomes are probabilistic. Verbally, we know this - the hard part, as always, is convincing our brain of the fact.
bias  psychology  narrative  story-telling  fallacy  reasoning 
august 2009 by tsuomela
Less Wrong: Atheism = Untheism Antitheism
Hunter-gatherer superstition isn't much like what we think of as "religion". Early Westerners often derided it as not really being religion at all, and they were right, in my opinion. In the hunter-gatherer stage the supernatural agents aren't particularly moral, or charged with enforcing any rules
religion  anthropology  archaeology  philosophy  atheism  theology  reasoning  epistemology 
july 2009 by tsuomela
Gunnar Olsson: Abysmal - a Critique of Cartographic Reason
People rely on reason to think about and navigate the abstract world of human relations in much the same way they rely on maps to study and traverse the physical world. Starting from that simple observation, renowned geographer Gunnar Olsson offers in Abysmal an astonishingly erudite critique of the way human thought and action have become deeply immersed in the rhetoric of cartography and how this cartographic reasoning allows the powerful to map out other people’s lives.
book  philosophy  mapping  cartography  reason  reasoning  rationality  metaphor  psychology 
june 2009 by tsuomela
[cs/0406061] The Complexity of Agreement
A celebrated 1976 theorem of Aumann asserts that honest, rational Bayesian agents with common priors will never "agree to disagree": if their opinions about any topic are common knowledge, then those opinions must be equal. Economists have written numerous papers examining the assumptions behind this theorem. But two key questions went unaddressed: first, can the agents reach agreement after a conversation of reasonable length? Second, can the computations needed for that conversation be performed efficiently? This paper answers both questions in the affirmative, thereby strengthening Aumann's original conclusion.
reasoning  rationality  bayes  probability  philosophy  agreement  disagreement 
may 2009 by tsuomela
TheMoneyIllusion » Does Bryan Caplan believe in free trade?
Another way of putting my point was that I was primarily interested in a methodological question
philosophy  methodology  methods  hypothetical  utilitarianism  moral  reasoning 
april 2009 by tsuomela
Public Reason - Home
Public Reason is a peer-reviewed journal of political and moral philosophy. Public Reason publishes articles, book reviews, as well as discussion notes from all the fields of political philosophy and ethics, including political theory, applied ethics, and legal philosophy. The Journal encourages the debate around rationality in politics and ethics in the larger context of the discussion concerning rationality as a philosophical problem.
online  journal  philosophy  reason  reasoning  public  public-sphere  rationality  open-access 
march 2009 by tsuomela
The Problem of Induction (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Until about the middle of the previous century induction was treated as a quite specific method of inference: inference of a universal affirmative proposition (All swans are white) from its instances (a is a white swan, b is a white swan, etc.) The method had also a probabilistic form, in which the conclusion stated a probabilistic connection between the properties in question. It is no longer possible to think of induction in such a restricted way
philosophy  logic  reasoning  encyclopedia  thinking 
january 2009 by tsuomela
Defeasible Reasoning (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Reasoning is defeasible when the corresponding argument is rationally compelling but not deductively valid. The truth of the premises of a good defeasible argument provide support for the conclusion, even though it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. In other words, the relationship of support between premises and conclusion is a tentative one, potentially defeated by additional information.
philosophy  logic  encyclopedia  reasoning  inference 
january 2009 by tsuomela
Touchstone Archives: The Skeptical Inquirer
Unbelievers think that skepticism is their special virtue, the key virtue believers lack. Bolstered by bestselling authors, they see the skeptical and scientific mind as muscular thinking, which the believer has failed to develop. He could bulk up if he
religion  faith  reasoning  science  skepticism  atheism 
june 2008 by tsuomela

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